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Abstract
Walden queers its readers. While many have investigated Thoreau’s
queerness, there has been little notice of Walden’s queerness. This project begins
with a situational analysis that identifies the melancholic antecedents of Walden in
Thoreau’s life and his choices that led to the illumination of his melancholia.
Thoreau had already been experimenting with what Branka Arsić identified as
“literalization.” Nevertheless, a period of crisis, detailed by Robert Milder, made him
aware of what Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok have referred to as the
melancholic’s blind skill of “demetaphorization.” I suggest that Thoreau exploited
this skill to produce Walden’s unique ability to feed on and, as Henry Abelove and
Henry Golemba have suggested, awaken its reader’s desires. I combine a close
reading of Walden with selective study of the text’s reception. Walden delivers on
Thoreau’s theory of friendship from his first book, A Week on the Concord and
Merrimack Rivers. Walden’s friendship with its reader is the agency that
accomplishes what Henry Golemba and Lawrence Buell have noted as a blurring of
the boundary between reader and text. To investigate this friendship and Walden’s
accommodations of faux friendship, I construct a Burkean perspective by
incongruity using research in the nature-writing and rhetoric disciplines that
intersect with Thoreauvian studies. This incongruity is analyzed using not only
Burke’s theories of literary form and literature as equipment for living, but also
Deleuze’s process philosophy and Deleuze and Guattari’s analyses of the war
machine and their spatial analysis. This project complexifies Erin Rand’s research on
polemics, using Deleuze’s multiplicity not only to explain why polemics are
unpredictable, but also to address what Sarah Hallenbeck has referred to as “the
crisis of agency.” I suggest an expansion of José Esteban Muñoz’s research. The
question of how one actually transitions from melancholia to disidentification
cannot be adequately answered with terms like Stuart Hall’s ‘oppositional reading’
or Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘de/reterritorialization.’ I also suggest that queer utopian
thinking and poststructuralism are more compatible than previously argued. This
dissertation is itself a polemic, straining the possibilities of friendship in the service
of queerness.
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Introduction: Reawakening Desire with Wild Readings
On July 10, 2012, the 195th anniversary of Henry David Thoreau’s birth, Ken
Butigan analyzed a recent act of protest (2012). Before I discuss the details, consider
the analysis:
The power of Thoreau’s archetypal civil disobedience action over a century
and a half ago rings through this one: withdrawing consent from the state’s
policies that offend core values and one’s own conscience; doing so by
delivering the message “in person,” using the most powerful language at our
disposal, the vulnerable but resisting body; the potential effect which
conscientious, centered and nonviolent action can have on those carrying out
the policies in question and on those who chafe under them, as well as the
larger population of self-described bystanders. (para. 8)
Butigan’s quote “in person” as the touchstone of Thoreauvian protest comes from
Thoreau’s essay “Resistance to Civil Government” (1849, p. 198). This display of
conscience usually finds its way into the examples of Mohandas Gandhi and Rev. Dr.
Martin Luther King Jr. to describe protests involving thousands. However, the act of
protest that inspired Butigan to write involved only two protesters during an act
that, by itself, could not hope to produce an official acknowledgement. Instead, the
motive of the protest was a simple expression of their desire; a desire that state law
held to be illegitimate.
Seven days prior to Butigan’s article, Mark Jiminez and Beau Chandler,
residents of Dallas, Texas, went to the county clerk’s office to get married. They
knew, contrary to their mutual love, that they would be turned away. They brought
no weapons and raised no voices in anger. They simply informed the media and
their allies, which were present with cameras recording. As Butigan reports, “The
men are composed and clear” (para. 7). The clerk’s comments are inaudible to the
camera. However, the response is not: “That’s very unfortunate for us because we
love each other and want to get married” (michturn, 2012). The two men then
handcuffed themselves to each other, calmly sat on the floor in the middle of the
room, and waited, married together by steel. When the office staff announced that
the office was closing and that everyone had to leave, Jiminez calmly said that they
would remain until they received a marriage license. The next video record shows
the two men being escorted out of the lobby in police custody. The two men posted
bond later that night, and were received with applause by Dallas LGBTQ activists.
“Unfortunate” is an apt adjective. These men risked a $2,000 fine and had to
wait nearly three more years for the Supreme Court to legitimate their desire to
marry (Butigan, 2012). Even after Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), opponents continue
to deny the legitimacy of same sex marriage (Yuhas & Dart, 2015). It would seem
foolish for Jiminez and Chandler to risk arrest and penalty knowing that the office
would not grant their request. However, that was not their motive. They showed us
through “the perception and the performance of right” (Thoreau, 1849, p. 197) that
the status quo was, to use Jiminez’s word, unfortunate.
Activists have a long relationship with Thoreau’s logic. Mohandas Gandhi,
who was integral in India’s struggle for independence, found his writings to be
1

useful in explaining the merits of his nonviolent resistance method. Rev. Dr. Martin
Luther Link Jr. famously credits Thoreau for inspiring his lifelong pursuit of social
justice that led to the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Thoreau has been philosophically
recruited for the benefit of famous civil rights giants, and he continues to serve in
that capacity.
In addition to illuminating the well-known episodes of civil rights activism in
our history books, he has also served as a champion of the average person
struggling for the right to speak honestly. Maggie Sullivan Murphy, in a response to a
pro-rape meetup group in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, had this to write
concerning Thoreau’s contribution:
I think that it's important to do more than speak politely to evil. Many people,
much more noble than I, used various tactics to disrupt groups like these.
Disruption is part of the non-violent protest action described and utilized by
Thoreau, Gandhi, King and most recently, Black Lives Matter. If they have the
right to assemble and use hate speech, then I have the right to assemble and
be as obnoxious as humanly possible. (quoted by Dinan, 2016, para. 2)
This rhetoric of “counter friction,” to borrow a phrase from Thoreau (1849, p. 198),
continues today. In the gay marriage protest article discussed above, Butigan finds
that the wisdom behind Thoreau’s political philosophy is that it focuses on
individual choices: the quest for social justice does not hinge on one’s ability to
mobilize voters, silence opposition, and conform to a standard model for historical
movements. Instead, the quest for social justice hinges on the existence of a
multitude of singular examples of conscience in the midst of injustice.
Thoreau has been used countless times as a symbol of protest, and vast
scholarship reveals this legacy, but his works train us to do more than that. Besides
“Resistance to Civil Government,” Thoreau’s famous masterpiece, Walden, provides
other resources—queer resources—that take us beyond the norms of protest.
Walden subsumes the point of civil disobedience, albeit in a different style of
writing, and it goes farther. “Resistance to Civil Government” is a treatise, one
written straightforward in the vein of Thoreau’s lecture on that topic. Walden
contains, among many things, an allegory of an individual placed under arrest by a
tax collector, of a naturalist with a queer interest in two colonies of ants engaged in
heroic struggle. These two anecdotes capture Thoreau’s thesis on civil disobedience,
which uses disengagement and nonviolent confrontation to boycott unethical social
practices and by that absence induce others to take notice. However, Walden offers
more than simply a mythos for reinforcing the stock theory of civil protest that is
often articulated in schools. More than announcing a duty, Walden works.
In Walden, Thoreau’s infectious queerness makes his contribution special.
Thoreau was writing during the middle of the 19th Century, the era of our westward
expansion. This colonization of the hinterland required new families to produce
children, new farms to grow food, new roads and railroads to market resources, new
communication technologies to integrate it, and everything that stood in the way of
this burgeoning expansion of the American empire was treated with disdain (Howe,
2007; Sellers, 1991). Walden praises none of the familial values that American
society came to expect from her writers (Abelove, 2003). Henry Abelove has found
2

ample evidence of Thoreau’s queer reception (p. 29). For instance, the Boston Globe,
in reviewing Thoreau’s Walden, wrote, “The author had not, even in his imagination,
peopled his hut at the pond ‘with a loving and beloved wife and blooming children’”
(p. 29). The National Era openly wondered how long society would last if they
“squatted on solitary duck-ponds, eschewing matrimony” and “casting off all ties of
family” (p. 29). It is no surprise that Thoreau’s contemporaries criticized him for
being “eccentric” (p. 29). But you will not find that criticism within Walden.
After Thoreau’s death, Ralph Waldo Emerson tried to erase this public
perception of Thoreau’s eccentricity, replacing that appearance with one that was
unfriendly, political, and cerebral (Harding, 1995). This move loses touch with the
enormously wide breadth of Thoreau’s desires, such as his fascination with the
absurd antics of squirrels, his awe at the repeated patterns found in both sand and
leaves, his empathy for the deep melancholies of owls, the ways in which a pond can
resemble a giant eye gazing into the cosmos, his faith-like confidence that we could
measure all of it. Thoreau was not afraid of society, nor was he unfriendly. He
desired to see the men and boys in town, and recounted his asexual attempt to
seduce a woodchopper in the safety of his cabin (Abelove, 2003, pp. 34-36). Thoreau
passionately felt that each person had an important part to play in the cosmic
drama, and he pursued his own with the awareness that he had a duty to respect the
ability of others to do the same, even if that means giving the reader special
interpretive license (Buell, 1995; Golemba, 1990).
The lasting power of Walden is not the specific issues that Thoreau spoke to
in his time or how it equips individuals to oppose public culture; rather, Walden
remains durable because of the manner in which his queer method cultivated a
reawakening of individual desire (Abelove, 2003, p. 37; Golemba, 1990). Civil
disobedience is a common ingredient that reminds individuals that they should not
sponsor state efforts to obstruct individual desire, but civil disobedience is only the
beginning of one man’s contribution to a project of awakening that can be traced to
the Stoics and continues today among process philosophers. Consider a few effects
of Walden that exceed the rubric of civil disobedience. Amy Wang, a teacher in
Oregon, interpreted Walden as a self-help tutorial for people living with the special
needs of autism (2015). She found wisdom in his careful placement of an abode far
enough from the town to avoid crowds, but close enough to foster frequent
interpersonal encounters. Alexandra Nicewicz Carroll, rejecting the practice of New
Years Resolutions, suggested that we replace the Resolution with an Intention, citing
Thoreau. She quoted Thoreau’s Walden: “Go confidently in the direction of your
dreams. Live the life you have imagined.”1 Reading Thoreau’s story as merely an
exercise in resistance seems far removed from a person who, in truth, was squatting
on his friend’s land (with his permission) in order to study, write, and find his own
way (Harding, 1982).
Although Carroll (2015, para. 12) misquotes Thoreau, her attribution is a
paraphrase of the following passage from Walden: “If one advances confidently in
the direction of his dreams, and endeavors to live the life which he has imagined, he
will meet with a success unexpected in common hours” (1985, p. 580).
1

3

The Supreme Court’s affirmation of gay marriage rights in the United States,
like Thoreau’s civil disobedience, is just one step in the collaborative quest for
desire. Queer folk still face reproach and violent denial, and moving from civil
disobedience to Walden coincides with another step in United States queer
advocacy. LGBTQ employees have limited state-level legal protections in the United
States. This does not account for legal attempts that are underway in various states
and cities to roll back protections that already exist. In 2015, anti-trans advocates in
Houston, Texas, repealed an ordinance that allowed transpeople to use bathrooms
that match their gender identities (Lett, 2015). This repeal has encouraged North
Carolina to pass sweeping anti-LGBTQ legislation, which has only recently been
repealed, only to give private businesses the freedom to discriminate against
nonconforming individuals. Numerous studies have shown that transgender and
gender nonconforming people face high percentages of the population who see their
expressions as illegitimate, and this scorn has been linked to high rates of
depression and suicide (Haas, Rodgers, & Herman, 2014). The freedom of gays and
lesbians to pursue their dreams leaves much to be desired.
Exigence
Most activists and Thoreauvian scholars have remained within the confines
of civil disobedience and have not graduated to the ways that Walden reawakens
desire (Abelove, 2003, p. 37; Golemba, 1990). This has happened for a few reasons.
The first reason is practical. The ways in which civil disobedience can be exploited
in political contexts are vast, and activists on both sides of queer politics will be able
to draw upon its heuristic for the foreseeable future. Queer people can be
disobedient in many ways, but it should be pointed out that opponents of queer
advocacy are also aware of Thoreau’s political philosophy (Lopez, 2015), and the
recent rollbacks of queer rights demonstrate that civil disobedience is insufficient.
The second reason is theoretical. The vast majority of research on Walden positions
it in terms of its ecological possibilities and as an extension of civil disobedience,
rather than the queer way it provides a robust and erotic model for living. Few
academics have tested Walden in terms of queer advocacy. There is a nascent field
that bridges ecology and queer studies, but its connection to Thoreau remains
tenuous.2
Thoreauvian studies has mostly failed to exploit Walden’s queer mission to
reawaken desire because it does not take queer desire seriously as a force worthy of
consideration. There are two reasons for this, but they both have to do with the old
American avoidance of queerness. The first reason is a general lack of attention.
Queer studies has, until recently, remained at the periphery of academic study, and
queerness is perhaps forever out of alignment with heteronormative culture
(Warner, 2002). In addition to this general lack of service, specific failures to notice
the queerness of Thoreau and others have affected research trajectories. For
Catriona Mortimer-Sandilands and Bruce Erickson’s (2010) introduction to their
anthology on queer ecology mentions Thoreau only once in passing in a singleparagraph review of 19th century literature.
2
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example, Robert Richardson’s biography of Thoreau, perhaps the most recent
(1986) source on the man’s life, made no mention of Thoreau’s queerness, and this
lack has filtered to every other secondary source that relied on Richardson. In
addition, even though Michael Warner has focused on Thoreau’s alleged
homosexuality (1992), he has continued to analyze Walden as a force that opposes
common sense rather than as a champion for the enabling of desire (2002). Another
more disturbing example is the reception of Francis Matthiessen’s American
Renaissance (1941 as cited by Abelove, 2003). This book, arguably one of the most
important seminal texts of American studies, helped establish America as part of the
university curriculum and made America’s literature worthy of examination in
political and historical disciplines (Abelove, 2003). However, the reception of the
text was qualified with an “edginess, reserve, and wariness” of “an erotic focus in the
book, a focus that is somehow obtrusive though never quite explicit” (pp. 61-62).
Henry Abelove continued:
What is inexplicit, what is merely suggested, is the question the book frames
without asking: what was the erotic meaning of that democracy, the erotic
dynamic, the ties, affections, affiliations, that bound together those white
men, supposititiously equal, supposititiously brothers, who were the
privileged subjects of the old republic? And if we could know that erotic
dynamic, would we know something pertinent to the tasks of improving and
deepening and expanding and advancing and even reconstructing democracy
in the present. (pp. 62-63)
The fact that American Renaissance was published in 1941 made it impossible for
Matthiessen to discuss his desires openly. Matthiessen’s homosexuality has been
well documented in retrospect (Steinberg, 2009). The reception of Matthiessen’s
American Renaissance is a representative anecdote of a refusal to take queer desires
seriously as anything more than as a gadfly of popular culture. Finally, with respect
to Thoreauvian studies, its inattention to Thoreau’s erotics has given the majority of
its literature a prominent blind spot.
Literature Review
This review addresses relevant intersections of Thoreau with and between
queer studies, rhetoric, and ecology. In this review, I first discuss the attention
Thoreau has received in queer studies. Second, I confront an issue over the
definition of ‘queer’ in queer rhetoric. Third, I review the rhetorical research on
Thoreau. Fourth, I discuss ecology’s attention to Walden as environmental literature.
Fifth, I address queer ecology’s emphasis on melancholic writing. I conclude the
review by identifying research questions that focus on the relationship between
melancholic writing and Walden’s queer rhetorical form.
Queer Studies
Henry Abelove represents queer studies’ interest in Thoreau. He conducted a
reception study of Walden and identified Thoreau’s queer turn away from sexual
reproduction. In this section, I present Abelove’s position to reveal an odd polysemy

5

around the salience of Thoreau’s sexuality that has problematized the meaning of
queer.
Modern readers are quick to dismiss Thoreau as an antisocial bore, but this
prejudice is premature. According to Abelove (2003), after Walden’s publication in
1854, reviewers complained that Thoreau’s literary persona was eccentric and
selfish (pp. 29-30). These derogations stemmed from Walden’s conspicuous silence
about marriage, domesticity, and sex (p. 30). This offended the values of Thoreau’s
contemporaries, and Emerson stepped in to erase the rumor that Thoreau was
affectionate with the young men in Concord (pp. 31-32). Emerson’s interference
with Thoreau’s oeuvre has been well established,3 but it is still an open question as
to how much of Thoreau’s hermit persona was really a person who saved his
affections for other men. Fortunately, Thoreau was able to preserve a few cleverly
hidden clues in Walden, found by Abelove, that reveal a different kind of person than
a sour misanthrope.
Walden reveals that Thoreau had a mature network of friends. He could be
intellectually seductive, not only with his friends, but also with his written audience.
Thoreau visited the village “to see the men and boys” (1985, p. 456 as quoted by
Abelove, 2003, p. 35). In addition, Thoreau received visitors at his cabin. The most
notable record in Walden of one of these visits is with a woodchopper. According to
Abelove (2003), “No other person who appears in Walden is so extensively
described” (p. 35). Thoreau identified the color and texture of his sunburned neck,
the leather of his boots, and his slapstick behavior (p. 35). When the woodchopper
visits, they read literature (p. 35). Thoreau’s choice, Homer, is extraordinary
because he has the woodchopper read a portion from The Iliad, in Greek, where
Achilles is consoling his grieving lover (Patroclus), reminding him that many of their
friends are still alive (p. 36). The woodchopper, who can pronounce Greek, reads the
words, and Thoreau translates (p. 35). This, for Abelove, is the seductive
relationship that Thoreau establishes with his reader:
Throughout Walden Thoreau repeatedly asks his readers the same question
that he translates from Homer for the woodchopper: Why so unnecessarily
sad? Why so unnecessarily discontented? Just as Thoreau tries to arouse the
woodchopper, so he tries to arouse his readers to what he again and again
calls “life.” Just as he hands the woodchopper a book, so he does to his
readers, and as readers we are therefore all positioned, regardless of our
gender or sexual taste, as the objects of a homosexual seduction. In addition,
the more successfully we are enabled to read Walden, that is, the farther we
get beyond just sounding the letters, the more willing we show ourselves. (p.
36)
Harding (1995) explains: “Emerson believed that Thoreau’s greatest claim to fame
was as a Stoic, and he tended to overemphasize the cold and the negative in his
portrait; indeed, he so overdid it that he inadvertently turned many people away
from Thoreau. Several years later when he came to edit Thoreau’s Letters to Various
Persons (1965), he did the same thing again, editing out of the letters anything that
showed warmth and human kindness” (p. 5).
3
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We do not know the wood-chopper’s sexual orientation, and so the reader knows
nothing more than his words: “That’s good” (Thoreau, 1985, p. 437 as quoted by
Abelove, 2003, p. 36). At that moment, Thoreau was not a misanthrope, but was
instead seductive of others (p. 36) and a queer inducer of melancholia.
Thoreau was not gay, but he was queer. It is tempting to pigeonhole Thoreau
as gay or bisexual by virtue of the suggestiveness of this exchange. It is important to
remember that Thoreau was critical of sensuality and found the woodchopper to be
particularly sensual, but not vicious or diseased. Nevertheless, Thoreau’s choice of
literary moment has given Abelove ample cause to interpret Thoreau as he did.
Since I have a different reading here, this leads to a queer polysemy. Does queer
have a sexual denotation, as many people in the LGBTQ community assert, or does it
refer to the establishment of difference?
Queer Rhetoric
Queer rhetoric subscribes to both essential and process perspectives. ‘Queer’
can refer to an audience’s interpretation of queerness. It can also refer to the way
that an act of communication is done. In this section, I discuss this split, and then I
adopt a process perspective for my interpretation of Walden.
What does queer mean? Queer rhetoric indicates that the answer depends on
how the word is used. Some argue that it involves sex, while others deny that it is
necessary to sex queerness.4 Queer is, in fact, an essentially contested concept
(Jackman, 2010). The primal wedge that divides definitions is the part of speech to
which queer belongs. Queer is a noun, an adjective, and a verb. Although these parts
are permeable and do not exhaust its possibilities, I use them as an entrance into the
topic of definition.
On one hand, queer tends to have an anti-normative essence when used as a
noun or as an adjective. Each person is a lens that selects examples of queer people
and objects judged against his or her conception of queerness (Bessette, 2016; West,
2013). Today, queer people and objects are different than or resistant to
heteronormativity (Dunn, 2011). By their very existence, queers “trouble sexual
normalcy and its discriminations” (Morris, 2006, p. 147) by being, like the young
Abraham Lincoln, “different, awkward, oddly demonstrative” (Morris, 2013, p. 407).
On the other hand, when queer is a verb, it is something that is done. To
queer something is to change it to being not normal (Morris, 2007a), and the
meaning of normal is by no means a settled issue (Bessette, 2016). The use of queer
as a verb does not always have the sexual denotation, although this often does
happen today. It can also be defined by its ability to do queer work, particularly to
other ideas (Rand, 2013b). In particular, an act of queering “play[s] norms against
one another” (West, 2013, p. 540) and may even produce readings of texts that are
at variance from the intentions of authors (Dunn, 2011).
Erin Rand (2008) has provided one example of this non-sexual deployment
of queering that I use to analyze Walden. She has developed criteria for the
Some scholarship declines to define queer altogether. See Morris (2007b, 2015a,
2015b).
4
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rhetorical form of polemics and argued that the polemic is a queer rhetorical form.
Rand’s queering of the polemic enables a queer analysis of Walden’s form.
Rand’s analysis of the polemic as queer falls on the verb side of the
definitional wedge because she categorizes the polemic as a rhetorical form. This
move is different from traditional analyses of the polemic because a rhetorical form
is supposed to have nothing to do with semantic content (Rand, 2008, p. 301) and
everything to do with how the speech act is carried out (pp. 298-299). Rand argued
that there are “four specific features that are unique to the polemical form” (p. 301).
The possibility that Walden is a polemic is provocative, but even more
interesting is the fact that Rand found the polemic to be a queer rhetorical form, a
form marked with unpredictability. For Rand, the “unpredictable relationship
between an intending agent and the effects of an action” (p. 312) makes a rhetorical
form queer. Because of their volatility and their risky flouting of the conventions of
argumentation, “the characteristics of polemics make them especially prone to being
put to unforeseen uses” (p. 310). They serve as a foil for more “complex, rational,
and theoretically based language” elsewhere (p. 311). Polemics provoke people to
make space for communication. In other words, the “‘failure’ of a polemic to do
exactly as its author intended is thus the very resource for its productivity” (p. 313).
Thoreau’s ‘intentions’ have been violated in unpredictable ways. The
stereotyped purpose of Walden’s rhetoric is to catalogue Thoreau’s stay at Walden
Pond. However, this stereotype is at variance with the users of Walden, some of
whom I have already discussed in the introduction. To provide a more thorough
answer to why this has occurred, I turn to rhetorical studies.
Rhetoric
Rhetorical studies shows that Walden’s meaning is wildly unpredictable
because it contains an unusual narrative structure and was written in an unusual
style. This narrative and style evolved during a period of melancholia that Thoreau
experienced over many years in his early life. In this section, I review the rhetorical
forms that have already been identified and discuss the details of Thoreau’s
melancholia.
Walden’s unusual nature derives from the way in which it features multiple
voices that contrast with Thoreau’s persona. Henry Golemba (1990) argued that
Walden’s Thoreau strategically poses as a model individualist, constraining him to
downplay his cooperative side. In addition, Thoreau incorporated a variety of voices
into his text, and it is difficult to isolate them individually (Buell, 1995; Bickman,
1992). This fusion, which has been regarded as a Bakhtinian carnival (Schueller,
1986), creates a “language of paradox, ambiguity, oxymoron, indirection, and
exaggeration” that provides a fertile field for reader interpretation (Golemba, 1990,
p. 203).
These multiple voices in Walden produce a provocative language. The
fertility in this field of interpretation permits the reader to run in unanticipated
directions with unsanctioned meaning. Thoreau goads the reader to take flights of
interpretation by speaking a “language of desire” (p. 233, p. 234). Taking an analogy
from Thoreau’s old correspondent, Harrison Blake, Golemba argued that this
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language of desire feels like a posted letter that has not quite yet arrived (p. 228).
This feeling of not quite having arrived fosters anxiety that induces the reader to
recover something that has been lost (p. 228), and that recovery, wherever it comes
from, becomes Walden’s interpretation.
Robert Milder (1995) reads many of these voices in Walden as the various
stages of Thoreau’s development. After exhaustive research into Thoreau’s prolific
journal and draft manuscripts of Walden, Milder concluded that Walden is more
than Thoreau’s portrait of reality, circa 1854. It combines both a narrated story and
an enacted story (p. 54) tracing and retracing his development, his painful lessons
and failures, and intimates a humbled student of nature who still had more to learn
(p. 55).
The multiple Thoreaus presented in Walden are arranged to form a complex
set of sequences, each of which expose different developments and tensions.
Walden’s genius, argued Milder, lies in the complex organization of these lessons
and cleverly hidden questions. As Milder argued, these lessons and questions are
imbricated in specific agon clusters that showcase specific struggles, Thoreau’s
failure to reconcile these struggles, and the lessons that he gleaned. Milder’s analysis
of these tensions coalesce around at least three clusters: one’s freedom, one’s purity,
and one’s relationship with the world.
Milder found that many of these complex sequences came about because of a
profound crisis that occurred between 1849 and 1854. This is the time period
between Thoreau’s first and second book publications (pp. 52-53). As Fink (1992)
and Milder (1995) have pointed out, the impetus for this crisis had something to do
with the fact that his first published book, A Week on the Concord and Merrimack
Rivers, was a humiliating failure. That book is about loss: the loss of not only his
close brother John in 1842, but also the loss of a pastoral image of America from his
youth. Failing such a personal debut project must have been devastating. However,
perhaps what truly made this time period a crisis for Thoreau was the fact that this
failure snowballed into a rift between him and his mentor and owner of Walden
Pond, Ralph Waldo Emerson (Milder, 1995).
Thoreau’s crisis, his estrangement from Emerson, occurred because A Week
established Thoreau’s public disagreement with Emerson’s philosophy of
Transcendentalism. Emerson held that the great moral and eternal truths that
guided humanity were located within each individual mind, and that each of us had
a duty to reach within ourselves to find and share these truths. A Week was a
spectacular departure from Emerson, finding the fount of truth not within each
person, but within the whole of nature itself, which included the human mind. For
whatever reason, Emerson warmly supported Thoreau’s final manuscript before
publication, urging him to publish it on credit (Fink, 1992). However, after
publication, Emerson turned about-face and refused to write a review of it (p. 248).
This rebuke intensified Thoreau’s downward spiral because Emerson’s silence
served to wave the writing industry away from Thoreau, condemning him to
oblivion. Thoreau published A Week at his own expense, and he was barely able to
make his debt payments by working in his father’s pencil factory and doing hard
work outdoors as a surveyor (Milder, 1995, p. 99).
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Thoreau’s embarrassment led to a painful distancing of himself from his
friends, but this isolation would be a blessing in disguise. “Genial misanthropy” is a
fair assessment of Thoreau during this crisis (p. 104). To compensate for his
solitude, Thoreau tried to befriend nature and its dispassionate laws, continued to
dream about being a successful writer, and remained faithful to his journal writing
(p. 105). His prose progressively described more and explained less (Golemba,
1990, pp. 223-224), and he feared that the world was losing its wonder (Milder,
1995). He sought to renew this wonder through nighttime walks alone in the woods;
it was in these times and places of being profoundly lost that he found nature, there
all along in his mind, teaching him something (pp. 110-111).
Ecology
Research on Walden as ecological literature shows that Thoreau learned that
nature is nonlinear and should be regarded as an equal. In this section, I review the
research by Lawrence Buell (1995), who discusses the nature of this nonlinearity
and the importance of Thoreau’s filial love affair with nature.
Buell argued that Walden has a nonlinear seasonal progression. This
nonlinearity exists for two reasons. First, as Buell has identified, Thoreau must have
realized that his own recovery was nonlinear: he made breakthroughs, and these
breakthroughs occurred because of previous setbacks. Walden zigzags in its
advocacy, reflecting Thoreau’s inconsistent progress and coinciding with the
irregularity of evolution. Second, and more importantly, as Buell has pointed out,
Thoreau discovered that placing the ego at the center of the world was problematic.
Walden destabilizes the persona of Thoreau, making it difficult to trace his position
through it (Buell, 1995; Milder, 1995). Without a stable authority to restrain the
reader’s interpretations, flights of interpretation become possible. However,
Thoreau left behind abundant resources to help recover these personae, and this
recovery leads to different ways to interpret Walden (Milder, 1995).
The nonlinear nature of Walden embodies Thoreau’s growth into a genuine
peer of nature (Buell, 1995). His journals and drafts of Walden testify to his gradual
evolution from an egalitarian survivalist to a whole human who was capable of
regarding “nonhuman agents as bona fide partners” (p. 179). In the first draft of
Walden, Thoreau’s argument is an unambiguous nod to Emersonian metaphysics
with a working-class twist. He told a mostly easy romance between nature and a
transparent eyeball in the woods, he covered his blunders, and praised the tools that
he already had. However, with each subsequent draft, Thoreau’s appreciation for
nature’s lessons grew to cover Walden’s entire surface and disrupted any normal
boundary between author and content (Milder, 1995). Perhaps the most important
lesson that links these lessons together is the realization that a true love is an equal.
There is no better way for a text to do this than by inviting the reader to become a
co-author. Walden is a text that turns on an unpredictable relationship between
itself and its intended meaning. This move is profoundly democratic, and because it
involves internal moves that destabilize its own identity, Thoreau’s ecology is queer.
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Queer Ecology
Queer ecology demonstrates the importance of melancholia. In this section, I
show why melancholia is of interest to queer ecology, define it as a distinct
phenomenon, and discuss why research in this area should focus on Walden’s
language of desire.
Despite its personal nature, melancholia is an important topic because it
grows out of situations of social denial. For Catriona Mortimer-Sandilands (2010),
melancholia “is focused exactly on the condition of grieving the ungrievable: how
does one mourn in the midst of a culture that finds it almost impossible to recognize
the value of what has been lost?” (p. 333). Melancholia finds purchase not only in
queer studies, where popular culture has long held queer attachments to be barely
tolerable, but also in ecology, which has had to confront “a society that cannot
acknowledge nonhuman beings, natural environments, and ecological processes as
appropriate objects for genuine grief” (p. 333).
Melancholia is the condition5 of denying or being denied one’s desires6 in the
midst of loss. Mortimer-Sandilands showed, through analysis of Judith Butler and
Melancholia has a long history that dates back to antiquity and survives today with
a different meaning. In the 19th century, before and during the establishment of
psychiatry as a legitimate medical field, melancholia was a term that referred to an
explanation for madness that involved mysterious anatomical lesions (Berrios,
1988, pp. 298) and moral degeneration (Misbach & Stam, 2006, p. 49). The
symptoms of affect, such as sadness, were not a part of the concept (Berrios, 1988,
p. 298). In the insane asylums, patients with melancholia either recovered on their
own or went on to develop more intense and terminal forms of insanity, and the
early 19th century saw the erosion of traditional social support structures and
growing asylum populations (Misbach & Stam, 2006, p. 50). This epidemic
encouraged a paradigm shift in the emerging field of psychiatry at the hands of
neurologists (p. 50). Moral degeneration became less relevant to medical
empiricism, and because the anatomical lesions were nowhere to be found, their
apparent size shrank until they became metaphorical (Berrios, 1988, p. 299). In the
U.S. context, between the late 1860s and the 1900s, melancholia underwent a
complex conceptual reframing and was ultimately replaced by mental depression
and bipolar disorder (Misbach & Stam, 2006, p. 50; Berrios, 1988, p. 302). There is
little terminological equivalence between melancholia and these terms. There is not
enough space here to detail this evolution, which involved several “bridge”
diagnoses and typologies that are no longer commonly used, but it should be enough
to say that most people with depression and bipolar disorder today would not have
been diagnosed with melancholia in the early 19th century (Berrios, 1988, p. 298, p.
300). Depression and bipolar disorder are symptom terms, leaving behind the
anatomical and moral mechanisms of causation that melancholia represented as
explanations. Today, melancholia survives in the psychoanalytic realm as a term of
explanation for why a person’s mourning continues interminably.
6 In this project, I use a process-oriented understanding of desire, defining it as “the
production of production” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2009, p. 6).
5
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Freud’s writings, that not everyone grieves the same way. In this theoretical
orientation, which has been summarized by these three authors, some people are
encouraged or permitted to mourn the loss of the objects of their desires. Normal
mourning occurs in cases where the psychic trauma would be too great for the loss
to be accepted all at once (Arsić, 2016). Alternatively, the subject may simply not be
ready to part with the object (Butler, 1999). To accommodate this gradual process,
the psyche constructs a fantastic version of the lost object, an illusion that is made
possible by a metaphorical swallowing, consuming, or acquiring (Leader, 2008),
with that metaphor being concealed from the subject’s awareness (Abraham &
Torok, 1994a). This normal mourning involves a feeling of anger, first directed
inward during the stage of denial, and then outward toward the desired object that
is now absent in reality (or related objects; Leader, 2008), and the fantasy of the
object’s continued existence is slowly diminished at the pace in which the psyche is
able to absorb the truth (Arsić, 2016). Mourning does not, by itself, induce the
subject to ‘move on’ from the loss; rather, mourning slowly lessens the intensity of
one’s grief so that it can be managed in the context of continued living (Leader,
2008, p. 99). As Darian Leader has observed, not only is grief distinct from mourning
(p. 8), but old losses are apt to be resurged when subsequent losses occur; old losses
stick to fresh ones, especially when they occur to others in a social group (p. 67). On
the other hand, some people lose more than just objects of desire, but their desires
as well; as Butler clarified, instead of mourning, a melancholic individual
incorporates a lost object into their psyche as usual, but once there it becomes a
permanent resident of the subject’s identity (as cited by Mortimer-Sandilands,
2010). It has nothing to do with narcissism or overwhelming pain, but instead it is
the halting of a process. This happens subconsciously; most people are unaware
why they are melancholic (p. 335). Anger still occurs, but since the desired object
has been devoured, anger remains turned inward as guilt (p. 335). Melancholia is a
mourning frozen in time, but the guilt continues to gnaw. Butler argued that
melancholia does indeed apply to sexual desires, and that one’s gender identity is
susceptible to melancholic incorporation when specific sexual desires are
disavowed (1997 as cited by Mortimer-Sandilands, 2010). As Leader (2008) has put
it, the melancholic dies along with the loss (p. 8).
Because melancholia can last for months, years, or even a lifetime,
melancholic writing is an important means of recovery from the arresting death of
melancholia. The most important observation, in my opinion, that MortimerSandilands (2010) made concerning melancholic writing is her notice of Jan Zita
Grover’s notice that it can accomplish “imaginative feats” (p. 345). These feats
“emerge from a conscious, laborious process of reflection grounded in intimate
experiences and local histories, in the precise ways in which pain and loss are
manifest in lives and events” (p. 345). Melancholic writing involves the reader with
the features of melancholic experience, and those features demonstrate to the
reader the transition from melancholia to mourning. This experience has the
potential to induce a recovery from melancholia. In Thoreau’s case, an attentive
reader of Walden has an experience that follows Thoreau’s descent into winter and
redemption in spring. The lesson of melancholia can only be obtained through
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painstaking attention to the phenomenon of melancholia. That lesson does not occur
when the writer discusses melancholia abstractly.
An example of Thoreau’s melancholic writing that has this functionality
appears in Walden in an unlikely place. The central chapter of Walden, “The Ponds,”
is often regarded by readers as the most descriptive and least evaluative chapter in
the entire book. It is a summertime chapter that marks an almost imperceptible
change in the tone of the book. In his description of Walden Pond, Thoreau laments
about the untold civilizations that have used this pond as their Delphic fountain. The
version that he had in hand when he published A Week leaves this history
unexplored.7 However, in later drafts, he added, among other things, this segment:
Yet perchance the first who came to this well have left some trace of their
footsteps. I have been surprised to detect encircling the pond, even where a
thick wood has just been cut down on the shore, a narrow shelf-like path in
the steep hillside alternatively rising and falling, approaching and receding
from the water’s edge, as old probably as the race of man here, worn by the
feet of aboriginal hunters, and still from time to time unwittingly trodden by
the present occupants of the land. This is particularly distinct to one standing
on the middle of the pond in winter, just after a light snow has fallen,
appearing as a clear undulating white line, unobscured by weeds and twigs,
and very obvious a quarter of a mile off in many places where in summer it is
hardly distinguishable close at hand. The snow reprints it, as it were in clear
white type alto-relievo. The ornamented grounds of villas which will one day
be built here may still preserve some trace of this. (1985, p. 466)
At the outset of Walden, Thoreau is adamant that his desire is that people should
find their own way, and so I read this passage as a confession that he has not been
entirely going his own way. What is remarkable here is that Thoreau could not
notice this old path in the summer, but had to stand on the middle of the frozen
pond. He predicted that in the future this old path would still be noticeable.
Becoming aware of one’s habits and the loss of originality can reawaken desire, and
Thoreau’s language in this passage is charged with a significant fertility.
Summary and Inquiry
We began this review with the discovery that Walden permits itself to be
interpreted as queer. It can be interpreted as such in homosexual (Abelove, 2003),
asexual, and melancholic ways, leading it to have an indeterminate meaning. Queer
is an essentially contested concept (Jackman, 2010), making Walden queer at a
formal level and through a text’s unforeseen potential (Rand, 2008).
Walden employs various literary forms, and uses a queer language of desire
to describe Thoreau’s life in the woods (Golemba, 1990). This strategy involves the
reader in the process of authorizing its content, leaving it with indeterminate
meaning that goads the reader to recover it (p. 228). This is the source of its
queerness.
This observation, and many others like it in this dissertation, was made possible by
a digital encoding of Ronald Clapper’s dissertation (Schacht, n.d.).
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One of Walden’s literary forms is a seasonal progression, developed out of
the author’s fall into, overwintering in, and spring back from melancholia (Buell,
1995). Extant drafts written by Thoreau, his journal, and his biography reveal that
Thoreau gradually introduced his language of desire during a period of melancholia,
which followed a pattern similar to Walden’s fall, winter, and spring (Milder, 1995).
He also, by his own claim in the opening passages of the text, wrote the bulk of these
seasons into Walden during this time. Thoreau’s crisis led him to encounter nature,
learn from it as an equal, and redeemed him by making him understand his powers
of careful observation and description.
Thoreau’s language of desire interacts with his melancholic writing.
Melancholic writings have already been subjected to research, which found their
strength in the particularity of their descriptions that show the specific features of
melancholic experience (Mortimer-Sandilands, 2010). Research has already noted
that Thoreau’s powers of description were particularly strong. However, the
melancholic writings that Mortimer-Sandilands examined focused on queer and
ecological content, not queer form. Walden is unique for its use of melancholic
writing in a queer rhetorical form. In light of this fresh combination, this
dissertation addresses two questions:
RQ1: How does Thoreau’s language of desire interact with his melancholic writing?
RQ2: How does this interaction implicate queer studies and queer movements?
Method
This section describes the means of analysis in the dissertation. The
analytical tasks are a presentation of the situation of Walden, how the various
rhetorical forms within it interact, and how that interaction implicates queer studies
and queer movements.
As Kenneth Burke’s early works (1941/1973, 1935/1984a, 1937/1984b)
show, one must know the artist’s situation before it is possible to understand what
the art communicated. This requirement warrants a more thorough discussion of
the historical state of affairs in the 19th century coupled with the particular details
of Thoreau’s own biography and oeuvre.
My analysis of Walden is specifically a formal analysis. Kenneth Burke’s early
writings on the relationship between situations and literary responses are rich
resources of formal method for analyzing Walden’s status as equipment for living
(1941/1973). Thoreau responded to his situation with a unique combination of
conventional and impious attitudes, and Burke helps to assemble incongruous
perspectives (1935/1984a). To develop answers to the research questions, I
propose to exercise the typologies explored in Burke’s Counter-statement
(1931/1968) so that I can chart Thoreau’s complex formal sequences.
Thoreau deployed a language of desire, and this addition queers what would
be a normal formal analysis. I investigate the relationship between the forms and
chart changes to Thoreau’s unique language of desire. Rand (2008) argued that all
rhetorical forms enable a range of meanings and purposes. Nevertheless, the
meaning of the content of that form is especially contingent on the reader of Walden
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(Buell, 1995; Golemba, 1990). To this end, it is important to chart a selective
constellation of readings of Walden to construct a perspective by incongruity. Leah
Ceccarelli (1998) argued that an appropriate method to understand polysemic texts
that have high levels of hermeneutic depth should involve “a close reading of the
receptional evidence, with an eye toward the construal of message content by
different interpretive communities” and “a close reading of the text itself” (p. 410).
Outline
This dissertation is divided into two main parts and a conclusion. The first
part of the dissertation addresses the topic of melancholia through both biography
and close textual analysis of Thoreau’s early works. The second part focuses on
Walden’s form, first from a nature-writing perspective, then from a rhetorical
perspective, and then from a polemical perspective. Finally, the conclusion reviews
the dissertation, answers the research questions, and explores how this implicates
future research on melancholia and queer studies in the communication discipline.
Not including this Introduction chapter, this dissertation has six chapters.
Chapter One provides an accounting of a narrative of Thoreau’s life that focused on
his vulnerability to melancholia, the real losses and blunders that he experienced,
and the breakthrough in self-loss that assisted him in recognizing his condition and
the skill that he invented to hide that condition. Chapter Two traces Thoreau’s
progression through three stages of melancholia: entrenchment, transfer, and
recognition. These waypoints are reflected by his published works: the journal and
magazine publications that he published before 1849, his first book, A Week, and
finally his writings on walking after 1849. Chapter Three identifies how Walden
defines the parameters of friendship with itself, as well as its offer of spacious
hospitality toward readers who are not ready for or willing to take the challenge of
befriending the text. Chapter Four discusses the procession of friendship in between
literary forms in Walden at different levels of scale, revealing an interaction between
perceptual striation and smoothening that uncovers a holey space (see Deleuze &
Guattari, 1987) for Thoreau to reveal his philosophy of self-respect. Chapter Five
investigates the borders of Walden’s friendship with the reader through an
investigation of the unpredictable agency of Walden’s polemical characteristics (see
Rand, 2008). Finally, the Conclusion chapter engages the research of José Esteban
Muñoz (2009, 1999).
Coda
Despite the tendency of scholars to ignore the queer legacy of Thoreau, his
message has reached a much larger audience. Many people love to read Walden
without understanding why Thoreau’s rhetorical situation has increased in
relevancy. Until that understanding becomes commonplace, I am comforted that
there are individuals, like Mark Jiminez and Beau Chandler, who married
themselves years before the state recognized their partnership. These men, like the
melancholic owls that kept Thoreau up at night, exercised their desires in a culture
that often only responds to what is “expedient” (Thoreau, 1849, p. 189). Perhaps in
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the future more individuals will be able to draw from this relief, reawaken their
slumbering passions, and live their own dreams.
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Chapter One: A Narrative of Melancholia
There we lay under an oak, on the bank of the stream, near to some farmer’s
cornfield, getting sleep, and forgetting where we were; a great blessing, that
we are obliged to forget our enterprises every twelve hours. Minks,
muskrats, meadow-mice, woodchucks, squirrels, skunks, rabbits, foxes, and
weasels, all inhabit near, but keep very close where you are there. The river
sucking and eddying away all night down toward the marts and the seaboard,
a great wash and freshet, and no small enterprise to reflect on. . . .
One sailor was visited in his dreams this night by the Evil Destinies, and all
those powers that are hostile to human life, which constrain and oppress the
minds of men, and make their path seem difficult and narrow, and beset with
dangers, so that the most innocent and worthy enterprises appear insolent
and a tempting of fate, and the gods go not with us. But the other happily
passed a serene and even ambrosial or immortal night, and his sleep was
dreamless, or only the atmosphere of pleasant dreams remained, a happy
natural sleep until the morning; and his cheerful spirit soothed and
reassured his brother, for whenever they meet, the Good Genius is sure to
prevail.
—Thoreau’s A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers, “Sunday” (1985,
pp. 93-94)
The roots of Thoreau’s melancholia began to form with his relationship with
his family, and especially with his brother. Despite the fact that they had different
personalities, the two men shared a love for one another that could only have been
possible because of a loving family. Paradoxically, this same family was responsible
for cultivating co-dependency that induced psychological heteronomy. Henry was
the intellectual genius, but John was the social genius. Henry had difficulty finding
work, but John held the steady job. Whereas Henry whispered the language of
nature, John was the representative man of culture (Thoreau, 1985, p. 198). Henry
loved his brother, and deferred to his desires. They vacationed together, slept
together, and taught together, but it was always John who held the keys to society. It
is not unfair to say that Henry looked up to his older brother with admiration, even
when his parents had decided to send Henry to college and not John.
When John died, abruptly, a void opened in Henry’s heart, and he spent years
formulating an expression of that grief. Thoreau’s first attempt to fill that void was
to replace his brother with his mentor, Emerson, and the promise of a writing career
that came with him (see Fink, 1992) in what seems to be a case of “involuntary
surrogation” (Roach, 1996, pp. 5-6). Emerson was impressed with Thoreau’s
performance at Harvard College, and Thoreau was similarly impressed with
Emerson’s lectures and published essays (Richardson, 1986). When John died,
Emerson took Thoreau under his wing, and eventually, under his roof; he included
Thoreau into the circle of Transcendentalists, and offered him privileged
opportunities to get his essays published in his journal (Fink, 1992; Harding, 1982).
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However, differences soon fractured the famous friendship; Thoreau had good
reason to believe that Emerson was not making good on his notions to find
enlightenment in nature (Sattelmeyer, 1989). It was Thoreau, and not Emerson, who
became the Transcendentalist in nature.
It was nature, and not Emerson, who would be Thoreau’s best friend.
Aggrieved over the loss of the illusion that Emerson was a genuine friend for
Thoreau, he turned away from publishing and towards surveying for a livelihood
(Milder, 1995). He went on a trip to Cape Cod to reacquire what he had lost, and
developed a habit of walking through the wilderness of his hometown (Milder,
1995; Harding, 1982). In 1851, when Thoreau was anesthetized with ether (Milder,
1995), he made a breakthrough: nature was his friend, and in its ability to disorient
the nighttime walker lay the key to restoring the desires that he thought had been
debased by social pressure.
This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part of this chapter
addresses Thoreau’s susceptibility to melancholia. Thoreau’s actions make it clear
that he had a heteronomic relationship with his family (Lebeaux, 1984). This
involved a willingness to subordinate his own desires in a way that made him
susceptible to melancholia. The second part of this chapter discusses several losses
and blunders. Because of the difficulty in discerning Thoreau’s emotions in his
biographical record, any conclusion of exactly when he contracted melancholia has
to be left to speculation in light of an overall survey of these losses and ironies.
Finally, I discuss his nighttime walks in the woods and his experience with losing
himself with the unexpected assistance of ether. Isolation made Thoreau aware of
his melancholia and provided him with clues that helped him invent Walden.
This chapter begins with two stories of the Thoreau brothers and one man’s
quest to create meaning in a world that was crumbling around him. There were
many sad moments in Thoreau’s early life, and many of them were linked to the loss
of his brother. One of these stories had to do with their time teaching together. The
other one of these stories had to do with a woman whom they both loved and
wanted to marry. Both are integral puzzle pieces that reveal a growing melancholia
that scholars have already identified in Thoreau. The purpose here is to present that
condition so that Thoreau’s subordination of his own desires may be laid bare for
examination. The first strokes of that picture need to be drawn from Thoreau’s
family biography.
The Thoreau Family
According to Walter Harding (1982), the Thoreau family was a tight unit,
with Henry’s mother being the hub. Henry’s father, John Sr., was a quiet and hard
working businessman, good to his wife and children, and always filled with a sense
of responsibility to them (p. 13). His “business flaw,” wrote Walter Harding, “was
apparently his good nature” (p. 13). Henry’s mother, Cynthia, was a social butterfly
who loved to talk and form alliances; she was the most crucial person in the house,
holding social gatherings there, and served as the vice president of the Concord
Female Charitable Society (Sullivan, 2009, p. 31). Cynthia had an enormous
influence on Henry’s life, imparting in Henry his sense of civic duty, his familiarity
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with Latin, and his acquaintance with the local botanical life (p. 33). While it makes
sense to assume that both parents had strong moral compasses and were
instrumental in instilling a sense of social justice into their children, it was Cynthia
as matriarch that advocated for natural familiarity, familial cohesion, and
intellectual curiosity (p. 33). Early in their marriage, the young couple was bogged
down with failed business ventures, and they were itinerant (p. 27). They eventually
settled down in Concord, Massachusetts, with socially active relatives, and were able
to produce a stable and nurturing environment for their children; they rented out
rooms and made pencils (Sullivan, 2009; Harding, 1982).
Most of Thoreau’s frugal life was spent boarding with his family, and the
Thoreau family relied on boarders for a significant portion of its income during and
after Henry’s life (Harding, 1982). When Henry was five, the family returned to
Concord (Sullivan, 2009). When he was able, Henry contributed to the setup by
paying for his own room and providing entertainment to the occupants in the
rhythmic forms of dance and flute playing (p. 31). In addition to having Henry as a
paying renter of the Thoreau family, the home was also used to board four students
for Thoreau’s private school for a few months in 1838 before Henry leased the
Concord Academy building (Harding, 1982, p. 75).
In “The Landlord” (1843d), Thoreau praised the enterprise of the
boardinghouse, singling out the public virtue of its Landlord for discussion. This
archetype, argued Thoreau, had “sacrifice[d] the tender but narrow ties of private
friendship” (p. 427) and exchanged it for “a broad, sun-shiny, fair-weather-and-foul
friendship for his race; who loves men, not as a philosopher, with philanthropy, nor
as an overseer of the poor, with charity, but by a necessity of his nature” (p. 427).
The signature character trait of the Landlord is the abandonment of privacy. The
guest of the Landlord is welcome in the kitchen, and “all the secrets of housekeeping
are exhibited to the eyes of men, above and below, before and behind” (p. 428).
Thoreau argued that it is in such a public place of habitation that “the real and
sincere life which we meet in the streets was actually fed and sheltered” (p. 428). In
contrast, the Landlord’s neighbor hides behind a screen of trees and relies on a
fence to keep visitors away.
Harding’s (1982) biography of Thoreau shows that the similarity between
the archetype in the essay “The Landlord” and the Thoreau family is too striking to
ignore. After Thoreau began to lease the Concord Academy building (for $20 per
year; p. 75), his school business picked up considerably and he was pleased to be in
need of his brother’s help with teaching (p. 76). There, the brothers taught
numerous boarding students and had steady employment until 1841 (p. 76, pp. 8788). For some reason, instead of continuing his teaching without his brother, as he
originally did, Henry shuttered the school and resigned from the profession of
teaching entirely (pp. 87-88, p. 122). In 1844, a year after “The Landlord,” the
Thoreau family was approved for a mortgage to purchase their first plot of land,
where the family built their first home, which would also be used for boarders
(Sullivan, 2009, p. 143). Later, in Walden, Thoreau wrote about not using a lock on
his cabin door, expressing openness to being able to entice strangers to examine his
habitation and provisions, and being open to the prying eyes of passing travelers as
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he hoed his beans. Thoreau, like the Landlord, loved everyone. It is no accident that
Thoreau wrote that the Landlord “is a more public character than a statesman” and
that he should be exempt from paying taxes (1843d, p. 429).
Before they moved to Concord, they visited a glacial pond at the outskirts of
the town (Sullivan, 2009). The most important and salient portrait of this
environment is recorded in Thoreau’s journal and his masterpiece, Walden. This
image is, of course, on the shore of Walden Pond. It takes place when Thoreau was
either five or seven years old. It was, for Thoreau,
one of the most ancient scenes stamped on the tablets of my memory, the
oriental Asiatic valley of my world, whence so many races and inventions
have gone forth in recent times. That woodland vision for a long time made
the drapery of my dreams. That sweet solitude my spirit seemed so early to
require that I might have room to entertain my thronging guests, and that
speaking silence that my ears might distinguish the significant sound.
Somehow or other it at once gave the preference to this recess among the
pines, where almost sunshine and shadow were the only inhabitants that
varied the scene, over the tumultuous and varied city, as if it had found its
proper nursery. (Thoreau, 1906a, pp. 380-381)
John and Cynthia were there with their four children, Helen, John Jr., “David Henry,”
and Sophia. Chowder cooked over an open fire (Sullivan, 2009). It was in this
moment that he began his friendship with Walden Pond.
As they grew up, each brother used his strength to compensate for the
other’s weakness (Harding, 1982). In school, Thoreau was teased because he did not
want to play with the other children, preferring “to sit on the sidelines and watch”
(p. 18). One of his schoolmates later wrote that he was “an odd stick, not very
studious or devoted in his lessons, but a thoughtful youth and very fond of reading
. . . not given to play or to fellowship with the boys; but shy and silent” (p. 30).
The Thoreau Brothers
The year 1833 was the educational crossroads for the Thoreau brothers.
Despite showing great promise as a carpenter, Henry was selected by his parents to
attend Harvard college because of his intellectual abilities (p. 32). The Thoreaus
were not wealthy during Henry’s childhood, and could only afford to send one of
their children to college (p. 32). Harvard during its early years was uninspiring and
rote; a constant source of resentment for the student body and for Thoreau for his
entire life (Richardson, 1986). However, what he failed in enthusiasm, he gained in
his mastery of several languages, mathematics, history, and his acquaintance with
Emerson (Harding, 1982).
Pedagogy
Thoreau’s employment problems began soon after his graduation (p. 53).
When Thoreau graduated from college, he surprisingly found a lucrative teaching
position (p. 52). Unfortunately, his family values chafed against the unofficial
corporeal punishment policy of the school, and he resigned his position (p. 53). This
inconvenienced the faculty enormously, and they must have been able to extract
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their revenge on Thoreau, because he could not find a teaching position anywhere at
any of the existing schools (pp. 55-59). He looked as far as Maine for teaching work
(p. 58). Desperate, he started his own boarding school (p. 75).
Thoreau’s boarding school brought him into closer proximity to his brother,
but the arrangement lasted for less than three years (p. 87). Thoreau’s “academy”
debuted in the fall of 1838 (p. 75). Thoreau started with only four students, but that
number quickly grew, and he found himself needing his brother to work with him
(pp. 75-76). John was eager to work with his brother, for the two of them were
excellent teachers, and shared the same attitude toward student discipline (pp. 7980). Unfortunately, John was also afflicted with tuberculosis, and his teaching duties
caused his condition to deteriorate with alarming speed (p. 87). The brothers’
Concord Academy had not even been open for three years when John had to quit (p.
87). Then, Henry closed the school (pp. 87-88). Why? He didn’t have to; he had
started the academy by himself (p. 75). Instead, he applied to one teaching position,
and failing that, he resigned himself to shoveling manure for 75 cents a day (p. 122).
The answer to why the academy closed lies in John’s failing health and
Henry’s growing sense of isolation. As early as 1833, John’s health was visibly
deteriorating; he got frequent nosebleeds that sometimes caused him to faint (p.
87). In this time period, Henry “had been thinking of retiring to some lonely spot
where he might rest and devote himself to writing” (p. 122). He had experimented
with simple living at the end of his college days by camping at Flint Pond (Eidson,
1951 as cited by Thoreau, 1995).
Harding explained that Thoreau found his living solution, or more accurately,
Thoreau’s solution found him (p. 127). In April 1841, he decided to purchase a
dismal and isolated farm plot called the Hollowell Place (p. 123). As Thoreau
detailed in Walden, days later, the wife on the farm had second thoughts, and
convinced her husband, and Thoreau, to return the property. After the Hollowell
farm, Emerson offered to let Thoreau board at his house in exchange for a few hours
of handyman work per day (pp. 127-128). The hours were flexible, and Thoreau
honored the agreement (p. 127). He also enjoyed Emerson’s vast library, and access
to a living scholar who was more than willing to share his philosophical ideas (pp.
127-131). All of this nurtured a seductive promise of a career in writing and
lecturing to match the older scholar. Almost immediately, Thoreau’s isolation
dissolved when he became acquainted with Emerson’s child, Edith (p. 128).
However, the relationship between Thoreau and Emerson was not perfect; Emerson
treated Thoreau as less than an equal, and Thoreau deeply resented this subtle
treatment (Sattelmeyer, 1989). Eventually, Thoreau tried to live elsewhere to make
a living. He moved to Staten Island in New York to try to break into the writing
market (and tutor Emerson’s cousin), but by the time he moved there, the market
was thoroughly saturated (Fink, 1992). He moved back and most likely continued to
irritate his landlord. Eventually, Emerson decided to let Thoreau pursue his solitary
living on a new woodland property that Emerson had recently purchased (Harding,
1982).
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Thoreau was capable of deep affection, warmth, love, and conflict (Abelove,
2003), and his relationship with Edith Emerson is proof that the man was not a
hermit. Thoreau was also capable of romance (Harding, 1982).
Love
In 1839, one of the women who boarded with the Thoreaus was a Mrs.
Joseph Ward, precipitating love (p. 77). On June 17, her grandson, Edmund Sewall,
visited her for a week (p. 77). As the poets say, it was love at first sight (p. 77). Two
days later, Thoreau went on to compose a poem in honor of this 11-year-old boy,
invoking a number of chords that would suggest a powerful queerness by today’s
standards (pp. 77-78). Thoreau thought the poem important enough to him that he
included it in his first book, A Week. In the 19th century cultural atmosphere, such
affection was not unusual (pp. 78-79). In fact, the Sewalls thought it was wonderful,
and asked Thoreau to write a similar poem for Edmund’s younger brother, George
(pp. 78-79). It was in reference to Edmund that Thoreau famously wrote, “I might
have loved him, had I loved him less” (p. 78).
Perhaps Thoreau found something lovely about the Sewall lineage, because
he fell in love with another Sewall less than a month later (pp. 94-96). On July 20,
Edmund’s sister, Ellen, came with the Wards to visit the Thoreaus (p. 94). Thoreau
had met her before on a number of occasions, but he was not nearly as responsive
then as on this occasion (p. 94). Thoreau had been slow to develop romantic
interests, and when he saw the 17-year-old woman, he fell head over heels in love
with her (p. 94). He showered her with poetry, became obsequious, and only refused
to do as she asked when she wanted him to attend church (pp. 94-96).
Henry’s brother also developed affections for Ellen (p. 97). After her twoweek stay in Concord, she had inadvertently left behind some Indian relics (p. 96).
John mailed them to her, along with a note that he and his brother were taking a
vacation trip on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers (pp. 96-97). When they
returned, John immediately left to visit Ellen, ignoring her aunt’s warning that her
parents were away and that it would be imprudent to seek her affections at such a
time (p. 97). Nevertheless, John made the trip, and they had a lovely time. John and
Ellen went walking, and spent time together with her brothers (p. 97). George also
found John to be delightful, but interestingly, he kept slipping up by calling him
Henry (p. 97). That December, Ellen wrote to her aunt, then boarding with the
Thoreaus; she felt that the house had been deserted since she had left to board with
the Thoreaus (pp. 97-98). Ellen wished “a thousand times” to see her aunt, John,
and Henry again (p. 97).
Ellen had little choice but to reject both Henry and John (pp. 101-102). Her
father strongly disapproved of them (p. 100). Undaunted, John proposed to Ellen in
July the next year, and she accepted (p. 100). However, she changed her mind (p.
100). Harding argued that her mother intervened, knowing that Mr. Sewall’s
conservative Unitarianism would never stand for such a marriage. However,
Richardson (1986, p. 60) felt that the evidence for this was uncertain, and suggests
that her family did not intervene. Henry, at his end of the correspondence, was
aware of what had transpired (Harding, 1982, p. 100). However, like us, he did not
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know why she changed her mind (p. 100). Henry was free to make a proposal of his
own, in writing (p. 101). However, this time, Ellen did consult with her father (pp.
101-102). His response reveals just how protective of his family he was, and how
much he distrusted the Thoreau brothers (pp. 101-102). He demanded that Ellen
write a cold letter rebuffing Henry, and she agreed that no other response would
suffice (pp. 101-102). Ellen felt awful for being forced to treat Henry with such
disregard, but she had little choice but to turn him down (p. 102). Later, she wrote:
“I wonder if his thoughts ever wander back to those times when the hours sped so
pleasantly and we were so happy. I think they do. I little thought then that he cared
so much as subsequent events have proved” (p. 103). Harding concluded that Ellen
actually preferred Henry over John (p. 100). At the time, Ellen had already met the
man who was destined to be her future husband (p. 103).
Summary
The relationship between Henry and John was complex, filled with joy,
hardship, love, and heartache. The biographical records of Henry David Thoreau
offer a glimpse of a man who had desires of his own and the willingness to pursue
them, but at this stage of his life, he ultimately privileged the desires of other people
(Lebeaux, 1984).
Graduating Loss and Blunder
When Thoreau graduated from Harvard College in 1837, the economic
environment was already placing pressures on him to make a living. Martin Van
Buren had just been inaugurated as President of the United States, who promised to
follow in the footsteps of his predecessor, Andrew Jackson (Howe, 2007; Sellers,
1991). Jackson’s economic policies had started a recession that began three months
before Thoreau’s graduation and would last until his retreat to Walden Pond in
1845 (Howe, 2007; Sellers, 1991). It was the United States’ first double-dip
recession, which evolved into the first economic depression of capitalism in the New
World.
With the decline of Thoreau’s teaching prospects, Thoreau made a herculean
effort to make money as a writer (1982). His more successful efforts were with his
mentor, Emerson, who gave the young scholar the advantage of a journal that was
chronically in need of submissions (Fink, 1992). In 1840, he published his first text
in the Transcendentalist journal, The Dial (1840), and he would publish several
more articles in that journal before it folded (Fink, 1992). By that time, Thoreau had
secured a few important connections in other publishing venues (Fink, 1992). While
there are several occasions where Thoreau was paid for his writing, in the end
writing did not make Thoreau money (Fink, 1992). Most of his income was secured
through his father’s pencil factory and doing survey work; after A Week, all of
Thoreau’s income would be coming from surveying (Sullivan, 2009). Nevertheless,
Thoreau placed an amazing amount of effort into the vocation of writing, and
gambled with the financial risk of self-publishing in 1849 (Fink, 1992).
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Loss of Privacy
Two factors influenced Thoreau’s coping after Ellen Sewall and John. The
first was the enigmatic nature of his journal writing. The second was a scientific
instrument.
Thoreau’s public is astonishing. Besides having lived in a boardinghouse with
astonishingly public boundaries, Thoreau did not use his journal for emotional
release. Instead, it began as a scrapbook (Harding, 1982, p. 71). Before 1849, it is
exceptionally difficult to use it as a barometric genealogy of his emotions. After
1849, when Thoreau’s writings became more observational rather than simply
analytical, the reader must intuit the writer’s mood from the sensory detail, and one
risks projecting one’s own feelings onto the author (see Golemba, 1990). Despite
writing on January 26, 1841, that “good writing as well as good acting will be
obedience to conscience” (Thoreau, 2009, p. 14), there are few clues in the journal
pages of his state of mind. A passage from three days later illustrates this difficulty:
Of all strange and unaccountable things this journalizing is the strangest. It
will allow nothing to be predicated of it; its good is not good, nor its bad bad.
If I make a huge effort to expose my innermost and richest wares to light, my
counter seems cluttered with the meanest homemade stuffs . . . (p. 15)
Of course, as anyone who has kept a diary knows, such an outlet is supposed to be
therapeutic. Denying himself such a personal and uncensored tapestry must have
had an effect of slowing the procession of his emotions. In addition, the fact that he
shunted his feelings into the privacy of lyric poetry is further evidence that Thoreau
felt that his journal was not a safe place to express himself.8 Emerson, in the most
telling anecdote of their differences, made no secret that he thought that Thoreau’s
poetry was inferior, further discouraging that outlet (Harding, 1982). That
discouragement became so great that at some point he incinerated most of his
poetry (p. 117). It was Emerson who, at the beginning of their friendship, advised
Thoreau to start his journal (Thoreau, 2009). It is possible that his acquaintance
with such a popular intellectual figure made Thoreau believe that his personal
writings would become the object of scrutiny after his death.
The safe place that Thoreau found to validate his emotions was the
spaciousness of nature, and his scientific ability to focus on nature enabled him to
pursue his relationship with nature and, for lack of a better term, lose himself. In the
Michael Warner argued that lyric poetry is private: “Lyric poems are in fact
produced by particular persons and addressed to others, and they circulate in public
media (even if only in manuscript). But to read them as lyric, we ignore those facts
and reinterpret both the speaking event, the boundaries of the text, and all the
figures of apostrophe in the text (even, or especially, in love lyrics, which have a
special vocabulary of love that allows us to do this). The rhetoric of lyric, including
its affects, scenes, and temporality, exploits this reading convention. In reading
something as lyric, rather than regard the speaking voice as wholly alienated to the
text, we regard it as transcendent. Though it could only be produced through the
displacement of writing, we read it with cultivated disregard of its circumstance of
circulation, understanding it as an image of absolute privacy” (2002, pp. 80-81).
8
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fall of 1840, Thoreau introduced surveying into his school’s academy curriculum,
and made a purchase that probably saved his sanity in later years (Harding, 1982).
The purchase was for a hybrid instrument, a combination of a surveyor’s level and a
circumferentor (p. 83). With this device, he was able to take the students at the
academy on field trips and teach them how to survey (p. 83). Thoreau must have
also been able to use it as an excuse to take walks into nature without his students,
and for that matter, anyone. The fact that Thoreau became familiar with the use of a
circumferentor is important, because of the status of surveying technology at the
time. As Gerard L’Estrange Turner (1998) has pointed out, in the 19th century,
circumferentors had for the most part been replaced with more modern theodolites.
Nevertheless, circumferentors were still the favored instrument for use in
woodlands and in areas with uncleared ground (p. 43). It was in these secluded,
inaccessible, often dark places that Thoreau preferred to explore, and helped him be
in an environment that validated his emotions. Only through this means of
distancing himself from the public world, which would become even more
important to his mental health later in life, would he be able to focus on his scholarly
writing.
Loss of a Brother
Thoreau’s only refuge against romantic and professional rejection was
nature, both on the page and in the world. His brother’s health was deteriorating,
and soon he would be unable to fulfill his teaching duties (Harding, 1982, p. 87).
With “almost physical hunger he went for long walks in the winter woods, and
avidly took in the migrating otter tracks, the young pines springing up in the corn
fields. Everything was striking, beautiful, sustaining” (Richardson, 1986, p. 86). In
addition to seeking a tangible relationship with natural surroundings, Thoreau
continued to have a voracious reading appetite. He delved into the Georgics of Virgil,
using the ancient poet to appreciate the travails in his own life (pp. 87-88). In the
Georgics, the Jovian god “brought the Golden Age to an end so that man might have
to work in order to earn and savor the good things won through work” (pp. 87-88).
Virgil also appreciated the seasons, and his prowess with depicting the cycles of
labor “showed Thoreau just how much detail was required to sustain a literary work
designed to convey the feel of the land” (p. 88).
After the academy, Thoreau fully came under Emerson’s “spell” (Richardson,
1986, p. 96). In early 1841, Emerson came to visit Thoreau when he was sick with
bronchitis, leaving the younger man “with the unutterable security and exaltation
that comes when someone the world loves loves us” (p. 99). Joseph Roach (1996)
has found widespread historical evidence that whenever “actual or perceived
vacancies occur in the network of relations” that are disrupted by loss, “survivors
attempt to fit satisfactory alternatives” in a process called “surrogation” (p. 2). In the
case of Thoreau, Emerson would be John’s first involuntary (pp. 5-6) surrogate
candidate, since I suspect that Emerson never intended to replace John, but simply
wished to give Thoreau the ability to realize his potential. A few months later,
Emerson invited Thoreau to board at his house in exchange for his handyman
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skills, and the arrangement would last for two years (p. 103). Put to work and
challenged intellectually, Thoreau appeared to be moving forward (p. 103).
However, both Richardson (1986) and Harding (1982) clearly show that
Emerson’s friendship and mentorship could not adequately compensate Thoreau for
the loss of his brother. The next year, Henry’s brother John Jr. cut himself while
stropping a shaving razor, and came down with a horrific case of tetanus (Harding,
1982, p. 134). When Thoreau heard of his brother’s illness, he came home to be with
his brother (Richardson, 1986, p. 113). However, there was nothing that could have
been done. John’s body seized and he died in his brother’s arms after days of
excruciating agony (Harding, 1982, p. 134). Henry himself was astonishingly quiet
for days afterwards, worrying his family and even himself (pp. 135-136). Then,
Henry too came down with the same symptoms—a “psychosomatic illness” that
embodied his sympathy for his brother (p. 136). He recovered physically, but the
death of John Jr. opened a void in Henry’s life that would not easily be filled (p. 136).
Steven Fink (1992) shows that, from an academic perspective, Emerson’s
assistance was divine. Emerson had just acquired a pile of natural history resources,
and felt that his nature-loving protégé would be up to the task of producing a
nature-writing piece (p. 41). The gift virtually guaranteed another publication (p.
42). It must have been a religious experience, which perhaps explains why
Thoreau’s journal in this period is filled with an uncommon number of references to
God and speculations about what great tasks he seemed destined to fulfill (p. 39).
Fink interpreted these journal comments as evidence that Thoreau began to see
himself as a kind of prophet, selected by Providence to survive his late brother and
deliver their word to the human race (p. 39).
It took less than a year for cracks to appear in the Emerson-Thoreau
friendship (Sattelmeyer, 1989). In September, Thoreau began to fear that he was
“living with Mr. Emerson in very dangerous prosperity” (quoted by Richardson,
1986, p. 109). As Roach has pointed out, surrogation often fails (1996).
In the winter of 1842-1843, Nathaniel Hawthorne was enjoying his first
winter as a resident of Concord, but his appreciation was no match for Thoreau’s
nymph-like behavior (Harding, 1982). Hawthorne particularly appreciated
Thoreau’s unpretentious company, often vanishing from his own home just to avoid
visitors (to his wife’s embarrassment; p. 139). Emerson too was a frequent presence
with Thoreau and Hawthorne during these excursions (p. 139). However, neither
Hawthorne nor Emerson could match Thoreau’s spritely skill with his ice skates (p.
139). As Harding wrote, Thoreau performed “dithyrambic dances and Bacchic leaps
on the ice” while Hawthorne moved stiffly and Emerson had no sense of balance (p.
139).
Thoreau’s happy presentation of self to Hawthorne was an act. Thoreau was
sick for most of that winter; he wrote in his journal that he viewed himself as “a
diseased bundle of nerves standing between time and eternity like a withered leaf”
(quoted in Richardson, 1986, p. 120). He also wrote about having a happy streak in
him that never seemed to last, and he “tried to keep up his spirits in the face of
numerous and prolonged illnesses” (p. 120). His attitude was especially telling in a
letter that he wrote to his friend, Mrs. Lucy Brown, on January 25, 1843. It was a
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tortured letter, sent with the self-consciousness of not having any good news to
share:
I am mistaken, or rather impatient when I say this, —for we all have a gift to
send, not only when the year begins, but as long as interest and memory last.
I don’t know whether you have got the many I have sent you, or rather
whether you were quite sure where they came from. I mean the letters I have
sometimes launched off eastward in my thought; but if you have been
happier at one time than another, think that then you received them. But this
that I now send you is of another sort. It will go slowly, drawn by horses over
muddy roads, and lose much of its little value by the way. You may have to
pay for it, and it may not make you happy after all. But what shall be my newyear’s gift, then? Why, I will send you my still fresh remembrance of the
hours I have passed with you here, for I find in the remembrance of them the
best gift you have left to me. We are poor and sick creatures at best; but we
can have well memories, and sound and healthy thoughts of one another still,
and an intercourse may be remembered which was without blur, and above
us both. (Sanborn, 1895, pp. 53-54 quoted in part by Richardson, 1986, p.
121)
Thoreau’s only defense here against his feeling of sadness was nostalgia for happier
times, and this coping strategy crept into his professional writings.
Loss of a Surrogate
Meanwhile, according to Harding’s account, Thoreau was feeling restless
with his life (1982). He began to seek forms of employment that did not involve
manual labor in March 1843, and wrote to Emerson to ask him for advice in that
endeavor (p. 145). At the time, Emerson was staying with his brother on Staten
Island during the New York leg of his lecture circuit (p. 145). Emerson’s brother,
William, the County Seat Judge of Richmond Court, had a number of children that he
wanted to see well educated (p. 145). They talked about Thoreau’s situation, and
Emerson agreed with his brother’s proposition that Thoreau would be an ideal
candidate for tutoring the children (p. 145). What we know about the
correspondence between Thoreau and Emerson we know from Emerson’s
correspondence with his brother, and the following words need to be read through
that lens:
I have to say that Henry Thoreau listens very willingly to your proposition[;]
he thinks it exactly fit for him & he very rarely finds offers that do fit him. He
says that it is such a relation as he wishes to sustain, to be the friend &
educator of a boy, & one not yet subdued by schoolmasters. (p. 145)
There was a lot of truth in Emerson words. Thoreau’s previous relationship with
Edmund Fuller indicates that Thoreau did like to teach young men. However, the
fact that Thoreau deliberately shuttered his academy when he could have kept it
open does not cohere with Emerson’s correspondence. If Thoreau was so desperate
for work, and he must have experienced that desperation after he quit his teaching
position in 1837, then there was a more important motive for Thoreau’s decision to
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move to New York. As Emerson mentioned later in his letter to his brother, Thoreau
still wanted to make writing a profession (p. 146).
Thoreau returned to his family from New York at the tail end of 1843 with
his tail between his legs (p. 157). He failed to do anything in New York but network
with publishers and get further into debt (p. 157; Fink, 1992). He put the experience
out of his mind, and immediately went to work in his father’s pencil factory
(Harding, 1982, p. 157). He made a number of breakthroughs in the pencil
manufacturing process, and developed a method of adjusting the hardness and
brittleness of the pencil graphite (p. 157). He worked in the factory so much that he
began to dream about it (p. 157).
At this point, Thoreau’s relationship with Emerson was deteriorating
(Sattelmeyer, 1989, pp. 192-193 as cited by Rossi, 2010). “It is clear that Emerson’s
enthusiasm for his younger friend had been steadily moderating for several years,
beginning as early as 1842 and 1843” (Sattelmeyer, 1989, p. 192). As Roach (1996)
has observed, “surrogation rarely if ever succeeds” (p. 2). Up until this point,
Emerson had been a boon to Thoreau is several ways, including being an editorial
advocate, moneylender, employer, and job finder (Fink, 1992). Soon he would also
be allowing his friend to stay on a newly purchased plot of wilderness land
(Harding, 1982). However, in Emerson’s judgment, Thoreau was squandering his
blessings (Fink, 1992). He complained in writing about the “phlegmatic” “Natural
History of Massachusetts” and how “nervous & wretched” he felt to read “A Winter
Walk” (Sattelmeyer, 1989, p. 193). Sattelmeyer also pointed out that while Emerson
was complaining privately about Thoreau’s prolixity, he was publishing fawning
praise about Ellery Channing’s poems (Emerson, 1843 as cited by Sattelmeyer,
1989). It is not surprising that at this time, Emerson wrote in the privacy of his
journal, “H[enry] will never be a writer[;] he is active as a shoemaker” (quoted by
Sattelmeyer, 1989, p. 193).
At the end of April 1844, Thoreau took a break from pencil making and went
on an even more disastrous trip than his stay in New York (Harding, 1982, pp. 159161). This time, it was a vacation with his friend Edward Sherman Hoar to boat on
the Sudbury River (p. 159). The river trip never materialized (p. 160). Their mistake
occurred when they stopped to cook a mess of fish they caught before they had
rowed a mile up the river (p. 160). Their fire produced sparks that lit the dry grass,
and soon their cooking fire was a blaze that they could no longer control (p. 160).
Desperate, the two men raced in separate directions for help (p. 160). Edward took
the boat down the river; Thoreau ran on foot through the woods towards town (p.
160). Thoreau relayed the news to the owner of the woods, and they returned to the
scene (p. 160). By this time the fire was half a mile wide, and they realized that they
needed more help (p. 160). The owner of the woods ran to town (p. 160). However,
Thoreau had run two miles, and his weak lungs were spent (p. 160). Instead of
walking to town or waiting for assistance, he shamefully sneaked off to the cliffs of
Fair Haven, and watched as the town citizens responded (p. 160). On May 3, the
Concord Freeman reported that the fire had burned 300 acres and caused two
thousand dollars of damage (p. 161). If it were not for the fact that Edward Hoar’s
father was the leading citizen of the town, the two might have been prosecuted in
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court (p. 161). For the rest of his life, Thoreau was infamous among the residents of
Concord for causing what James Kendall Hosmer called “the forest fire” (Lebeaux,
1984, p. 118).
The fire fiasco weighed on Thoreau, but even in his journal he gave no
indication of having a guilty conscience. He wrote nothing of it for six years. Then, in
his journal, he wrote an account of what had occurred. What is particularly telling
about Thoreau’s version is how little responsibility and blame he seems to have
accepted. He excused himself, on account of some convenient facts, such as the
matter of the forest not really belonging to anyone, and that he interpreted
everyone’s excitement as merely an opportunity to throw water on some flames. It
seems more likely that Thoreau was in denial, that he was actually ashamed of the
episode, and that he could not bring himself to be accountable for what had
occurred. Whatever his personal feelings about the fire, Thoreau continued to focus
on his writing and worked with his father making pencils (Harding, 1982).
Historians do not have to speculate how Thoreau’s behavior affected his
relationship with Emerson. In 1844, Emerson published his second series of essays,
which included “Experience.” In that essay, Emerson complained: “We see young
men who owe us a new world, so readily and lavishly they promise, but they never
acquit the debt; they die young and dodge the account: or if they live, they lose
themselves in the crowd” (1983, p. 474 as quoted by Sattelmeyer, 1989, p. 194). In
the privacy of his journal, Emerson recorded these words with explicit reference to
Thoreau (Sattelmeyer, 1989, p. 194).
In the summer of that year, the Thoreau pencil business was doing well
enough that Mrs. Thoreau had decided that they should own a house (Harding,
1982, pp. 177-178). On September 10, 1844, Mr. Thoreau made a down deposit of
25 dollars for a three-quarters-acre lot (p. 177). Two days later, he was approved
for a $500 mortgage (p. 177). Henry’s assistance was integral. He dug and stoned in
a cellar, and then helped his father build the house (pp. 177-178). They bought two
vacant Irish shanties, and used the lumber to add a lean-to shed to house the pencil
business (p. 178). The town assessors valued the two-story complex at $1100 (p.
178). Thoreau not only had learned how to build a house, but he also learned how to
do it on a shoestring budget.
At this time, Thoreau had been dreaming for a long time of living by himself
in a house built by himself, and now it seemed that he could make his dreams a
reality (p. 181). All he needed was a place upon which to build. He had tried to squat
at Flint Pond after he graduated from college, but the plan did not work out with Mr.
Flint (Eidson, 1951 as cited by Thoreau, 1995). Fortunately, Emerson had just
recently bought the area surrounding Walden Pond for 300 dollars, and he
reluctantly agreed to let Thoreau build a cabin at the pond (Sattelmeyer, 1989, pp.
195-196). As soon as the 1844-45 winter broke, he dug another cellar a few
hundred feet from the shores of Walden Pond (p. 181). Then, he bought a local
shack, dismantled it, and moved the lumber to the construction site (pp. 180-181).
He also borrowed an axe, and proceeded to chop down pine trees for studs (p. 179).
He bought some nails, and went to work framing his cabin (p. 182). He must have
been terrible with a hammer, as excavators later found an unusual number of bent
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nails buried at the construction site (p. 182). Furthermore, Thoreau had detailed his
costs for construction supplies, and his nails entry was unusually expensive (p. 182).
He then asked his friends to help him raise the frame.9 He sheathed his hut with
used and sundried boards from Collins’ shanty, and began to occupy it on
Independence Day, 1845 (pp. 180-181).
Thoreau knew that if he wanted to become a successful writer, he had to “get
away from it all” (Harding, 1982, p. 179) and away from the heteronomy of his
mentor and his family. His cabin was his answer. Thoreau spent two years, two
months, and two days at the cabin. He left his cabin for two trips: the first time was
during his night in jail, and the second time was his trip to Mount Katahdin
(Lebeaux, 1984, p. 47). He returned to civilized life again after he had completed
first drafts of the only books he would publish in his lifetime: A Week, and Walden
(Harding, 1982).
Thoreau’s purpose of going to Walden Pond is a riddle, and the difficulty of
the riddle has to do with the fact that his purposes for moving to Walden Pond
changed dramatically after he moved in. In terms of economics, it was a necessary
move if he wanted to get any work done as a writer. Henry was living in the attic of
the new Thoreau home (Harding, 1982), and the increased number of renters there
must have been a distraction. As Thoreau claimed in Walden, his purpose for living
in the woods was “to live deliberately” (1985, p. 394), which has been interpreted in
a number of ways. To some it means that he lived simply, attempting to reduce his
cost of living. To others it means that he wished to interrogate the essence of living,
in the spirit of “A Winter Walk,” (1843b) by experimenting with asceticism. My
interpretation of the situation is that he had two objectives in mind when he went
there: to create a place to work that would suit his needs for solitude when it was
necessary; to find a place to live that pleased him. These two purposes are
interrelated. Furthermore, Thoreau found additional advantages that gave him still
another reason why such sojourns are worth undertaking. He was reacquainting
himself with nature, and slowly opening himself to the relationship. However,
during Thoreau’s famous stay at the pond, his understanding of friendship was not
fully developed. He was still limiting his friendships to animate relationships,
despite his claims to the contrary in Walden.
Although Thoreau’s residence at Walden Pond was a time of work and
solitude, there was plenty of time to be social and have friends (Abelove, 2003). As
Thoreau indicated in Walden, he made frequent walks to town. He also boasted that
his friends found his Spartan dwelling to be more than sufficient for having a good
time. Ellery Channing bunked with Thoreau at the cabin for two weeks (Harding,
1982). The anonymous woodchopper described in Walden was a real person, Alek
Therien, and the man was quite fond of Thoreau (Bradford, 1963). It is clear from
His assistants, not named in Walden, included the following: “Emerson, Bronson
Alcott, Ellery Channing, George William Curtis and his brother Burrill, and Thoreau’s
favorite Concord farmer, Edmund Hosmer, and his sons John, Edmund, and Andrew”
(Harding, 1982, p. 181).
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the number of social gatherings and Thoreau’s unwillingness to be a recluse that
Thoreau only wanted to be alone some of the time.
Thoreau’s stay at Walden Pond was enormously productive. As he explained
in Walden, in terms of productivity, not only did he maintain a bean field, but he also
wrote. In the two years that he spent at the pond, Thoreau produced more writing
than during any other two year stretch of time in his life (Richardson, 1986). He
continued to write in his journal, which was just beginning to shape up into a visible
work of writing in its own right. It is not surprising that Thoreau began to search for
a publisher to arrange for his first book to be printed (Fink, 1992).
Surprisingly, the end of Thoreau’s residence at Walden Pond came at the
request of Emerson’s wife, Lidian (Sattelmeyer, 1989 as cited by Rossi, 2010).
Waldo had decided to take a trip to England (Harding, 1982, p. 197). Lidian was
unwell, and because Emerson was going to be away for a longer time period than his
domestic tours, she felt it to be important to ask someone trustworthy to stay with
her and the children; Thoreau agreed and returned to town (Sattelmeyer, 1989).
According to Sattelmeyer (1989), Thoreau’s stay at the Emerson house
without his mentor reveals a great deal about the growing distance between the two
men and a growing intimacy between Thoreau and Lidian. While Waldo was in
England, he was in correspondence with Lidian and Thoreau (pp. 196-198). Waldo’s
relationship with Lidian suffered (p. 196). Not only was Lidian physically unwell,
but she was also dependent on Thoreau (Harding, 1982, p. 197). Lidian complained
of a cold Waldo through her letters. Emerson brushed off her pleas for warmth and
promised to return “shortly and behave the best I can” (Sattelmeyer, 1989, p. 197).
Sattelmeyer quoted Gay Wilson Allen, who concluded that Emerson took the trip not
because he needed money, but because he was “bored and dissatisfied with his life”
(p. 196). In one of Thoreau’s letters to Waldo, he wrote, “Lidian and I make very
good housekeepers. She is a very dear sister to me” (p. 197). Thoreau’s use of
“sister” was not just a casual jab or an accident. In Thoreau’s journal, he wrote about
this relationship more explicitly:
I still think of you as my sister. I presume to know you. Others are of my
kindred by blood or of my acquaintance but you are mine. You are of me & I
of you I can not tell where I leave off and you begin.— there is such a
harmony when your sphere meets mine To you I can afford to be forever
what I am, for your presence will not permit me to be what I should not be.
(quoted by Sattelmeyer, 1989, p. 198)
The entry went on to make it clear that Thoreau was not talking about his actual
sisters (p. 199). Then, Thoreau ended his entry with an explanation for why this
relationship was so important to him:
On the remembrance of whom I repose— — So old a sister art thou—so
newly hast thou recreated me. Who speakest never colored words—who art
not possessed by a demon. Who dwellest in the morning light whose eyes are
like the morning star Who comest to me in the morning twilight (quoted by
Sattelmeyer, 1989, p. 199)
Thoreau was replacing Waldo with Lidian as his friend. In other words, Lidian was
the second candidate for John’s surrogate in Thoreau’s world of fraternal loss.
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According to Sattelmeyer, one of the Emerson children also felt the need to
compensate for their father’s absence. In the same letter that Thoreau confessed to
Waldo that he had begun to view Lidian as a sister, he reported the behavior of the
Emerson children in a way that would have disturbed any father. In the letter,
Thoreau continued:
Ellen and Edith and Eddy and Aunty Brown keep up the tragedy and comedy
and tragic-comedy of life as usual. . . [Eddy] very seriously asked me, the
other day, ‘Mr. Thoreau, will you be my father?’ I am occasionally Mr. Roughand-Tumble with him that I may not miss him, and lest he should miss you
too much. So you must come back soon, or you will be superseded. (quoted
by Sattelmeyer, 1989, p. 197)
Although we must guess as to Waldo’s reaction to these comments, the fact remains
that Thoreau was taking on Waldo’s role as “paterfamilias,” not only to Emerson’s
wife, but to the Emerson children as well (p. 196). Unfortunately, as Roach has
observed, “the very uncanniness of the process of surrogation, which tends to
disturb the complacency of all thoughtful incumbents, may provoke many unbidden
emotions” and might also induce forgetting (pp. 2-3). Thoreau later wrote in his
journal that he did not know why he left Walden Pond when he did (Arsić, 2016).
Thoreau’s forgetting can easily be attributable to an anxiety over securing an
appropriate replacement for a sibling.
When Emerson returned, he brought two things back with him that alienated
Thoreau (Sattelmeyer, 1989). First, he brought his old status as head of household
back to where it belonged. Thoreau moved back into his parents’ house, and
continued to make pencils (Harding, 1982, p. 234). He also continued to search for a
publisher willing to print his first book; Thoreau was having problems finding a
publisher that would front the printing costs (Fink, 1992). The second thing that
Emerson brought back was a different man than the one that had left the U.S. the
previous year. Sattelmeyer (1989) wrote, “He was suddenly full of praise for
England and the English—their wonderful manufacturing economy, transportation,
and even culture—and was much more stereotypically the Boston Brahmin than he
had even been before” (p. 197). To illustrate how much he had changed, Sattelmeyer
pointed out that Emerson had even developed a habit of smoking after-dinner
cigars, and found himself in need of a club. He “soon joined Alcott in founding the
Town and Country Club, a loose-jointed organization much more given to sociability
and dinners than the earlier Transcendental Club had been” (p. 197). Thoreau did
not join the club, but he did continue to care for Lidian (p. 197).
What followed was one of the most foolish things that Thoreau ever did in his
life: he published his first book on credit (Fink, 1992). Thoreau was most likely
discouraged after being rejected by publishers, but that does not explain the errant
foolishness of his financial gamble, especially with his awareness of the shackles of
debt. Perhaps his lack of self-regard was a result of feelings of guilt caused by
melancholia, as Butler (1997) and Leader (2008) predicted? Thoreau could not
afford to front the printing costs for a thousand copies of A Week (p. 214). He
consulted with his mentor, Emerson, who seemed to have a positive opinion of the
text (p. 212). He urged Thoreau to publish the book with his own funds, as Emerson
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had done previously with his own publications (p. 212). As it turned out, Emerson
was simply repeating to Thoreau his own advice from 1844.10 Thoreau entered into
an agreement with Munroe publishers: they agreed to publish the book, but on the
condition that Thoreau would pay the publishing costs if the book failed to sell (p.
199). He signed the contract in 1849, and it only took a few months for him to
discover that he had made an enormous mistake (Harding, 1982). The book
received mixed reviews from newspapers and magazines, and Emerson refused to
give it any public review (Fink, 1992). Furthermore, Munroe, noticing that it had no
real stake in ensuring that the book did well, made no effort to publicize it (p. 213).
Most of the books sat in a warehouse until the publisher told Thoreau that they no
longer had any space to store the copies; he retrieved the unsold copies, and
Thoreau stored them in his parents’ house (Harding, 1982, p. 254).
There is an interesting perspectival contrast to be drawn from Thoreau’s
actions. Those two perspectives are the prospective and the retrospective, which
match up with Milder’s (1995) contention that Walden tells both a narrated story
and an enacted story of the Walden experience. Thoreau did something that, in
prospect, was an enormously foolish thing, and he suffered with debt for years
before he paid it off. However, in retrospect, Thoreau’s failure set him up to learn a
special lesson from nature about friendship. This is why friendship is important. The
importance of irony comes into play when Thoreau’s forecast made him blind to
specific facts about his plan to publish a book and treat nature as an obedient
subject (p. 96).
Loss of Prestige
Unfortunately, the failure of Thoreau’s first book, combined with his past
embarrassments, would make it impossible for his mourning strategy to succeed.
The Massachusetts Quarterly Review asked Emerson to review A Week, but Emerson
refused, citing that “he was of Thoreau’s ‘same clan & parish’” (quoted by Lebeaux,
1984, p. 106). Not to be denied, the journal commissioned Lowell, who wrote a
devastatingly mixed review that “gave with one hand” and “took away with the
other” (Harding, 1982, p. 250). Instead of admiring and respecting Thoreau, his
contemporaries treated him as laughing stock for the neighborhood: the
irresponsible son who burned a forest and got away with it (Lebeaux, 1984). A
poignant example of this dynamic between the Concord locals and Thoreau was
penned by James Hosmer years later:
Steven Fink (1992) showed that during negotiations to get Margaret Fuller’s book
published in 1844, Thoreau was an ardent advocate of self-publishing. Emerson
wrote to Fuller that “Henry Thoreau has been showing me triumphantly how much
cheaper & every way wiser it would be to publish the book ourselves paying the
booksellers only a simple commission for vending it & conducting personally the
correspondence with distant booksellers” (p. 212). Fink went on to note that Fuller
did not take Thoreau and Emerson’s advice. Her choice “turned out to be an
especially wise one” (p. 212).
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Thoreau in those days was known in the town as an irregular, eccentric
spirit, rather hopeless for any practical purpose. He could make a good leadpencil but having mastered the art he dropped it, preferring to lead a
vagabond life, loitering on the river and in the woods, rather to the
disquietude of the community, though he had a comfortable home cared for
by his good mother and sister. . . . This strange man, rumor said, had written
a book no copy of which had ever been sold. . . . The edition fell dead from the
press, and all the books, one thousand or more, he had collected in his
mother’s house, a queer library of unsold books which he used to exhibit to
visitors laughing grimly over his unfortunate venture into the field of letters.
My aunt sent me one day to carry a message to Mrs. Thoreau and my rap on
her door was answered by no other man than this odd son who, on the
threshold received my message. He stood in the doorway with hair which
looked as if it had been dressed with a pine-cone, inattentive grey eyes, hazy
with faraway musings, an emphatic nose and disheveled attire that bore
signs of tramps in woods and swamps. Thinking of the forest fire I fancied he
smelled of smoke and peered curiously up the staircase behind him hoping I
might catch a glimpse of that queer library all of one book duplicated many
times. (Hosmer, 1912, pp. 235-236 as quoted in part by Lebeaux, 1984, p.
118)
Despite the withering criticism in these words, they contain several important
truths for the present study. Abandoning the pencil-making business, loitering in the
wild, and having to pay for hundreds of unsold books were all realities which
Thoreau had to live with after his “unfortunate venture” of self-publishing.
Loss of Friendships
According to Milder, despite having access to a larger living space, or rather
because of it, Thoreau found his network of friends drifting away (1995). The years
beginning in 1849 are the infamous years in which the friendship between Emerson
and Thoreau cooled down and approached a dissatisfying low that would last for the
rest of their lives (Milder, 1995; Sattelmeyer, 1989). However, Thoreau’s friendship
problems were by no means limited to Emerson (Milder, 1995). On February 15,
1851, for example, Thoreau wrote the following in his journal:
Fatal is the discovery that our friend is fallible, that he has prejudices. He is,
then, only prejudiced in our favor. What is the value of his esteem who does
not justly esteem another?
Alas! Alas! when my friend begins to deal in confessions, breaks silence,
makes a theme of friendship (which then is always something past), and
descends to merely human relations! As long as there is a spark of love
remaining, cherish that alone. Only that can be kindled into a flame. I thought
that friendship, that love was still possible between. I thought that we have
not withdrawn very far asunder. But now that my friend rashly,
thoughtlessly, profanely speaks, recognizing the distance between us, that
distance seems infinitely increased.
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Of our friends we do not incline to speak, to complain, to others; we would
not disturb the foundations of confidence that may still be. (1906b, pp. 161162)
There are two imports to glean from this journal entry. The first fact is that the level
of specificity found here is typical of Thoreau’s whole journal. We do not know who
Thoreau was referring to or if there was anyone in particular who precipitated this
entry. Most of Thoreau’s journal entries are open-ended enough that he probably
predicted that someone would be reading his journal, and he carefully maintained
the silence of particular friendships within the confines of his journal. The second
fact that is revealed by this journal entry is that Thoreau was predicating a pattern
from a single example. He went from noticing when his “friend begins to deal in
confessions,” to making remarks about an unwritten principle, “Of our friends we do
not incline to speak, to complain, to others.” This indicates that Thoreau was
noticing a pattern of behavior that was not particular to a single friendship. It also
posits silence and patience as hallmarks of genuine friendship.
Summary
The losses and blunders that Thoreau experienced were profound and
unrelenting. Some of Thoreau’s losses cannot be appreciated within the bounds of
his own life, such as the public nature of the Thoreau family. For him, such
conventions were seen as right, even though Thoreau himself followed the family
form imperfectly. Other losses were acute, such as Thoreau’s loss of his brother.
This was the major loss of his life, more significant than the losses of his friends, his
mentor, and even his prestige; it fed into the melancholia that had begun before.
Finally, some of the losses were chronic, such as his loss of steady employment, his
loss of the surrogates that he had cultivated to replace his brother, and the steady
drifting-away of his friends when his melancholia reached fever pitch in 1849. In
addition to his losses, Thoreau committed several blunders. His decision to move to
Staten Island in 1843, his decision to boat on the Sudbury River in 1844, and his
decision to publish his first book on credit saddled him with 275 dollars of debt
(Harding, 1982, p. 254) and an even more dubious reputation of being a foolish
momma’s boy.
The shock that came from the spectacular change of fortune from a
privileged member of the Transcendental Club to a fallen protégé of a friend-turnedfaux was a complex blow to Thoreau’s ego, an upheaval to his life plan, and the
beginning of a life experience that prepared him to write Walden (Milder, 1995).
Thoreau had already completed three drafts of Walden by the time he sent the final
proofs of A Week to the printing press, but it was nothing close to the masterpiece
that he developed by the time it was published in 1854 (p. 52). The pain was
palpable, the worries and pressures in his life were real, and he could do little about
it but shrink away from his network of friends and colleagues (p. 104). The only
comfort that carried Thoreau the five years between 1849 and 1854 was the
unconditional love that cold facts and cold darkness offered to him. The going was
tough, but time continued to move inexorably forward. The breakthrough for
Thoreau occurred during a dental operation that involved the use of a general
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anesthetic, and the experience sharpened his sense of what was so important about
his melancholic walks in solitude (p. 110).
Thoreau’s Heroic Journey into the Ether
Thoreau’s breakthrough, which happened in 1851, cured him of his
heteronomy. As Richard Lebeaux argued, Thoreau “was coming to realize, when he
could afford to let down his guard and be honest with himself, that he had oriented
himself too much to others’ expectations and demands—his family’s, Emerson’s, his
townspeople’s, the literary establishment’s” (1984, p. 114). Years of effort and hard
work had produced sad fruit, and he came to realize “that it is not easy to find your
own way” (p. 116). He took a trip to Cape Cod later that year “to recapture a sense of
wildness and put distance between himself and the pollution of civilization; the
ocean was a vaster (though less benign) version of the pond” (p. 122). He was
aggrieved at the loss of his friends in the Emerson family (pp. 122-123).
While Thoreau was leaning toward abandoning pencil making, he did not
abandon surveying (Harding, 1982). Because he was staying with his parents, his
rent must have been relatively low, and his surveying jobs and pencil work at the
end of 1849 were sufficient both to make his debt payments and to buy a dedicated
notebook (p. 235). As Harding put it, “Deciding to turn professional, he made up a
list of fourteen books to study, had his compass repaired, acquired a surveyor, a
blank journal, and some drawing paper, and inquired about the prices of a drawing
instrument” (p. 235). According to John Gordan (1955), at some point (we are not
sure when), Thoreau had a broadside advertisement printed in a local circulating
journal, magazine, or newspaper. The evidence for this advertisement was an old
scrap of paper that had been reproduced from an original that has long since been
lost (Harding, 1982, p. 235). “The piece,” Gordan wrote, “is unrecorded in any
published Thoreau bibliography or checklist” (1955, p. 253):
LAND SURVEYING [/] Of all kinds, according to the best [/] methods known;
the necessary data supplied, in order that the boundaries of Farmers may be
accurately described in Deeds; Woods lotted off, distinctly and according to a
regular plan; Roads laid out, &c., &c. Distinct and accurate Plans of Farms
furnished, with the buildings thereon, of any size, and with a scale of feet
attached, to accompany the Farm Book, so that the land may be laid out in a
winter evening.
Areas warranted accurate within almost any degree of exactness, and the
Variation of the Compass given, so that the lines can be run again. Apply to
[/] HENRY D. THOREAU. (pp. 254-255 as quoted by Harding, 1982, p. 235)
According to Gordan, it is possible that this broadside’s publication preceded the
publication of A Week, and it is possible that it was not published until well after
1851. I would venture to conclude that the time of publication was around this time
period in 1849 when Thoreau found himself completely dependent on surveying for
income. Harding also reported that Thoreau did not yet have enough funds in 1849
to repair his own compass, and had to borrow working equipment from Cyrus
Hubbard until he could purchase working equipment in the spring of 1850 (1982, p.
235).
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After A Week, Thoreau published nothing for three years (Fink, 1992). It was
a time for working, reading, reflection, and walking. In a May 31 1850 journal entry,
he wrote about the forest fire incident (1906b, pp. 21-27). He made copious notes of
his first of many trips to Cape Cod; those notes turned into a manuscript that ended
up as a posthumous publication (Harding, 1982). His journal began to swell in 1850
(Lebeaux, 1984).
The journey that proved to be most profitable for Thoreau was one in which
no amount of money would provide: it was a trip that cost him his teeth (Milder,
1995). For his May 12, 1851 journal entry, Thoreau wrote about his experience, or
rather lack of experience, with being anesthetized with ether to remove his teeth
and replace them with false teeth. It is interesting that Richardson (1986) did not
record this episode in his biography. However, Harding’s older (1982) biography
does record this incident, but Harding perhaps did not understand the significance
of the event. Instead, he attributed the perceptual change in Thoreau’s writing to a
realization that he was getting older. I find that the breakthrough for Thoreau came
from the ether, or rather the return from the ether, not from the necessity of having
his teeth replaced. If old age were the catalyst, he wouldn’t have posited his false
teeth as an example of “how much Art outdoes Nature” (quoted by Harding, 1982, p.
296).
For Thoreau, ether’s power was in its ability to unplug an individual’s array
of senses and cause an irreversible change. As Thoreau wrote in his journal, while
you are under, “You are a sane mind without organs” (1906b, p. 194), making a
statement that is eerily similar to Deleuze’s famous “body without organs,” “an
organism without parts which operates entirely by insufflation, respiration,
evaporation and fluid transmission” (1990, p. 88). For Thoreau, as for many people
who have been through similar ordeals, such an experience brought a new
youthfulness to his writing that had not previously been there (Harding, 1982). This
was the ‘boon,’ as Joseph Campbell (1949/2008, p. 148) has referred to it, that
Thoreau returned from the ether. Harding detailed a number of giggle-worthy
things that appeared in his journal after his psychedelic experience (1982). He “was
squeezing pokeberries and rejoicing to see their rich purple wine staining his hand”
(p. 296). He noted “the aroma of wild grapes on the wind and thought he possessed
the sense of smell in greater perfection than usual” (p. 296). He began to swim in the
nude, ritualistically, bathing himself at every stream encountered during his walks
(p. 296). Sometimes he would walk down rivers dressed in nothing but “a hat and
occasionally a shirt to protect himself from the sun” (p. 296). Thoreau’s behavior
was strange enough that Channing wrote about his refusal to follow Thoreau’s
breaks from convention (p. 296).
Months later, the breakthrough was continuing to unfold, to change the way
he read his senses. That summer, he began to describe his nighttime walks with a
newfound intensity; as Lebeaux observed, walking at night gave Thoreau “a
privileged perspective not available to ‘day men’” (1984, p. 132). This privilege
became so important to Thoreau that he sometimes pulled all-nighters to be able to
enjoy a walk in the woods “in order to imbibe his own brand of moonshine” (p. 132).
On August 19, 1851, Thoreau wrote about the need for a “meteorological journal of
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the mind. You shall observe what occurs in your latitude, I in mine” (1906b, p. 403).
The line became famous enough that it was quoted in Annie Dillard’s text, Pilgrim at
Tinker Creek (2007).
Thoreau already understood the power of walking, but his experience with
taking ether further awakened him to his transformative capabilities as a writer
(Milder, 1995). The connection between these two practices, walking and
description, became clear in the additions that he made to Walden during this time
(pp. 52-53). He focused more on the minutia of sensory data that flows during the
winter and the lessons that the body learns when the active season shuts down and
returns in a way that invites polysemic interpretation. Winter is the resting season,
like the taking of ether (or any other psychedelic compound). Like getting lost in the
woods on a stormy night, it produces profound changes in individual identity (Buell,
1995).
The change of individual identity that getting lost does can be profoundly
restorative, but not regressively so. As Lebeaux concluded about Thoreau’s
nighttime walks, the practice “was a means to regain access to the youthful
inspiration and vitality he had lost” (p. 133). More than simply regaining access,
these walks at night functioned as a way to filter and separate his desires from the
desires around him. As anyone who has taken large doses of psychedelics or
traveled to a foreign country can say, the experience of being completely “turned
round” (Thoreau, 1985, p. 459) can be profoundly deprogramming of one’s cultural
values. The return of a traveler or a psychonaut from a ‘trip’ can be just as
transformative as the trip itself, revealing what practices and rituals are done for the
sake of genuine desire, social pressure, and what may be done to relieve
heteronomy.
Coda
When I re-read the quote at the beginning of this chapter, I am reminded of
what Thoreau wrote on his birthday in 1851. In the quote at the beginning of this
chapter, Thoreau was trying to sleep, but the bank of the Merrimack River kept
Thoreau’s mind interested in the many enterprises that the river makes possible,
enterprises that other people and other animals are engaged with. He resisted sleep
because he was thinking about others. Eventually, he and his brother fell asleep, and
had different experiences that night. One brother had a pleasant sleep, but the other
was plagued with a bad dream. When the morning arrived, the assured brother
consoled his mortified friend. The horror turned out to be more than just a dream.
Thoreau went on to encounter the Evil Destinies, who had the power to make those
who come under their influence doubt the sincerity and legitimacy of their desires.
What was Thoreau to do now that his brother was dead? Could his friend-as-nature
really console him?
On July 12, 1851, when Thoreau turned 34, he wrote what seems to me an
affirmative response to that question, and a response to what he had published two
years prior:
8 P. M. — Now at least the moon is full, and I walk alone, which is best by
night, if not by day always. Your companion must sympathize with the
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present mood. The conversation must be located where the walkers are, and
vary exactly with the scene and events and the contour of the ground.
Farewell to those who will talk of nature unnaturally, whose presence is an
interruption. I know but one with whom I can walk. I might as well be sitting
in a bar-room with them as walk and talk with most. We are never side by
side in our thoughts, and we cannot hear each other’s silence. Indeed, we
cannot be silent. We are forever breaking silence, that is all, and mending
nothing. How can they keep together who are going different ways!
I start a sparrow from her three eggs in the grass, where she had settled for
the night. The earliest corn is beginning to show its tassels now, and I scent it
as I walk, —its peculiar dry scent. (This afternoon I gathered ripe
blackberries, and felt as if the autumn had commenced.) Now perchance
many sounds and sights only remind me that they once said something to me,
and are so by association interesting. I go forth to be reminded of a previous
state of existence, if perchance any memento of it is to be met with
hereabouts. I have no doubt that Nature preserves her integrity. Nature is in
as rude health as when Homer sang. We may at last by our sympathies be
well. (1906b, pp. 302-303)
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Chapter Two: Roots of Melancholia
In dark places and dungeons the preacher’s words might perhaps strike root
and grow, but not in broad daylight in any part of the world that I know. The
sounds of the Sabbath bell far away, now breaking on these shores, does not
awaken pleasing associations, but melancholy and somber ones rather. One
involuntarily rests on his oar, to humor his unusually meditative mood. It is
as the sound of many catechisms and religious books twanging a canting peal
round the earth, seeming to issue from some Egyptian temple and echo along
the shore of the Nile, right opposite to Pharaoh’s palace and Moses in the
bulrushes, startling a multitude of storks and alligators basking in the sun.
—Thoreau, A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers, “Sunday” (1985, p.
63)
The epigraph to this chapter is perhaps Thoreau’s most direct engagement
with the effects of melancholia in 1849. Several chapters later in A Week, in what
appears to be a solution for this “unusually meditative mood,” Thoreau prescribed
the light of day that promises to banish the shadows that are cast by our bodies and
spirits. For this early Thoreau, grief always comes from a dark shadow, and the
solution is to accept the fact that “constant abrasion and decay of our lives makes
the soil of our future growth” (p. 286). We simply need to expose our darkness or
illuminate ourselves, turn the humus and sustain the aerobic oxidation of decay, and
“if we preserve ourselves untarnished, we are able to enlighten our shaded side” (p.
287).
In A Week, Thoreau did not distinguish between the loss of an object of desire
and the loss of desire itself when he prescribed daylight. This solution assumes that
“there is no ill which may not be dissipated, like the dark, if you let in a stronger
light upon it” (p. 287), but what if the person is tarnished, as Richard Bridgman
complained about Thoreau (1982)? What if we decide or are forced not to let in or
out that stronger light? Too bad? This is a special concern to those of us who have
become melancholic, who have allowed others to corrupt what we believe is worthy
of grief. In A Week, Thoreau does not seem to have crafted his solution for the
melancholic individual, but for people who have lost a legitimate object of desire.
In 1849, when A Week was published, Thoreau was already experiencing
melancholia, but he was not fully aware of this fact. The text of A Week reveals this;
there, his medicinal poetry assuages the intensity of his grief at the loss of his
brother and his image of pastoral America. It does this by attempting to reproduce
loss within the mind of the reader in a way that presumes to know the reader’s
desires. A Week is beautiful and its language is dense. It is difficult to read, and to a
large extent it was not the easy reading that the natural history and travelogue
readers preferred, producing a tension that would leave Thoreau with additional
loss. Unfortunately, Thoreau’s grief strategy was blind to the realities of the
publishing world. In the scenario Thoreau set up, his ritual of mourning needed to
be legitimated and accepted by his readers. This did not happen, and when Thoreau
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discovered that his grief was solitary among humans, he became aware of his
melancholia and the universal possibilities of friendship that helped him mourn and
restore his powers of metaphorical thinking while preserving his grief for his lost
brother.
After 1849, Thoreau rediscovered a profound and deep relationship with
nature in Walden, departing subtly but significantly from his arguments about
friendship in A Week. Moreover, this friendship with nature was not an attempt at
surrogation (Roach, 1996), for it was not designed to replace John. Rejected by
companions and left to labor under the weight of his financial debt in oblivion,
Thoreau discovered how to relate to “nonhuman agents as bona fide partners”
(Buell, 1995, p. 179). Thoreau’s friendship with nature led him back to his desire to
publish with a seasoned awareness, and reawakened the desires that he had
suppressed early in his career at the behest of Emerson, John, and the rest of his
family. Nature (in its infinite modes of expression) was his best friend: more reliable
and more honest about his situation than his mentor, Emerson. One of nature’s
modes, melancholia, taught Thoreau how to relate to language not just literally, but
when he recovered, also revealed to him the interface between literal and
metaphorical levels of meaning.
While biographers have been able to ascertain the fact that Thoreau had, in
fact, been experiencing melancholia, they have not been able to identify why he was
experiencing that condition and how his understanding of it evolved. Arsić (2016)
has investigated Thoreau’s regenerative process of grieving, tracing his encounter
with melancholia to John’s death. In truth, Thoreau’s melancholia antedated that
tragedy.11 To help make my case, this chapter examines his writings. Before I do so,
it is important to revisit melancholia theory. I do this not simply to reconsider the
current literature on the Freudian tradition of melancholia, but also to examine
Arsić’s analysis of Thoreau’s own take on the topic, which anticipates and departs
from the Freud in important ways. After discussing the theoretical matter of
melancholia, I address Thoreau’s early works, split into three time periods that
correspond to three stages of Thoreau’s experience with melancholia: entrenchment,
transfer, and recognition. The first segment on entrenchment assesses Thoreau’s
early works, focusing on material he wrote before his first book. The second
segment on transfer focuses on that first major work: A Week on the Concord and
Merrimack Rivers. This second segment also introduces literature on irony and
friendship. The third segment that highlights Thoreau’s recognition of his
melancholia focuses on “Walking,” his masterpiece essay that describes of a
technique that assisted him to produce Walden.
Thoreau’s situation and his melancholic condition, I argue, was entrenched in
a suppressed desire to do philosophy using an evolving technique of experimental
writing that he appropriated from Emerson and modified for his own purposes. This
One clear explanation for Arsić’s (2016) trace of Thoreau’s melancholia no further
back than John’s death is her claim that “The Service” was published when he
submitted it to The Dial (see p. 47). My contention is that melancholia was a
preexisting condition for Thoreau when John died.
11
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desire is most obvious in Thoreau’s first essays, one of which was rejected by
Margaret Fuller, a senior Transcendentalist to Thoreau. Fuller’s 1840 rejection of
Thoreau’s essay, “The Service,” is an important moment in the shaping of Thoreau’s
trajectory as a writer,12 and an indication that Thoreau was most likely already
suffering from the classic Freudian form of melancholia that Judith Butler has
further developed as a compound of loss and disavowal (1997). My motivation for
writing Chapter One was to bolster my contention that the stage for this
melancholia stretched back into his early life and the lost genealogy of his family’s
parenting strategies. After Fuller’s rejection, Thoreau was handed multiple
opportunities to write on other topics in writing genres that were significant
departures from Thoreau’s preferred style and topics (Fink, 1992). When John died,
as Arsić (2016) has observed, Thoreau sought to grieve in perpetuity. My argument
about melancholia does not deny this perpetual grief, but rather produces a tension
with it because Thoreau was trying to express a grief that he was also trying to
disavow. Thoreau bowed significantly to market pressures to produce writing that
would sell (Fink, 1992), butting up against his desires that found a prominence in
his “Persius” and “The Service” essays and his desire to grieve for his brother.
During these years, Arsić (2016) observed that Thoreau had thoroughly developed a
skill of “literalization” (p. 8). Since Arsić did not trace Thoreau’s melancholia further
back than John’s death, she does not attribute this literalization to Thoreau’s
melancholia. My contention is that Thoreau’s extended experience with melancholia
was the germ that cultivated and magnified this skill. His literalization is plain to see
in the first version of Walden, but it had not yet become his “language of desire”
(Golemba, 1990, p. 233, p. 234).
Thoreau resurrected his queer experimental writing and lyrical exegesis in A
Week, taking a gamble that the marketplace would validate his grief by allowing that
grief to be transferred to them. A Week was not a failure because it was a bad book.
On the contrary, as Fink (1992) pointed out, A Week was meticulously engineered
and offers an intimate portrait of the values in the Thoreau family, especially a view
of Henry and John Jr. as semi-fused personalities. Instead, A Week failed because
Thoreau was trying to ask an archive to do the work of a repertoire (see Taylor,
2003). This error led him to get a bad publishing deal, and this happened because he
wanted to publish his book for an audience that was not prepared for or accepting of
it (p. 215). This audience problem was caused by the fact that the text was archival
in nature, which made for an inflexible scenario of loss (see Taylor, 2003). The fact
that his mentor, Emerson, did not share his true feelings about his book until after
its publication intensified Thoreau’s feelings of betrayal (Fink, 1992, p. 248). Had A
Fuller wrote her rejection of “The Service” to Thoreau on December 1, 1840
(Thoreau, 1902, p. ix). However, Fink (1992) has pointed out that Emerson probably
anticipated the rejection, as evinced by Emerson’s written apologia to Fuller in
August of that year, and Fuller’s not placing the essay in the October issue of The
Dial (pp. 30-31). This anticipation would have been communicated to Thoreau far
earlier than Fuller’s letter. The letter was simply confirmation of the two men’s
suspicions.
12
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Week been printed with a different publishing firm and stripped down to the form
and style of “Ktaadn” or Cape Cod, or perhaps made into a lecture performance that
sought to transfer a repertoire to an audience who could modify Thoreau’s scenario
and transfer the repertoire to others (see Taylor, 2003), A Week would most likely
have been more successful in terms of circulation (Fink, 1992, p. 215). However, it
would not have been such an intense and durable fusion of an autobiography and a
counter-monument to his late brother and pastoral America. When A Week failed to
sell, it further invalidated Thoreau’s grief and forced him to work as a surveyor to
pay off his debt (Harding, 1982).
A Week’s publication precipitated a personal crisis for Thoreau (Milder,
1995), inducing him to retreat further into the wilderness with the company of
nature and sadness where he discovered that nature shared the grief that he had
made contingent on human validation. This natural validation revealed to Thoreau
how to write that recovery for others. This crisis started around late 1849 with the
unfolding commercial failure of A Week and his falling out with Emerson (Milder,
1995; Fink, 1992). His melancholia and nighttime walks both forced him to engage
with the interface between the literal and the metaphorical aspects of language,
enabling him not just to literalize his prose, as Arsić observed, but also to leave
metaphorical significance fallow in wild furrows for his readers to sow their own
seeds and witness how friendship functions. The triad of melancholia, irony, and
nomadic sauntering are the experiences and practices that he used to invent
Walden.
Melancholia
Melancholia is a difficult topic to analyze because its psychic workings are
concealed from self-discovery by melancholics, and twice removed from
professional analysis. However, I argue that it is this self-sealing nature of
melancholia that bestows a special skill of communication that can be carried
forward beyond recovery to help others recover. Unfortunately, the traditional
mode of recovery, detailed by the Freudian tradition, curtails the importing of this
special skill for therapeutic purposes and gives psychoanalysis an undeserved
monopoly on melancholia therapy. Thoreau’s own experience with melancholia and
his recovery from it provides a powerful alternative to the Freudian model that ends
this monopoly by turning former melancholics into walking advocates and cures.
The Freudian model posits two different models of mourning, and they both
have one important similarity and one important difference. Originally, the Freudian
model posited that mourning was done for the purpose of replacing a lost object
(Butler, 1999, 1997), but Darian Leader’s (2008) more recent version of Freudian
mourning indicates that the purpose is for the subject to live with loss. The
similarity between ‘normal’ mourning and melancholia is at the beginning of the
process, since both begin with the illusion that the object has not actually been lost
(Arsić, 2016). This illusion is made possible by a figure that Abraham and Torok
called “antimetaphor,” which is “not simply a matter of reverting to the literal
meaning of words, but of using them in such a way—whether in speech or deed—
that their very capacity for figurative representation is destroyed” (1994a, p. 132).
43

Arsić’s analysis seems to agree that this “demetaphorization” (Rand, 1994, p. 105) is
a characteristic of melancholia, although her sources vary in their accounts of how it
comes about. The difference between the two kinds of mourning comes into play
when the two processes progress through time. This difference is produced by the
presence or absence of another process known as ‘introjection,’ which is a process
that occurs in everyday life where we appropriate desires from the objects in our
world to which we are attached (Rand, 1994, p. 100). These objects are phenomenal,
and as such they are being constructed from sensory data as we form attachments
to them. When loss occurs, melancholic individuals disavow their desires (for any
number of reasons, such as coercion from the agent that caused the loss, seduction
by prospective surrogates, or feelings of betrayal caused by the loss itself), and it is
the disavowal that stops the process of introjection (Butler, 1997). Unfortunately,
according to the model developed by Abraham and Torok, the only way to dissolve
the “antimetaphorical activity” (Butler, 1999, p. 87) is slowly through introjection.
Normal mourners begin their journey in denial (the first stage of loss), and
introjection carries them to the next stage of anger directed outwards at the pace in
which demetaphorization is dispelled. Furthermore, as the reality of loss gradually
sets in, the process of introjection continues with the memory of the lost object—
with the understanding that the memory was produced by someone or something
that has been lost. Thus, contrary to some understandings of this process (e.g., Rand,
2007), mourning does not achieve a detachment of desire (i.e., decathexis) from the
lost object. Grief never truly ends, but the process of recovery from
demetaphorization, which I identify as mourning, does resolve, affirming Darian
Leader’s (2008) contention that grieving and mourning are two different things, and
that the proper goal of mourning is not to eliminate grief, but to reduce its intensity
so that it may coexist with life.
Ordinarily, overcoming the barrier of demetaphorization is a natural process
accomplished during mourning by allowing introjection to do its work, but in
melancholia, an intervention is needed; the Freudian tradition intervenes on one
level; Thoreau intervenes on two levels. In the Freudian tradition, overcoming the
barrier of demetaphorization that guarantees the secured encryption of melancholia
involves a partnership that targets the disavowal of desire, not melancholia itself
(Abraham & Torok, 1994c). Responding to the usual and dysfunctional response to
melancholia that urges the aggrieved to ‘move on,’ Abraham and Torok point out
that any push that condemns or threatens the crypt itself is counterproductive
because what melancholic subjects need to do—what they have disabled themselves
from doing—is mourn for the lost object and address the legitimate reasons why it
has been retained (p. 156). Telling melancholics to ‘move on’ tells the subjects that
their encryptions of their lost objects are illegitimate, that they need to be
disavowed, thereby reinforcing the shackles of melancholia (p. 156). What those
around melancholic subjects should do, instead of threatening the crypt, is to
embrace the crypt, and to display friendly hospitality for the secret within the crypt;
this requires that the contents of the crypt be “laid out in the open and recognized as
the unalienable property of the subject” (p. 156). Once this occurs, melancholic
subjects can introject the contents of the crypt (Butler, 1999, 1997). Psychoanalysis,
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according to Abraham and Torok, facilitates this by inducing the melancholic to
project the crypt onto the psychoanalyst and using them as a symbol of the lost
object—a stand-in for the crypt itself. For Thoreau, this was not an option. For
Thoreau, the problem was that he thought that he had dealt with the melancholia
that had occurred with the death of his brother, but in fact he had a prior
melancholia that had escaped his awareness, and psychoanalysts did not yet exist.
Thus the issues of recognition and the requirement of psychoanalytic assistance
affect how well Freudian intervention works. Thoreau’s intervention deals with this
problem by inducing ego death, which for Thoreau was caused by his experience
with ether, and for those of us without access to such a compound, we are to get lost
on a sauntering walk. When ego death occurs, the melancholic is forced to come to
terms with the fact that the lost object has in fact been lost, because the subject
(along with the object) has died. However, since the memory is obviously still
present, it is recognized as not the object that was lost.
Branka Arsić (2016) argued that Thoreau departured from the Freudian
model, building an alternative that advocates perpetual grief for losses that are
constantly occurring and constantly being transformed anew. Thoreau’s preferred
grief, according to Arsić, was a kind of perpetual mourning that resists mourning
through representational means, giving the incorporated object its own life at the
expense of oneself. In this kind of mourning, argued Arsić, the bereaved refuses the
conventional wisdom that one’s memories or perceptions are representations. This
is the consequence of Thoreau’s literalization, which Arsić argued can be implicitly
traced as far back as 1837 and became explicit in 1842 (this explication happened
after Fuller’s rejection of “The Service” in 1840). By my reading of Arsić, she held
that Thoreau lived with demetaphorization for his entire life. My reading of Thoreau
is that he recovered from this insistence on literality, and appreciated the spacious
capacity of the phenomenal world to accommodate both literal and metaphorical
meaning—space for all of one’s remembered losses—all sources of desire.13 In any
event, it is a good thing that Thoreau found a way to mourn through nonrepresentational means, since Leader (2008) was adamant that symbolic mourning
is necessary to dissolve demetaphorization. As it is my contention that Thoreau’s
recovery was enabled through a friendship with nature, and not by unilaterally
Perhaps the most lucid evidence of Thoreau’s recovery was a March 7, 1852
journal entry, quoted by Henry Golemba (1990, p. 8): “As I look down the rail-road,
standing on the west brink of the Deep Cut—I seem to see in the manner in which
the moon is reflected from the west slope covered with snow, in the sort of misty
light as if a fine vapor were rising from it—a promise or sign of spring. This stillness
is more impressive than any sound,—the moon, the stars, the trees, the snow, the
sand when bare,—a monumental stillness, whose void must be supplied by thought.
It extracts thought from the beholder, as the void under a cupping-glass raises a
swelling. How much a silent mankind might suggest! There is no snow on the trees.
The moon appears to have waned a little, yet, with snow on the ground, I can plainly
see the words I write. What a contrast there may be between this moon and the
next!” (1906c, pp. 340-341).
13
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projecting his own significance onto it, nature’s non-representational mode of
communication is a unique walk to recovery that gives the necessary space for
metaphorical interpretation to be introduced by the observer.
Whatever the ultimate truth is regarding how we mourn and grieve or should
mourn and grieve, the cause of melancholia is the disavowal of desire, and it is this
disavowal that produces and intensifies the literalization or demetaphorization, the
latter which scholarship has noticed as a touchstone of the melancholic experience.
The longer an individual bears with the experience of melancholia, the more
thoroughly they are familiarized with the practice of stripping symbols of their
metaphorical fertility, and the symbols are left bare. It is my contention that
Thoreau restored the legitimacy of his desires that he set aside when he bowed to
the writing constraints that Fuller articulated when she informed Thoreau that “The
Service” was unacceptable. Since he spent years as a melancholic, he carried a
profound familiarity with literalization/demetaphorization forward in his writing
practices, but also returned with a restored awareness that literal meaning has
room for metaphors, and that that space draws on what the reader has suppressed.
Thoreau’s Early Career
This section analyzes Thoreau’s major writings that he composed before A
Week. In this time period, Thoreau’s oeuvre is varied and spans different genres.
This ‘literature’ review is structured into three main parts. The first part focuses on
his seminal essay, which has been neglected in the secondary literature. This essay,
“Aulus Persius Flaccus,” has been dismissed or ignored by many scholars. I find that
although it was written in a style that is not easy to read and that it is exceptionally
abstract, it contain arguments that are important clarifications that set Thoreau
apart from not only Emerson, but also most thinkers who follow Hegel. The second
part of this review focuses on the nature-writing essays. These essays were written
with a different style and focus than his early essays and the remaining essays that I
will discuss in the third part of this section. These nature-writing essays form a
compositional tension when juxtaposed with first book, A Week. This tension is
evidence of the melancholia that Thoreau was unable to recognize. The final part of
this review focuses on other writings that do not fit into the nature-writing genre.
These essays demonstrate Thoreau’s development of a symbolic statement about
desire.
“Persius”
The first essay in Thoreau’s career, “Aulus Persius Flaccus,” is an important
opportunity to view some of Thoreau’s philosophical perspectives before they were
integrated into his nature writing. “Persius” shows that Thoreau was following
Spinoza and ignoring Hegel.
Thoreau’s debut publication, “Aulus Persius Flaccus” (1840), is the densest
and most underappreciated example of writing that he ever published in his
lifetime. In just four pages of text with wide margins, Thoreau brought special
attention to Persius’ lineage, and described a model for affirmative difference that
does not rely exclusively on negation when he shows the learning curve of genius.
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The main argumentative project in “Persius” is to announce Thoreau’s criticism of
uninspired satire. Perhaps the most important sentence in the essay lays this
reasoning out: “Truth never turns to rebuke falsehood; her own
straightforwardness is the severest correction” (p. 118).
For Thoreau, what made satire inspired was not an abstract Muse, but a
process that frees the satirist from the object of complaint. Thoreau wrote that there
is “a sort of necessary order in the development of Genius” (1840, p. 118). This
order consists of three waypoints: Complaint, Plaint, and then Love. Perhaps what
made the essay so difficult to analyze was the fact that Thoreau never explained
what difference he meant between “complaint” and “plaint.” In the modern
colloquial sense, there is no difference between those two words. Etymologically,
however, ‘complaint’ is different from ‘plaint’ with respect to object relations. On the
one hand, a complaint involves a target, situation, or condition. An example of this is
a legal complaint. In common law, a legal complaint always occurs against at least
one other party (James, 1961). A plaint is a somewhat archaic word, and it is
actually the root word of complaint. The difference is ‘plaint’ is missing the prefix
‘com,’ which means “together.” This means that the first step toward genius was
separating satire from the original target that served as the impetus of attack in the
first place.
The separation that the transition from ‘complaint’ to ‘plaint’ accomplishes is
a transition from the tears of sorrow to the tears of joy, a natural progression
(Thoreau, 1840). Thoreau argued that the highest form of poetry and nature herself,
which offers the gentlest “reproof to the hearer” (p. 118), is like the “sighs of her
winds in the woods” (p. 118). For Thoreau, “As long as there is satire, the poet is, as
it were, particeps criminis” (1985, p. 252). The importance of graduating beyond
negation cannot be overestimated in Thoreau’s philosophy, and in Thoreau’s life. As
anyone who is familiar with Hegelian philosophy knows, negation is the central
component that allows his dialectical engine to function. Negation links together
thesis and antithesis, and brings a new antithesis to the new synthesis. Thoreau’s
philosophy does not propose that any person or any idea should exist merely to
oppose another person or another idea, but will eventually stand on their own
merits and sing the song that they hear. This is why Thoreau wants each person to
graduate beyond complaint. This incompatibility between Thoreauvian and
Hegelian thought complicates the relationship between Thoreau and other scholars
who have used a Hegelian framework to write about Thoreau (Warner, 2002, 1992)
and queer culture (Muñoz, 2009), a point I return to in the Conclusion chapter.
Writing Nature From Massachusetts to Maine
In what became a series of nature-writing essays, Thoreau’s effort to
reconcile his desires with the opportunities presented to him is visible in two ways.
First, Thoreau’s idea that his career as a writer made him into a prophet is
noticeable in each of his nature-writing essays, but this role that Thoreau carved out
for himself evolved toward the empowerment of his audience rather than towards
the empowerment of his own prophetic role (Fink, 1992). Second, Thoreau’s naturewriting essays are a fascinating inventory of experimental writing. Thoreau began
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his career in nature writing with a gift publication from Emerson (p. 42), and the
reader has a brief opportunity to find Thoreau being honest about what interested
him and what did not. After Thoreau was able to secure publishing outlets outside of
the Transcendentalist territory of The Dial and realized that Emerson was using him
to fill his journal, the reader begins to see this Thoreau returning to a bold
experimentation with poetry and prose, reminiscent of his writing in his “Persius”
and “The Service” essays. As the essays progress in more competitive outlets, the
reader finds Thoreau moving away from poetry and towards a subtle awareness of
feeling and desire. Specifically, Thoreau’s nature writing essays became subtly more
preoccupied with the phenomenon of melancholia.
In this section, I am concerned with the audiences targeted by the nature
writing articles produced by Thoreau before A Week: “Natural History of
Massachusetts,” “A Walk to Wachusett,” “A Winter Walk,” and “Ktaadn and the
Maine Woods.” These articles, when examined as a progression of writing skill and
motivation, reveal a writer who was continuing to grapple with a reading audience
that was more interested in the commodity of nature than the philosophical imports
that Thoreau cherished from those observations. When these essays are read as a
series of publications, Thoreau’s role of prophet began as defined and embraced, but
transformed into a role that was increasingly deflected away from himself and
towards the audience (Fink, 1992). After “Natural History of Massachusetts,” the
reader is exposed to an array of writing experiments, which lead to a curiously
elided concern with melancholia. In the last of these articles, “Ktaadn,” Thoreau’s
narrative is positively dark, leading one to doubt Robert Richardson’s (1986, p. 116)
and Robert Sullivan’s (2009, p. 94) conclusion that his brother’s death somehow
freed him. Instead, I argue, his brother’s death placed a special obligation on Henry;
he began to burn like a candle, and the flame was not entirely his own. This mission
would continue until after A Week’s failure to sell.
The nature-writing essays that Thoreau wrote before A Week reveal a writer
who appeared to be progressing towards two writing conventions. The first
convention acknowledged the prophetic role of Thoreau as author, and this role was
slowly democratized to include the audience in the prophetic process of revelation
(Fink, 1992). Thoreau began this role by being a prophet in the traditional sense, of
making prophecies and sharing those prophecies with his readers (1842). Later, he
experimented with sharing the empirical method of revelation, showing the
audience how to reach the prophetic role themselves, first by walking up a
mountain, and then taking a winter walk (1843a, 1843b). Then, Thoreau resorted to
pure description to avoid spoiling the empirical method, and letting the readers
reach their own conclusions regarding what qualifies as the prophetic role and the
substance of prophecy during a bruising trek up Mt. Katahdin (1848). The second
convention involved the reader as an active part of the reading experience. Thoreau
began his nature-writing with a straightforward exposition of the philosophical
issues that concerned him (1842). Later, he experimented with complex prose and
poetry that required great effort and, sometimes, special knowledge, to interpret his
writing (1843a). Then, Thoreau resorted to the strategic use of description and the
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avoidance of explanation, to force the reader to do more work of interpretation
(1848).
Thoreau’s published nature-writing reveals a budding writer who was
struggling with a dejection that threatened to consume him. “A Winter Walk” and
“Ktaadn” are appropriate examples. He saw the sad descent that his brother was
taking into infirmity, and he found himself completely helpless to forestall the
entropy that was unfolding all around him. When John died, Emerson tried to
provide him with distracting opportunities, but those opportunities ended up
returning Thoreau to his losses. He did not want to let go, but his career path was
pushing him to do just that.
Thoreau produced other works before A Week, which, taken together,
amount to a coherent statement of his practice of desire. In his first book, which I
discuss later in this chapter, Thoreau was reluctant to leave any of his innovations
or arguments behind, and portions of most of them were imported into the heart of
the manuscript. Thoreau’s omnibus book revealed, with the exception of a few
fleeting relationships, the brutal historical fact that Thoreau was surrounded by a
capitalist society that did not share his values, and did not value his uncommonly
queer and loving soul. It only cared about his labor.
Toward a Statement About Desire
Five of Thoreau’s early writings, when taken together, capture his theoretical
and empirical relationship with desire. Thoreau had a developed understanding of
what he did not want to do, but the affirmative project of pursuing his own desires
was not sufficiently developed. He had learned a considerable amount from his
friend, Emerson, and Thoreau’s family was enormously influential on his values, as
his essays reveal. However, Thoreau had yet to appreciate a more important
relationship that he had already begun to cultivate: friendship with nature.
Thoreau’s frustrations with and disinterest in the intricate facets of the publishing
industry were the most significant reasons why his first book failed. Thoreau did not
understand or accept the fact that the human world of publishing is a part of nature,
and his ironic confidence in his mastery of it was the most significant factor that
made him aware of his melancholic crisis in 1849.
The myriad statements that Thoreau made during this time period about
desire can be summarized. This summary is an extract of five quotations from five of
his essays joined together into a statement that presents Thoreau’s emerging
perspective: Accept that “the past cannot be presented” (1843c, p. 57), ward against
“a love of popularity” (2001, p. 64), and be “a more public character than a
statesman” (1843d, p. 429); we must “succeed alone, that we may enjoy our success
together” (1843e, p. 461), and I will work with “language itself, and the common
arts of life” (1844, p. 292). These five lines were taken from the following five
essays: “Dark Ages” (1843c), “Sir Walter Raleigh” (2001), “The Landlord” (1843d),
“Paradise (to be) Regained” (1843e), and “Homer, Ossian, Chaucer” (1844).
As the concatenated poem above illustrates, the essays that Thoreau
produced in 1843 and 1844 form the kernel of his understanding of desire. Thoreau
was invested in the ways in which memory is stored within whole cultures and
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individuals (1843c). At this time in Thoreau’s development, probably because of his
close proximity to a number of powerful and intelligent scholars who were
grappling with the temptations of fame, the motives for being a productive member
of society became a major concern to him. His earliest influences were, of course, his
family members, but Thoreau was still having difficulty discovering an affirmative
statement about his own beliefs. His essay on poetry was the closest thing to such a
statement about (one of) his own passions, but that perspective needed more time,
writing, and maturity to find its own voice. The poem begins by constructing an
identity in negative terms, mirroring the “complaint” phase in Thoreau’s “Persius”
essay. As this poem continues, the reader sees Thoreau’s family lineage in his praise
for an idealized public citizen. After all of this, Thoreau starts to recognize his own
attraction to instrumental individualism and his passion for working with language
and the arts of prosaic living.
The two major lessons that Thoreau had yet to learn have to do with the
ironic nature of his own philosophical contradictions, and the fact that his writings
on friendship show that he was failing to recognize what was the most important
friendship in his life. Thoreau’s inability to learn these lessons until after 1849
indicate that he did not sufficiently understand irony or friendship.
A Week with Irony and Friendship
In this section, I discuss the relationship of irony and friendship at a
theoretical level and with respect to Thoreau’s situation. Irony and friendship are
timeless topics in philosophy, and continue to be relevant in communication studies.
In addition, they are my two main concerns with respect to the text of his first book.
Irony
Scholarly interest in irony dates back at least as far as Ancient Greece
(Carlson, 1993). Plays were producing characters afflicted with the trope of folly,
and other characters bent on exposing these follies, and characters that could tell
jokes about it (Muecke, 1969). These plays introduced specific stock characters that
interacted with each other, performed folly, and produced important experiences
for the audience (Burke, 1941/1973). The insight that is produced when audiences
are forced to respond to multiple incompatible perspectives and learn vicarious
lessons is the essence of irony that is carried into contemporary theoretical
discussions about this topic (Muecke, 1969).
Ancient Irony
Ancient Greek theatre’s most important contribution to the current inquiry
rests between stock characters (Muecke, 1969). These stock characters showcase
attitudes and patterns of interaction with each other that produce ironic states of
affairs within a dramatic situation (Burke, 1941/1973). Three of these characters,
the eiron, the alazon, and the bomocholus, always appeared in Greek comedy
(Muecke, 1969). The eiron and the alazon also appeared in the finest examples of
Greek tragedy, interacting to produce dramatic ironic situations.

50

Ancient Greek theater helps us understand irony through the interactions of
these stock characters. The eiron, as its name suggests, is the master of irony
(Muecke, 1969; Karstetter, 1964). Audiences find the eiron employing what Aristotle
in his Nicomachean Ethics (1984, p. 1750; 1108a22 as cited by Muecke, 1969)
described as understatement and self-depreciation to humiliate others who exhibit
innocent and confident unawareness. The alazon fulfills the role of the oblivious
character that underestimates skeptical cautions, speaks beyond competence, and
falls victim to folly (Muecke, 1969; Karstetter, 1964). The important contrast
between the eiron and the alazon occurs at an epistemic level, requiring the alazon
to display hubris or express confident anticipations. The last stock character, the
bomolochus, known as the buffoon who supplies comedic wit, crude and direct
address to the audience, employs several narrative tools, and a privileged vantage
point, that allow the author to share information with the audience relatively
transparently (Muecke, 1969).
Muecke noted that the alazon need not appear as a stage character in ironic
performances. Offstage characters or naïve audience members can fulfill the role of
the alazon, and Muecke even went so far to say that modern alazonys (behavior or
speech befitting the alazon) can take the form of a salient school of thought or
prevailing worldview, regardless of whether the ironic text identifies specific alazon
examples and objects of ridicule. Likewise, as Muecke pointed out, the eiron also
need not appear in the ironic performance as a definite character; because the Greek
chorus almost no longer appears in modern dramatic productions, the ironist’s goal
and method may fold into a narrator, the author, the story, or life itself.
The Ancient Greek framework of irony is crucial to understanding how
ancient performances invented dramas that audiences were able to use to witness
irony. However, this analysis is incomplete without a discussion of how audiences
reach this understanding at a psychological level. To make this point, I turn to
Kenneth Burke.
Burke’s Irony
Burke contained his analysis of irony within three texts: the first in his
Attitudes Toward History (1937/1984b), another in his Philosophy of Literary Form
(1941/1973), and finally in his Grammar of Motives (1945/1969).
The first instance of Burke’s attention to irony was couched within his
analysis of ‘comic correctives’ or a ‘comic frame’ (1937/1984b). For Burke, “The
comic frame, in making a man the student of himself, makes it possible for him to
‘transcend’ occasions when he has been tricked or cheated, since he can readily put
such discouragements in his ‘assets’ column, under the head of ‘experience’” (p.
171). This comic frame “should enable people to be observers of themselves, while
acting” (p. 171). However, this analysis, while significant, did not address the
internal mechanisms of irony or how the audience comes to see itself as a proper
object of critique or, to use Burke’s terminology, how the audience experiences
drama.
In “Mainsprings of Character,” Burke (1941/1973) explained why audiences
cannot experience drama without witnessing dramatic irony:
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Dramatic irony arises from a relationship between the audience and the play.
The audience knows that certain tragic events are destined to take place. It
also hears some figure on the stage boasting of good times to come. And in
the audience, as spectator, arises dramatic irony. The audience is powerless
to affect the course of events; at the same time, its sympathy for the
characters makes it long to alter the course of events—and this divided
attitude, a sense of being with the people as regards one’s sympathies but
aloof as regards one’s ability to forestall the movements of destiny, this
awareness of a breach between one’s desires and one’s understanding, this is
ironic. (p. 419).
Writers exploited this dramatic mechanism in the nineteenth century, according to
Burke, to vent their disapproval of popular ambitions. Within irony, dramatists
could express their inability to change events that they disdained by depicting
“people headed with confidence toward desolate ends” (p. 419). Burke noted
Haakon Chevalier’s focus on certain character traits, such as irresponsibility, which
allowed Anatole France to exploit the ironic spectator. Furthermore, Burke rejected
the idea of a pure or separate spectator, emphasizing the need for a naïve audience.
As a kind of summary, in “Four Master Tropes,” Burke (1945/1969)
borrowed Vico’s terminology and built a framework around four overlapping
tropes: metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony. Irony is an interactive process
that occurs within the other tropes to “produce a development” (p. 512). Each of the
“participating ‘sub-perspectives’” is an integral contributor to the development of a
“perspective of perspectives,” and “only through an internal and external
experiencing of folly could we possess (in our intelligence or imagination) sufficient
‘characters’ for some measure of development beyond folly” (p. 512). The
requirement that irony consists of a development led Burke to emphasize that none
of the individual characters can be equivalent or foreign to the development itself.
Discussion
Thoreau’s life up to 1849 was ironic on two counts. At one level, Thoreau’s
decision to publish A Week on credit assumed the role of the alazon. He ignored the
realities of the publishing industry and exposed himself to 275 dollars of
unnecessary debt (Sullivan, 2009). To put this into perspective, he could have
purchased Walden Pond with that money (Fink, 1992). Thoreau could not have
pinned this error on his mentor’s bad advice, since it was his own advice to Emerson
in 1844 that led to Emerson’s own foolish attitude about self-publishing (p. 212).
Second, the content of A Week provided a detailed and honest presentation of
Thoreau-as-alazon. In the book, Thoreau boasted that he “found all things thus far,
persons and inanimate matter, elements and seasons, strangely adapted to my
resources. No matter what imprudent haste in my career; I am permitted to be rash”
(1985, p. 240). He also described nature as predictably obeying the laws of nature,
adding, “This world is but canvas to our imaginations” (p. 238). Thoreau woefully
underestimated the complexity of the publishing industry, indicating that either he
underestimated nature, did not recognize the hostility of the publishing industry (or
the public culture which was fed by the publishing industry) as a part of that nature,
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or both. It is obvious that his relationship with nature was still immature, making it
necessary for nature to teach him an expensive lesson about irony and friendship.
Thoreau’s Procession of Friends
For Thoreau, friendship is the giving and receiving between intermixed
individuals (Crosswhite, 2010). Its only risk, as Thoreau wrote, is that the process
will end, which puts former friends into a position of grief. In this section, I present
Thoreau’s understanding of friendship in 1849. It is helpful to understand Thoreau’s
theory of friendship because it not only helps identify the irony of Thoreau’s
decision to publish A Week, it shows the advantage of Thoreau’s future extension of
friendship to nature, and it exposes some contradictions surrounding the public
nature of friendship.
It should be obvious to any reader of A Week that Thoreau conceived of
friendship as a process, not a structural state of affairs. For Thoreau, as Crosswhite
has discussed, friendship is giving and receiving (p. 167). Friendship involves
friends with each other, but it is not the friends’ relationship that makes it a
friendship; instead, it is a form of “indwelling” between people that breaks the
illusion of independent self-sufficiency (p. 166).14 It is inevitable that friendship
ends when seen through a structural framework (p. 166). Because giving and
receiving is the procession of friendship, and that the giving and receiving is
cultivated from previous giving and receiving, friendship survives the supposed
denouement of particular relationships (p. 168). According to Thoreau, the grief that
is felt at the end of particular friendships can be analyzed in two ways: a contrast
between our unworthiness to be an individual’s friend and our perceived
unworthiness to be their friend, which measures “the intensity of our grief” (1985,
p. 242), and a shade that envelops the image of a lost friend when the aggrieved
subject blocks the source of light (p. 286).
The theory of friendship developed by Thoreau was a reorientation to
friendship that involved an abandonment of a structural understanding of
friendship and a move toward understanding friendship as a process (Crosswhite,
2010). For Thoreau, friendship is giving and receiving (p. 167), and it is an
intermixing of individuality in which “we give the best to, and receive the best from”
(1985, p. 218). It is nothing more than the moments when friends are imbricated
with each other, changing each other (Crosswhite, 2010, p. 168). “The best” are no
external material goods, nor are they instrumental advantages or pleasures. Instead,
“the best” are introjections to ourselves that are supplied by friendship: “the virtue
which we appreciate we to some extent appropriate, so that thus we are made at
last more fit for every relation of life” (Thoreau, 1985, p. 225). For Thoreau,
friendship is no more and no less than that mutual appropriation of virtue. It is
“evanescent” (p. 213 as quoted by Crosswhite, 2010, p. 167). At the same time,
however, friendship for Thoreau is a “perpetual and all-embracing service” that is
According to Crosswhite, “indwelling” is just one translation of perichoresis, “the
old theological word for that relation among the members of the Christian Trinity.”
(2010, p. 166).
14
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found over and over again, changing friends into new beings, turning them into a
friend of new friends, and creating new and wider possibilities for friendship (1985,
p. 217 as quoted by Crosswhite, 2010, p. 168). For Thoreau, the paradox that afflicts
Aristotle’s framework of friendship is not a paradox at all (Crosswhite, 2010, p.
168). Instead, Aristotle’s paradox happens because of two misconceptions. First,
virtuous individuals cannot be assessed apart from their friends(hips) (p. 168, pp.
170-171). Second, friendship should not be framed as a structural achievement (p.
166). Thoreau’s framework for friendship, which was his most significant
theoretical contribution in A Week, was advanced as a combination of empirical
observation and philosophical analysis.
Friendship contradicts several of our assumptions about how public culture
works. Friendship is traditionally seen as a relationship that, for the most part,
occurs outside of public view. However, this is a fiction generated by structural
understandings of friendship. According to Thoreau, friendship comes into existence
by virtue of our daily engagement with strangers, some who will be imagined and
realized as friends by their naming. In other words, friendship is a counterpublic
that exposes the contradiction of the standard public sphere literature that
characterizes strangerhood and intimacy as opposed (see Warner, 2002).
Thoreau’s analysis of friendship consists of his “Wednesday” chapter in A
Week and must be placed in the context of what Thoreau reported for that day. In
that chapter, Thoreau engaged in a mixture of empirical description and digression.
It was a day in which Thoreau and his brother were rowing up the Merrimack River.
In the context of a travel narrative, the digressions could be interpreted as
Thoreau’s musings that were occurring to him during the rowing, floating, sailing,
and walking that was being narrated in exquisite detail. Thoreau noticed that there
were some islands in the river that were not there previously. In addition, near a
spectacular waterfall, Thoreau noticed various holes in the bedrock. Finally, he
recalled a relationship between two men who lived in the area that he had read
about in the local annals. All three of these observations are important opportunities
to describe Thoreau’s theoretical understanding of friendship.
As William Rossi (2010, p. 121) has observed, river islands became Thoreau’s
metaphor to describe friendship, highlighting the difference between processual
and structural orientations toward friendship. During their river trip, John and
Henry noticed that there were a number of islands that periodically formed at river
confluences. These islands, when compared to Thoreau’s memory of his previous
encounter with the area, were ephemeral. The existence of these islands results
from a calming of the river water in specific places, and the depositing of river
sediment in those calm places. The islands are simply an incidental and evanescent
structural effect of friendship between rivers, and the appearance and location of
that friendship changes over time.
In addition to a consideration of river islands as a metaphor, “Wednesday”
also discussed the formation of a curious geological phenomenon near the river’s
waterfalls. While the two brothers were at a waterfall, they noticed that there were
holes that had been carved out of solid bedrock. Thoreau reported the silly
conclusion that the English arrived at to explain the existence of these holes: they
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thought that these holes were artificially carved by the natives to hide provisions
from invaders. Native Americans did not produce these holes. Instead, they were
produced by large river stones that had been caught in specific water currents, and
were forced to spin in place for enough millennia to carve holes into the bedrock.
These stones, which Thoreau thought were perhaps serving endless penance for
past sins, demonstrate Thoreau’s open-ended reframing of friendship as a process. I
see two ways to interpret this description and tracing of the holes in the river, one of
which arrives at Thoreau’s understanding of friendship. In one reading, there is
something in common in each of the relationships that exist in Thoreau’s
description: between the (1) water currents, (2) the river stones, (3) the bedrock,
and (4) the Native Americans. In another reading, the relationships that exist in
Thoreau’s description depict relationships that involve apparent disparities.
Misunderstanding the process of how these holes were formed amounts to an
understanding of friendship as a relationship between self-sufficient individuals.
Only one of these readings agrees with the perpetual aspect of friendship that
Thoreau advanced.
In the first reading of the river holes, Thoreau was able to discuss the
ephemeral moment of friendship caught in a stabilized pattern of repetition that
showcases its timeless features. Although there is apparently none of the parity of
friendship between the stone and the bedrock, the stone grinds away at the bedrock.
As Thoreau wrote, “As if by force of example and sympathy after so many lessons,
the rocks, the hardest material, had been endeavoring to whirl or flow into the
forms of the most fluid” (1985, p. 202). The stones were spinning because they had
inherited a pattern of motion from the water currents, and were passing that lesson
to the bedrock. The giving that occurs in friendship is displayed here surviving the
relationship between the river stones and the river itself, creating a hole in the
bedrock that the Native Americans used for themselves for their own purposes. In
this sense, the river gave the stones a flowing motion, and the stones gave the
bedrock a spinning motion, and the bedrock gave the natives holes in which to hide
their provisions. In return, the water was given a path in which to flow to the ocean,
the bedrock ground the stones to sediment (which were the material of the river
islands), and the Natives gave a special reverence to the river. This giving and
receiving never ends, and at the same time, the parties to the relationship are
changed in the encounters.
In the second reading of the river holes, Thoreau found a way to respond to a
structural understanding of friendship that he was attempting to correct. The stone
spins in the water, grinding itself away against the bedrock. That spinning produces
a hole, an absence, and that hole becomes deeper and more difficult to escape the
longer the stone performs its penance. The only fortuitous effect of this
phenomenon is that others will be able to take advantage of the hole, and others will
misunderstand how that hole was formed. Many relationships, Thoreau warns, are
nothing more than a trap in which someone feels that their daily work is to inscribe
their message of penance into the earth. So be it, but the hole enlarges the more the
stone invests. Such stones are either worn away by eons of spinning, are freed by a
chance flood, or reach low enough in their holes that they fall through the bottom of
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the bedrock, disappear into oblivion, and cause the river to leak “through in
anticipation of the fall” (p. 202).
In “Wednesday,” Thoreau was describing two different understandings of
friendship. One of these understandings is advanced by the English explorers. To the
English, the Native Americans were using the river for their own purposes, learning
nothing from the lessons of nature. In this framework of friendship between the
river and the natives, the two parties provide goods to each other, and part ways
when their period of friendship ends. The two parties only use each other to
appropriate their virtue, producing the requisite giving and receiving that
constitutes the process of friendship. In this framework, the form of the hole was
invented by the Native Americans. The Native Americans produced a void in the
riverbed in exchange for its life-giving water. However, this framework ignores the
chain of inheritance that links together the water, the stones, the bedrock, and the
Native Americans. The forms that are given at each stage of this inheritance again
reveal that friendship is a “perpetual and all-embracing service” that does not end at
the boundaries of a singular friendship (Thoreau, 1985, p. 217 as quoted by
Crosswhite, 2010, p. 168). The hiding place that the Native Americans found exists
because of the friendship between the water and the river stones, and between the
river stones and the bedrock. The giving outlasts particular friendships because
friendship is giving and receiving, and not the relations between water and stone, or
between stone and bedrock, or between hole and human. Friendships, like river
islands (Rossi, 2010, p. 121), are the movements of the sediment of other
friendships, which will be passed on…
Besides islands and river stones, Thoreau described a real friendship in what
has been a thoroughly abstract and metaphorical treatment of friendship. This real
friendship existed between a white man and a Native American: Wawatam, a Chief
of a tribe of Odawa Native Americans, and Andrew Henry, a fur-trader (Little
Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians, 2014; National Park Service, n.d.). This
“almost bare and leafless” friendship began after one of Wawatam’s vision quests,
which involved “fast, solitude, and mortification of body” (Thoreau, 1985, p. 223). In
Wawatam’s vision, he saw a white brother and decided to adopt him. After his
vision, Wawatam came to the white man’s lodge, told Henry about his vision, and
decided that the two men should be brothers. They “buried the hatchet,” and they
made plans to “hunt and feast and make maple-sugar together” (p. 223). At length,
Wawatam repaid his material debt of hospitality to Henry through his tribe, and the
two were durable friends. Their friendship appeared to endure beyond their last
meeting, even as Henry had to flee other Native Americans who wished to kill him.
As Henry departed, Wawatam gave a heartfelt speech to his tribe, and continued to
speak even after Henry’s boat was out of earshot.
The significance of the Wawatam-Henry friendship consists of the two men’s
perception of honor even in the face of an exceedingly basic relationship. Theirs was
a friendship that consisted of the exchange of material goods, and there was very
little, but still significant, mutual ascendancy toward virtue achieved between the
two men. However, Thoreau’s point in telling this story is not only to show that
friends are strangers before they are named (a point that I will return to), but also to
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make the distinction between friendships as they exist, and friendships as they are
imagined. For Thoreau, “Friendship is not so kind as is imagined” (p. 224). It was not
the setting aside of differences and the sharing of provisions that impressed
Thoreau. Instead, Thoreau took the story as an opportunity to describe how
friendship can behave with “a certain disregard for men and their erections, the
Christian duties and humanities, while it purifies the air like electricity.” (p. 224).
This is why Thoreau concluded that the dissolution of a friendship comes from
“unworthiness” rather than a disparity of deeds or even physical departure (p. 216,
p. 226). For Thoreau, there are perhaps no individuals who are actually worthy of
being “true and lasting” friends (p. 226). Actual worthiness is less important than
felt worthiness.
To explain why perception and actuality are two different things in
friendship, Thoreau compared friendship to a scientific illusion of intuition that is
still well known in physics, which he called the hydrostatic paradox (p. 221). The
hydrostatic paradox is an intuitive bias discovered by Blaise Pascal; living in the 17th
century, Pascal made a number of scientific and theological insights, including a
hydrostatic principle that science has named Pascal’s law (Acott, 1999). According
to Pascal’s law, in a fluid, a change of pressure at one point in the fluid will be
transmitted to all points in the fluid. Figure 1 is a scientifically sound illustration of
two of “Pascal’s vases.”

Figure 1: Pascal's Vases

The illustration appears to be wrong because the human mind habitually does not
expect the liquid to be where it is represented. If we pretend that the two vases are
separate containers, “the fluids in the two containers exert the same downward
force on their respective bases, and yet the containers clearly have different
weights” (Walker, 1998, p. 378). We expect the liquid to move to the left and
overflow the smaller cylinder. However, since the two vases are connected at their
bases, the level of the liquid is appropriately equal on both sides of the vessel. The
mind is tempted to conflate volume and pressure, trapped by the intuition that
weights need to be equal.
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The difference between perception and actuality in the context of friendship
carries psychological significance for the parties involved that becomes salient when
they are aggrieved. Since friendship is the giving and the receiving, and not the
status of our relationship with our friends, it is inevitable that our friends are going
to change in ways that are outside of our control, both in their identities, relation to
ourselves, and their presence/absence (Crosswhite, 2010). After a friendship, there
is perhaps always going to be a perception of our unworthiness, which Thoreau
defined as “the intensity of our grief, . . . our atonement, [which] measures the
degree by which this is separated from an actual unworthiness” (1985, p. 242). This
is why it is possible for people to feel immense amounts of grief for seemingly
insignificant relationships after the process ends, and why grief never truly ends.
For Thoreau, since friendship occurs before it is named, grief only becomes salient
after the fact. The grief that people feel is a manifestation of the difference between
the perception and actuality of our worthiness to be party to a specific friendship.
Finally, because everyone’s grief is different, not everyone is equally affected by the
hydrostatic paradox. The more one becomes familiar with the principles of
hydrostatics, the more one’s intuitions are brought in alignment with the behavior
of fluid in Pascal’s vases.
There is another level of the experience of grief that goes beyond the
difference between perception and actuality with respect to friendship worthiness.
This implication of grief is linked to Thoreau’s understanding of melancholia. Desire
can be imagined with reference to the above illustration of Pascal’s vases. Add some
liquid to one side of the apparatus, and the liquid will flow to the other side and
achieve equilibrium. On the other hand, the negative side of desire is melancholia, a
plug in the plumbing of the vases, which produces its own depressive effects. For
Thoreau, a state of melancholia is one in which “One involuntarily rests on his oar,
to humor his unusually meditative mood” (p. 63). In this mood, animals are startled
and are in a state of disease. Thoreau’s description of this discomfort is of a shaded
side of a person, the side that faces away from the light. Thoreau wrote, “This is his
grief” (p. 286). It should be like our shadow, but since it has been demetaphorized, it
is our shadow, always there, restricting our view of whatever falls in the shade. At
its most intense, it achieves orbit, functioning like the “moon eclipsed” (p. 286). The
treatment is to “preserve ourselves untarnished” so that the divine light will return
the shaded objects to illumination (p. 287; see also Arsić, 2016).
Discussion
So, who are our friends? Thoreau’s argument, that friendship occurs before it
is named, has public implications that go beyond relationships between people who
are thought of as friends. The relationships that Thoreau had in mind, including the
relationships between strangers, were just as important to him as the relationships
between friends who have named each other. The following stanza, taken from A
Week’s “Wednesday” chapter, sings this belief:
No warder at the gate
Can let the friendly in,
But, like the sun, o’er all
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He will the castle win,
And shine along the wall. (Thoreau, 1985, p. 235)
We cannot know the difference between a stranger and a friend until friendship has
been established by name. This has implications for public sphere theory concerning
counterpublics.
Thoreau’s address to his possible friends is a counterpublic. Since Thoreau’s
address to possible friends was an address to strangers, friendship for Thoreau is a
relationship that is imagined (p. 224). According to Michael Warner, publics (and
some counterpublics) are invoked merely through attention to circulating texts or
address and are “embedded in the background and self-understanding of its
participants in order to work” (2002, p. 9). This is a controversial claim, according to
Warner, because we tend to think of the public as having a non-contingent
existence, like an office park, that does not depend at all on the imaginative powers
of people who merely pay attention to an act of communication. However, as
Warner argued, this is an important fiction that we ignore when we engage in public
interaction, and this fiction becomes most salient when we consider counterpublics.
Thoreau’s counterpublic address to those who might turn out to be his
friends exposed him to hostility. As Warner warned, because counterpublics and
publics theoretically speak to the same pool of strangers (p. 120, p. 122)
counterpublics risk estrangement and hostility from the public to which their
participants must speak (p. 122, p. 130). However, it is not necessarily the
counterpublic that instigates this hostility. The hostility that earns counterpublics
its ‘counter’-ness is sometimes a hostility originating from the imagined community
of strangers. As Warner admitted, “Counterpublics are ‘counter’ to the extent that
they try to supply different ways of imagining stranger sociability and its reflexivity”
(pp. 121-122). It is important to remember that being different from ‘normal’
publics does not necessarily mean ‘counter,’ unless of course one gives identity
priority over difference, as Hegel did (Hardt, 1993). Warner openly relied on Hegel
as a framework for interpreting his conclusions about opposition and negation
(1992), and so it is easy to see him concluding that aberrant examples of publics
that ignore the standard framework for public engagement are branded as
counterpublics. However, my disagreement with Warner over the assumed primacy
of identity does not discount the reality that Thoreau realized his risk of
estrangement from the public sphere because he publicly abandoned the opposition
between strangerhood and intimacy. Heteronormative culture is invested in
maintaining this opposition between strangerhood and intimacy (Warner, 2002).
Friendship was an important topic for Thoreau for two reasons: Emerson
and John. In one way, Thoreau’s analysis of friendship was a response to Emerson’s
“Friendship” and a public grieving of their decaying relationship; their personal
relationship was certainly not to be lauded as an example of Thoreau’s friendship,
and it may have been Thoreau’s way of expressing his understanding of its
immanent denouement (Hodder, 2010, p. 137). In another way, Thoreau’s
relationship with his late brother epitomized Thoreau’s understanding of
friendship. To Thoreau, John was a Representative Man (Thoreau, 1985, p. 198), a
mountain (Thoreau, 1843a, p. 31), and a loss that deserved to be written about as
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his first full-length book. The loss left him with grief, and A Week was an attempt to
connect with others to atone for that grief. Thoreau’s atonement mirrored the
speech that Wawatam gave in honor of his brother, Henry. The expression of honor
for Thoreau hinged on his ability to preserve the memory of his brother in his
audience, and when it became evident that his audience was unwilling to experience
the depths of Thoreau’s story so that his brother may be forgotten, Thoreau was
forced to confront a poverty of friendship as he understood it in his immediate life.
Thoreau’s Counter-Monument to John
Thoreau’s first book, A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers, was
designed to introduce the reader to the two Thoreau brothers. It is both an
autobiography and a transmission of the memory of John to the reader. Because
Henry and John are treated as a good example of friendship, it is impossible for the
reader to tease apart the two individuals and consider them in isolation from each
other as self-sufficient individuals (Fink, 1992). This is both an indication of their
closeness, as well as the fact that Thoreau had incorporated his brother into his
identity (Arsić, 2016). Thoreau needed to express his grief for the loss of his
brother, but he also recognized that an artifact would only be a temporary
accommodation for the crypt of his brother. Instead of building a monument,
Thoreau imported his many theoretical explorations that he had made early in his
writing career into a crushing omnibus, and then made his audience responsible for
remembering and forgetting his brother on the “sacred space” of a represented
pastoral America (McGeough, 2011, p. i). The miscalculation that caused his debut
book to fail was the fact that Thoreau could not secure a readership willing to
participate in this program of loss (Fink, 1992). Without readers, Thoreau could not
bury his brother within them. Without that burial, Thoreau could not mourn for his
brother in the nonrepresentational manner that he had insisted was needed to
maintain one’s grief (Arsić, 2016).
In this section, I read A Week as a counter-monument. First, I review the
theoretical matter on counter-monuments. The second step in this discussion is to
show how A Week manifests these characteristics. Finally, I analyze where Thoreau
went awry.
The Character of Counter-Monuments
Ryan McGeough (2011) established that there were significant cultural
differences between Germany and the United States regarding the establishment of
counter-monuments. In McGeough’s review, counter-monuments force their
audiences to be responsible for remembering. German counter-monuments
“attempt to deny or avoid sacred space” (p. 80), usually through the selection of
prosaic locations and modes of display that serve as catharsis and camouflage. As a
contrast to this trend, “American counter-monuments embrace the idea of sacred
space, but contest access to it” (p. 80). This tendency of American countermonuments to embrace and regulate sacred spaces happens is a result of what
McGeough described as a tension between monuments and counter-monuments
that appears to be less salient in German memorializing. As McGeough explained,
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the American attempt to reconcile multiple perspectives had an effect of its own: as
each party contested the narrative associated with a particular monument,
additional monuments were added to the sacred space in a process of accretion that
accumulated monuments in one sacred space. This accretion of monuments,
according to McGeough, caused the monuments to mutate into a counter-monument
through the emergence of irony, a monument of monuments, a perspective of
perspectives.
The Sacred Space of A Week
Thoreau knew that to communicate his fraternal grief, it would not be
enough to create a monument for his brother. His “Dark Ages” and a litany of local
examples in A Week make it evident that he recognized the limitations of
monuments. Only by installing the memory of John within the minds of his readers
and inducing the reader to lose that memory would Thoreau feel satisfied that his
grief for his late brother was adequately transferred. This installation and loss of
memory required that he construct a narrative and then deconstruct that narrative
(see Fink, 1992, p. 220).
The fact that Thoreau was grieving for his brother is evident in A Week.
Recall that a person’s grief, in the context of A Week, is the sad shade that is felt as a
condition of melancholia (Thoreau, 1985, p. 286) measured by the difference
between a person’s actual worthiness to be a friend and their perceived worthiness
(p. 242). Thoreau expressed in verse, his most effective and private emotional
outlet, that his perceived worthiness of being his brother’s friend was different from
his actual worthiness (p. 133; 1843a, p. 31). The efforts of A Week were directed at
expressing Thoreau’s atonement, which still existed seven years after John’s death.
The main orienting theory of A Week was Thoreau’s “Dark Ages” (1843c).
“Dark Ages” reminded people that they are responsible for historical memory.
Thoreau argued that there are facts that are constantly being forgotten, and that
there is a strong and fruitless tradition of creating monuments to forestall the
process of forgetting. According to Thoreau, we remember the lessons that were
confided to us in song and dance, and we do not know the lesson of the Egyptian
pyramids for this reason. Instead of building larger and more durable memorials,
Thoreau insisted that living people are the appropriate containers of living facts.
Thoreau regarded history, the practice of recording history, and the future that
preservationist historians share with their archive, as fated to a gradual descent into
oblivion. Only a monument that accepted the darkness of history—a countermonument—would transmit the memory of his brother to the minds of his readers.
For most of us, it is not easy to absorb lessons from a book; it is more
effective to remember lessons confided to us through practice. Thoreau recognized
this, and programmed his text accordingly. A Week is much more than a
kaleidoscopic collection of facts about pastoral America and his fraternal
relationship. The book is capable of doing actual work on the reader. Every part,
especially the digressions, drives the practice of memory transfer and forgetting.
Many lines of quoted poetry were transcribed by Thoreau in Latin without any given
translation, making it necessary for a 19th century reader to accomplish that
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translation through learning the language or by consultation with an expert, such as
Thoreau himself at one of his Lyceum lectures. In addition, the text does not cite
many of its sources (although Thoreau does cite an abundant number of them). By
my count, there were 39 specific authors that Thoreau quoted without attribution.
Perhaps Thoreau meant for the names of these poets to be forgotten, for it
illustrates an important lesson for the reader. The reader is responsible for the task
of remembering, and there are likely people alive today that would be able to
connect the quoted verses and the names of these individuals. Fortunately, I was
able to use Google’s search technology to identify these authors. In the 19th century,
consulting with experts on poetry or Thoreau himself would have been the only
ways to discover these names. This demonstrates two things. First, it shows that
Thoreau’s passion went beyond philosophical or theological texts, as was Emerson’s
main areas of concern. Thoreau was enormously interested in poetry as well, and
the unattributed quotation of verse from these various poets, like the discipline of
performance studies, “challenges the disciplinary compartmentalization of the arts”
(Taylor, 2003, p. 26). Second, like un-translated Latin, this list shows that Thoreau
was actively engaging with his readers to encourage them to do the necessary work
of memorializing and forgetting.
Reading and understanding A Week requires the cultivation of the capability
of an archive to achieve what Diana Taylor has termed a “system of transfer” (p.
xvii). As Taylor argued, embodied “acts of transfer” are “an important system of
knowing and transmitting knowledge” (p. 26). It functions in a fundamentally
different way than “the archive of supposedly enduring materials (i.e., texts,
documents, buildings, bones)” (p. 19). Repertoires are competencies built into the
memories of the living, and they lack the durability that archivists prefer (pp. 1819). It is no accident that transferring repertoires to surrogates “work[s] against
notions of easy access, decipherability, and translatability” (p. 15).
Thoreau’s A Week, at a textual level and relatively speaking, is now easily
accessed, deciphered, and translated, but its mechanism of transmission of loss is
not. According to Steven Fink, “Thoreau loaded his narrative with an almost
crushing burden of meditative digressions and essays” (1992, p. 235). In light of this
unexpected duty, Thoreau subtly commented on his own writing, setting up the
“scenario” of the text (Taylor, 2003, p. 28), giving the reader riddles on how to
engage. For example, in reference to the “playful wisdom” of the Heetopades of
Veeshnoo (Thoreau, 1985, p. 119), Thoreau wrote:
The story and fabulous portion of this book winds loosely from sentence to
sentence as so many oases in a desert, and is as indistinct as a camel’s track
between Mourzouk and Darfour. It is a comment on the flow and freshet of
modern books. The reader leaps from sentence to sentence, as from one
stepping-stone to another, while the stream of the story rushes past
unregarded. . . . It is the characteristic of great poems that they will yield of
their sense in due proportion to the hasty and deliberate reader. To the
practical they will be common sense, and to the wise wisdom. . . (p. 119)
In other words, Thoreau placed an enormous burden on his reader to attend to the
“gestures, attitudes, and tones” (Taylor, 2003, p. 28) in the “stream of the story” and
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do the investigatory footwork necessary to gain access to the numerous shadow
texts. If readers did not, they were supposed to be left merely with “common sense.”
For the wise readers, engaging with the text, and going beyond the text, would
transmit memory to the reader, who would then lose it. Only then would the reader
approach an adequate understanding of Thoreau’s loss. However, Thoreau’s text is
subject to the rules of archival preservation and reproduction, not the embodied
mode of transmission that Taylor argued makes the scenarios of repertoires supple
in the hands of those who embody them. The archival status of A Week made it
impossible for anyone to modify Thoreau’s specific scenario.
To force the reader to choose between common sense and wisdom, Thoreau
deconstructed his own narrative (Fink, 1992, p. 220), and it is the forced choice that
made his scenario incapable of embodied modification. The deconstruction was
accomplished because of an interaction between the two kinds of ‘spaces’ in the text.
One of these spaces was the world surrounding the Thoreau brothers on their river
trip. It consisted of an exquisite “sacralization” of the surrounding environment: a
careful attention to the names of the fish, meticulous descriptions of the techniques
of the other sailors and boatmen on the river, and an accounting of the many human
personalities that represented a deceased pastoral America.15 The other space was
Thoreau’s mental world that unfolded during A Week’s many digressions. Thoreau’s
mental world was set in many places and times in the past, including previous
sojourns by himself and with other companions, and analytical essays that touched
upon various topics. The opening chapter of A Week gave a preview of what sights
the traveler would see during such a trip. For example, Thoreau told the would-be
traveler,
You shall see rude and sturdy, experienced and wise men, keeping their
castles, or teaming up their summer’s wood, or chopping alone in the woods,
men fuller of talk and rare adventure in the sun and wind and rain, than a
chestnut is of meat; who were out not only in ’75 and 1812, but have been
out every day of their lives; greater men than Homer, or Chaucer, or
Shakespeare, only they never got the time to say so; they never took to the
way of writing. Look at their fields, and imagine what they might write, if
ever they should put pen to paper. Or what have they not written on the face
of the earth already, clearing, and burning, and scratching, and harrowing,
and ploughing, in and in, and out and out, and over and over, again and again,
erasing what they had already written for want of parchment. (1985, p. 9)
These men and women worked against the sacredness of their living inscriptions
upon the earth. When Thoreau turns the attention of the reader away from the
conventional travel narrative in his digressions, he demonstrates nature’s
McGeough has reported that the process of “sight sacralization” consists of five
steps: (1) naming, (2) framing and elevation, (3) enshrinement, (4) mechanical
reproduction, and (5) social reproduction (2011, pp. 48-49). Reading the portions of
A Week that involve travel narrative proceeds through these stages. Thoreau’s
mental space—his digressions—worked against the sacredness of the travel
narrative.
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indifference to the losses that are sustained in these environments. The travel
narrative is no safe space, and everything in it is at risk of disappearing within the
mind of the reader. In fact, as Thoreau admitted in the text, it was already gone at
the time the book was published. “Books of natural history” are of no help either, as
Thoreau pointed out, for they “aim commonly to be hasty schedules, or inventories
of God’s property, by some clerk” (p. 79).
Constructing and then deconstructing Thoreau’s narrative in A Week had the
effect of burying John and the sacred space of pastoral America under the story’s
immense edifice, installed within the mind of the reader. The prose is dense, without
reprieve. Every detail is a potentially significant facet to be juxtaposed with
something in the next or the previous digression, and the reader’s memory becomes
laden with a growing inventory of archival data. In addition, Thoreau’s own poetry
is enigmatic, and cannot be set-aside without sacrificing a significant part of the
story. As a result, the reading of the text slows to a crawl, the reader’s memory
begins to leak through like the river, and the reader, perhaps if he or she notices this
process of loss, understands that Thoreau had meant for this to happen. This is the
same situation that Thoreau described in his metaphor of ancient history as a
“picture on the wall” (1985, p. 125; 1843c, p. 528), describing the comments made
by observers of history concerning what is behind that picture. Just like Walter
Benjamin’s “Angelus Novus,” it is the result of “one single catastrophe which keeps
piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet” (1968, p. 257).
Thoreau was burying his brother in the minds of his readers, trying to induce grief.
The act of transfer that A Week attempts to accomplish is necessarily
paradoxical. For Thoreau’s technique to work on an audience, it must both construct
a legitimate historical narrative, and then undermine it (Fink, 1992). In theory,
Thoreau accomplished those two tasks. As Steven Fink pointed out, Thoreau “charts
his route with geographic precision, identifying each village, each tributary, each
lock; he observes local commerce and agriculture” (p. 221). Thoreau also went
beyond these observations, taking note of the changes that have occurred to these
marks upon the landscape over time. Then, “Thoreau undermines this conventional
historical perspective by asserting nature’s indifferences to such changes” (p. 220).
A Week “ultimately turns on itself, achieving its ends by undermining its means—
not only an excursion that undermines the value of travel but finally a book in which
language itself must give way to a higher silence” (p. 220).
There is no surviving effigy in A Week for John. Thoreau went to painstaking
steps to describe him in a context that seems to be as sacred as his late brother.
However, to force the reader of A Week to absorb and lose a memory of him,
Thoreau incorporated a complex system of digressions into a narrow thread of a
travel narrative. This system worked to overburden the memory of the reader and
transferred a lesson to the reader regarding the necessity of forgetting. No durable
monument could accomplish that task. Only by developing the reader’s repertoire of
memory and forgetting would they understand Thoreau’s need to assuage the
intensity of his grief, which is what mourning is all about: preserving himself
untarnished and recruiting an audience to help him along the endless process of
equalizing his actual and perceived unworthiness of having been John’s friend.
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A Week’s Ironic Oversight
In practice, the system of transfer that Thoreau attempted to accomplish was
a failure. This is most salient in the context of A Week’s relationship with his
audience. As Lloyd Bitzer argued, the success of any rhetorical action turns on the
audience as the mediator of change (1968). The change that Thoreau asked of his
audience was nothing less than the willingness to endure the grueling process of
attempting to construct a travel narrative and follow him through a maze of
digressions that deconstructed that narrative (Fink, 1992). Much of Thoreau’s
audience was unwilling to follow him for two reasons. First, Thoreau’s marketing
strategy for his book, ironically, failed to account for the complexities of the
publishing industry as a legitimate ecological system of nature. Second, for many of
the individuals who did answer his call to read, the reading experience proved to be
too uncomfortable and taxing (pp. 241-242). Furthermore, the scenario for
experiencing the trip and losing that memory was inflexible due to its archival
nature (Taylor, 2003). This left a few of Thoreau’s friends who understood his
project (Fink, 1992, p. 242) and were willing to follow the scenario that he had
arranged for the reading experience. However, this number was far less than the
thousand-copy print run for which Thoreau contracted.
Thoreau’s inattention to an important relationship with nature, which would
develop years later, was an ironic testament to his blindness to the impending
failure of A Week. This blindness can be seen within the story, outside of the story,
and at the interface between the inside and the outside.
Internally, A Week’s most ironic oversight was Thoreau’s unwillingness to
engage with works of human artifice as legitimate natural constructions. Today, one
of Thoreau’s most important contributions to ecology was his rejection of the
nature-human divide. However, in 1849, this divide was very much intact in his
thinking. As Burke’s theory of irony shows, irony culminates in a “comic frame” that
makes audiences self-critical, and it requires an element of humility (1937/1984b).
That humility was missing in Thoreau’s text. In A Week, Thoreau’s absence of
humility can be seen in two ways. The first manifestation of Thoreau’s confident
unawareness can be seen through a comparison of his theory of friendship and his
practices of friendship with nature, or partial lack thereof. The second way that
Thoreau refused to countenance humility was through the rescue of a missing
specimen of fruit.
Thoreau’s meditation on friendship should have made him receptive to
friendship with inanimate objects in nature, but his theoretical stance at this time
was qualified. The allegorical reading of the transient river islands and the spinning
rocks underneath the waterfalls brings the relationship of friendship into close
proximity with things that are not people, nor are these allegorical examples
biologically alive. This raises the question: why did Thoreau prejudice the case of
friendship against “mere wood and stone” (1985, p. 218)? The theoretical answer to
that question is that he was merely following Aristotle, who argued that one does
not share friendship with inanimate objects (e.g., wine; Crosswhite, 2010).
The fact that A Week did not countenance friendship with inanimate objects
is most evident when Thoreau discussed the Billerica Dam. His description of this
65

artificial feature was fetishized and idolized. As my analysis of Thoreau’s theory of
friendship shows, it is important that friends perceive themselves to be equal.
There are three different ways to engage with things. These ways have been
assessed in detail by W. J. T. Mitchell (2005) and Diana Taylor (2003). Mitchell
argued that these three different “relations to things” (p. 188) are identified by the
type-name that is often given to them: fetish, idol, and totem. The difference
between these types of object-relations can only be assessed by inquiring “into what
it says and does, what rituals and myths circulate around it” (p. 189). A fetish is an
object that is evaluated as inferior, and the subordination “seems deeply linked with
trauma” (p. 192), frustration,16 privacy, and colonialism. An idol is an object that is
evaluated as superior, and the superordination is linked with iconoclasm, the norms
of language and theater, authority, and the “‘received systems’ of philosophy” (p.
189). Finally, a totem is an object that is evaluated as equal, and the kinship is linked
with friendship, tribal identity, monuments, and ritual scapegoating.17 Diana Taylor
extended this analysis. She showed that two of these categories, the idol and the
fetish, are strategically used by critics to delegitimate the object-relations of
others.18 However, as soon as this practice of delegitimation reaches to destroy the
‘fetish’ or the ‘idol,’ a new object is created out of the fragments (Taylor, 2003); for
Mitchell, this is the great irony of iconoclasm.
The Billerica Dam is artificial, and Thoreau used this constructedness as a
means to delegitimate the dam through an abuse of both fetishism and idolatry.
Thoreau’s descriptions made it clear that the dam had caused an enormous amount
of ecological harm. In Thoreau’s discussion of the fish migration patterns disrupted
by the dam, he suggested that it was inevitable that some greater friend of the fish
would take a crowbar and smash the dam. This is iconoclasm, and it doesn’t
acknowledge the reality that the dam was responsible for Henry and John’s
convenient passage through the locks. In addition, in Thoreau’s discussion of the
then-recent floods affecting the farmers, his attention to the discovery of the cause
of the flooding is particularly telling: “speedy emissaries revealed the unnatural
secret, in the new float-board, wholly a foot in width, added to their already too high
privileges by the dam proprietors” (1985, p. 32). This is strategic fetishism in
Thoreau’s denaturing of the float-board through a reduction of the board to simple
economic greed. Interestingly, Thoreau did not subject the canal locks to this level of
W. J. T. Mitchell associated the fetish with what he called ‘desire.’ However, since
Mitchell defined desire as a lack (“in the gap between demand . . . and need”; 2005, p.
73), I have adjusted Mitchell’s terminology to reflect my evaluation of how Mitchell
would respond to my framework.
17 The term “scapegoating” has connotations of pathological illness. However, as
Kenneth Burke argued, there is a distinction between ritual scapegoating and
pathological scapegoating. Ritual scapegoating involves a ritual in which some of the
sins of the group are transferred to the scapegoat before sacrifice. Pathological
scapegoating involves a spontaneous blaming of a scapegoat for all of the group’s
problems (Burke, 1941).
18 W. J. T. Mitchell (2005) restricted this practice of delegitimation to the iconoclasts.
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attack. The description of the canal locks occurs only once in the text. For Thoreau,
“These old gray structures, with their quiet arms stretched over the river in the sun,
appeared like natural objects in the scenery, and the kingfisher and sandpiper
alighted on them as readily as on stakes or rocks” (p. 194).
The shunting of the dam and its float-board into the categories of idol and
fetish is clear evidence of Thoreau’s failure to recognize the possibility of friendship
with nature in 1849. This lack of humility occurred because Thoreau could have had
a relationship of giving and receiving insights about nature with the dam, as
destructive as it was to the local residents. Alternatively, Thoreau could have left his
discussion of the dam as laconic and benign as his description of the locks.
The closest that Thoreau came to experiencing folly inside A Week was when
the two brothers almost lost fruit that they were preparing to enjoy. Toward the end
of “Wednesday,” the two brothers were setting up camp. They unpacked their prize
melon that had been in the boat from the beginning of their voyage. It was warm,
and so they placed it in the cool water at the river’s edge. After they finished
pitching the tent and returned to the boat, the melon was gone. The two brothers
rushed onto the boat and frantically rowed down the river in pursuit of their fruit.
Eventually, in the failing light, they were just able to find it. There was no further
mention of the episode, and no humility associated with almost losing their prized
melon. The Thoreau family was famous for their watermelon parties (Sullivan,
2009).
The internal picture of A Week’s irony is just as clear as the external picture,
and it is much easier to demonstrate. Steven Fink exposed Thoreau’s oversights
running up to A Week’s publication. Thoreau made two external errors in his
compositional choices and his marketing decisions. Both of these mistakes are
external in the sense of involving Thoreau’s audience. The compositional choice
was, unsurprisingly, identical with the technique of constructing and deconstructing
his travel narrative, and the marketing decision was Thoreau’s willingness to fund
his own publication (Fink, 1992).
The construction and deconstruction of A Week’s travel narrative inherently
made difficulties for Thoreau’s audience. Part of this difficulty was the level of trust
Thoreau placed into the ability of the audience to detect his technique. As Fink
pointed out, large portions of “Monday” were self-reflexive comments (p. 237).
However, Thoreau veiled these comments as references to other works, particularly
the Bhagavad Gita and the Laws of Menu. This made it more difficult for lay readers
to understand that Thoreau was referring to his own text. Furthermore, without this
key, readers were apt to be overwhelmed by the complex juxtapositions between
the thin thread of empirical observations and the numerous disparate digressions
laid out throughout the text (p. 237). Most of the readers were left with no compass
with which to navigate the tributaries, and as such, the text appeared merely to
“juxtapose the superficial with the profound, alternating between the literal and the
abstract, and so giving his reader no real choice in how to use the book” (p. 237).
The problem of audience access to the higher levels of meaning in A Week
was confirmed empirically by Thoreau’s own readers. While there were many
positive reviews, a number of them took notice of this problem of access and voiced
67

their irritation (pp. 241-242, pp. 250-251). Perhaps the most notable example of
these review complaints came from James Russell Lowell, a contemporary poet of
Thoreau who graduated from Harvard a year after him (Harding, 1982). Lowell is
famous for publishing severe criticism of Thoreau’s writings, belittling him for being
a copy of his mentor. With respect to A Week, Lowell thought that the digressions,
including Thoreau’s semi-intimate address to possible friends, were inappropriate
(Lowell, 1849, p. 47 as discussed by Fink, 1992, pp. 250-251). Other critical
reviewers were unhappy with Thoreau’s transparent pantheism, but by far the most
complaints were made against Thoreau’s violation of the genre’s conventions (Fink,
1992, p. 244, p. 251). Other reviewers were more accepting of Thoreau’s genius (p.
242). Nevertheless, there was no consensus among the reviewers (p. 251). The sales
of the book were dismal, and the 75 copies that were distributed to the reviewers
were provided at Thoreau’s own expense (p. 251). Thoreau’s publisher did nothing
to popularize the book, having no stake in its success (p. 251).
In between A Week’s commercial failure and the empirically verified inability
of the majority of its possible readers to follow Thoreau’s scenario, the most
significant failure of Thoreau’s project in 1849 was in its archival interface between
those internal and external mechanisms. As I discussed in my review of Taylor’s
(2003) typology of archives and repertoires, the main difference between the two
forms is in relation to the scenario in which they are presented to their audiences
and the options that exist for response. As Taylor argued, repertoires “enact
embodied memory” by allowing people to “participate in the production and
reproduction of knowledge by ‘being there,’ being a part of the transmission” (p. 2).
A repertoire can change its scenario from one performance to the next, or it can
change from one surrogate to the next. These alterations to the scenario can happen
for any number of reasons, but the most salient is when it is deemed in need of
revision to meet the needs of local conditions (Roach, 1996, pp. 28-29). Compared to
repertoires, archives have relatively inflexible scenarios, since “what changes over
time is the value, relevance, or meaning of the archive, how the items it contains get
interpreted, even embodied” (Taylor, 2003, p. 19). Archives are selected over
repertoires precisely because they are “resistant to change” (p. 19), and as such, the
archive of A Week reaches us with the recalcitrance that a repertoire would not
have. If A Week were a repertoire, the memory would be able to be modified in two
important ways. First, since A Week did not adequately account for the nature of the
publishing industry (indeed, A Week is still read far less than Walden), embodied
transmissions of the memory of the Thoreau brothers’ river trip could be made
more appealing through careful venue and style choices. Specifically, the seasick
readers who can get no farther than common sense might have a better chance of
experiencing Thoreauvian grief by witnessing a performance of A Week than by
reading-to-forget. Second, and perhaps more importantly, because a repertoire is
open to alteration as it is transmitted from one performer to the next, those
performance choices would always be provisional and open to further
experimentation by new imaginations. The only check on this transmission is the
existence of a reminder of what a repertoire is supposed to perform. Absent that,
there is no check on alterations between surrogates. For Roach (1996),
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“discontinuities rudely interrupt the succession of surrogates,” and genealogies have
revealed that any promise of a preserved origin is a political fantasy (p. 25).
Summary
A Week was both an autobiography and a counter-monument, albeit a
durable one that reliably repeats itself. Through this generic invention, Thoreau
violated the conventional expectations of the travel narrative, and alienated many of
his readers. Thoreau was grief-stricken, and his plan to assuage the intensity of that
grief involved recruiting his readers to share in the experience of loss in a process of
construction and deconstruction (Fink, 1992), sacralization and desacralization
(McGeough, 2011). This two-stage process was supposed to bury Thoreau’s brother
under the immense weight of dozens of stories of pastoral America, installed within
the minds of his readers. Unfortunately, Thoreau was asking far too much from most
of his readers, and his expectation of selling a thousand copies evinces Thoreau’s
ironic shortsighted lack of interest in the public dynamics of the publishing industry.
Without a comic frame (Burke, 1937/1984b) and a living repertoire that could
stand to alter Thoreau’s scenario (Taylor, 2003), Thoreau’s audience was/is in
jeopardy of not understanding why the two-stage process that results in loss was or
is necessary or useful.
As much pain as this failure sustained the intensity of Thoreau’s grief, it is
clear that he needed to experience what it is like to be an alazon to understand why
having such an experience is important for himself and his readers. Thoreau had
expectations concerning what he was going to be getting out of his relationship with
nature and his audience. His shortsighted relationship with the publishing industry
shows that he expected it to lack parity. His risky engagement with the audience
that he invoked by addressing strangers in the travel narrative industry shows that
he did not expect the ambivalence that his book attracted. The next section shows
how the ensuing years of Thoreau’s life brought him to recognize and profit from his
mistakes, to appreciate the awesome value that nature held in store for him during
his solitary walks in the middle of the night, as well as to develop a blueprint for
bringing a similar experience to his readers that did not invite the wrath of his
critics or the apathy of his readers.
Walking to the Crypt of Melancholia
In the early 1850s, Thoreau was working on a lecturing project about
walking (Fink, 1992). He had lectured on the topic about three weeks prior to his
experience with ether (Milder, 1995). The themes of Thoreau’s “Walking” (1862)
included the nomadic nature of walking, how it values the wild, and what happens
to the walker during the process. Thoreau’s argument in “Walking” that I want to
highlight here is his notice that walking forces people to pay attention to their
sensory experiences, and those experiences occur in the present moment. While
simultaneously living in the present moment and not staying in one place, not
tracking one’s place, walkers are uniquely suited to practicing healthy skepticism.
Thoreau’s skepticism is a mode of thinking that constantly challenges cultural and
environmental knowledge, turning the experience of walking into a powerful and
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simple practice for anyone to live with their surroundings and to use that life as a
standard to assess the legitimacy of their desires.
In this section, I review the themes embedded in “Walking.” It should be no
surprise that the essay is a complex weaving of interrelated themes. In my opinion,
it is Thoreau’s finest essay, holding more potential for political change than
“Resistance to Civil Government.” Once I have introduced the topics of “Walking,” I
discuss how the themes are all directed toward the redemptive powers of walking.
As I discussed toward the end of Chapter One, Thoreau’s breakthrough moment was
being anesthetized with ether (Milder, 1995). The psychedelic experience made
Thoreau aware of not only the possibility of friendship between himself and nature,
but it also made him aware that his condition of melancholia invoked a specific
incapacity (i.e., an incapacity to recognize that he had metaphorically incorporated
his losses into himself). My purpose of bringing up “Walking” is ultimately to argue
that the essay’s major power is in its ability to tell the reader how to have a
psychedelic experience without a psychedelic compound. That ability gives the
walker a profound analogical command of language, making melancholic walkers
aware of Arsić’s literalization or Abraham and Torok’s demetaphorization.
Walking: “The Enterprise and Adventure of the Day”
For Thoreau, walking is a wild art. It is a form of sauntering which aims only
to reach the “Holy Land” (1862, p. 657) of “leisure, freedom, and independence” (p.
658). This holy land is forever elsewhere, not in any place where one frequents or
stays. According to Thoreau, “It requires a direct dispensation from Heaven to
become a walker” (p. 658). Many of us try to be walkers, to follow the form of the
saunterer, but for Thoreau our failure to be “Walkers” is our unpreparedness or
faint-hearted unwillingness to leave behind everything that we have claimed and
gathered (p. 658). To leave that assemblage of people and things requires courage
and readiness, and that prerequisite grows larger in proportion to the people and
things that urge us to stay.
Thoreau himself was reliant on walking to live. Thoreau openly admitted, “I
think that I cannot preserve my health and spirits, unless I spend four hours a day at
least—and it is commonly more than that—sauntering through the woods and over
the hills and fields, absolutely free from all worldly engagements” (p. 658). Thoreau
found the public cultural tendency to stay in one place to be toxic, so much so that
he thought that mechanics and shopkeepers “deserve some credit for not having all
committed suicide long ago” (p. 658). For Thoreau, the attraction of walking is not
avoidance of anything or an instrument for some other purpose; walking “is itself
the enterprise and adventure of the day” (p. 659). In other words, walking is living.
The challenge of walking is to walk without purpose (p. 659). According to
Thoreau, leisure, freedom, and independence emerge from the practice, and it is
impossible to saunter to any particular destination or with intention (p. 659). For
Thoreau, walking is the witnessing of wildness by perpetually returning to one’s
senses (p. 659). This is why Thoreau believed that not everyone was cut out to be a
walker, because most people are not interested in walking in this way (p. 658).
Thoreau confessed that even he sometimes found it difficult to walk properly to the
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woods because of his attraction to and preoccupation with civilized occupations and
destinations (p. 659). According to Thoreau, when one reaches the wilderness, he or
she notices how small the world of civilization was in comparison to the world in
which we live (p. 660). This is a striking way to contemplate the limitations of the
public sphere and what commonly passes for knowledge within it.
It can be difficult to find the woods if one does not aim for it in one’s journey
(p. 659). For Thoreau, his best guidance was an observation that his instincts, when
allowed their freedom, move toward where the “earth seems more unexhausted and
richer” (p. 662).19 In practice, Thoreau found that this left him “attracted solely by a
few square rods of impermeable and unfathomable bog” (p. 666). He even proposed
to build his house in such a swamp, so that anyone who wished to visit him had to
walk into it (p. 666). The most socialized would not make the trek (p. 666).
Embracing “The Insufficiency of All That We Called Knowledge Before”
For Thoreau, the wild is a holy fertility, but that fertility goes beyond a mere
horticultural fortune and reaches an epistemic register (p. 667). Superficially, the
wild provides fertile lands for farming and property development. The fertility of
swamps is no secret to farmers. Some farmers, wrote Thoreau, had made a
commercial enterprise out of the practice of draining and clearing swamps (p. 667).
At a deeper level, wild fertility yields a “Sympathy with Intelligence” that provides
the humus of our intellectual growth (p. 671). This sympathy with intelligence for
Thoreau makes ignorance useful and beautiful (pp. 670-671).
Thoreau argued that useful ignorance is beautiful because it is responsible
for correcting and challenging what we think we know (p. 671). For Thoreau, this is
“Sympathy with Intelligence” (p. 671). To prove this, Thoreau asked the following
rhetorical question: “Which is the best man to deal with,—he who knows nothing
about a subject, and, what is extremely rare, knows that he knows nothing, or he
In the 19th century, Thoreau found the wild by walking toward the west.
Thoreau’s correlation of the richness of wilderness (specifically, uncultivated land)
and the west seems to have tempted him to make connections between cultural
advancement and westward movement, and his writing in this section has made
him an easy target for Edward Said’s critique of orientalism (1978). To a certain
presentist extent, Thoreau deserves to be critiqued as an orientalist, but this
criticism needs to be tempered by awareness that his observations were historical,
not theoretical. Thoreau did not pretend that any single locale, such as Atlantis,
ancient Greece, “The Orient,” or any other mythical name was the origin of
civilization. In fact, he was moving away from origins, observing that civilization
seems to be moving westward, and a glance back toward established civilizations,
such as Atlantis, Europe, ancient Greece, East Asia, or beyond, tell us from where the
fruit of the wild has been imported. Thoreau’s orient was not a specific place, such
as Asia, but a cardinal direction, one that is not sound in 2017. Indeed, if Thoreau
were alive today, his direction of advancement would not be westward, but would
be either downward into the oceans or upward into space at “a tangent to this
sphere” (1985, p. 579).
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who really knows something about it, but thinks that he knows all?” (p. 671). When
someone is guided by useful ignorance, they seek more experience to identify the
boundaries of what is known, and that experience is obtained because one does not
have “the habit of seeking after a law which we may obey” (p. 671). It is a “higher
knowledge” that culminates in “a grand surprise on a sudden revelation of the
insufficiency of all that we called Knowledge before” (p. 671).
Finding “The Literature Which Gives Expression to Nature”
When Thoreau was walking through the woods during his nighttime walks,
he discovered that the usual sources of literature were not suited to the natural
forms of expression that he witnessed (Lebeaux, 1984). As Richard Lebeaux
observed, “Nature would provide him with a language, private and yet rooted in
external reality, for discussing and imaging his life” (p. 137). This was an
involuntary and serendipitous “return to the primitive analogical and derivative
senses of words” (Thoreau, 1906b, p. 462 as quoted by Lebeaux, 1984, p. 137).
The literature that gives expression to nature is one that functions
analogically, but in such a way that allows metaphorical encoding (p. 137). For
Richard Rorty (1989), such use of language prevents anyone from saying whether
the sentences are true or false, at least until others pay attention to them and imbue
them with fresh meaning. As Rorty wrote, “One can only savor it or spit it out” (p.
18). This is where Thoreau discovered that a void of metaphorical content allowed
nature, of which we are a part, to do its work:
Where is the literature which gives expression to Nature? He would be a poet
who could impress the winds and streams into his service, to speak for him;
who nailed words to their primitive senses, as farmers drive down stakes in
the spring, which the frost has heaved; who derived his words as often as he
used them,—transplanted them to his page with earth adhering to their
roots; whose words were so true and fresh and natural that they would
appear to expand like the buds at the approach of spring, though they lay
half-smothered between two musty leaves in a library,—ay, to bloom and
bear fruit there, after their kind, annually; for the faithful reader, in sympathy
with surrounding Nature. (1862, p. 668)
One can see the deliberate refrain from signification in the above quote, since
Thoreau does not show how the growing of buds between the pages of a book
extends to the process of reading, but this certainly does not prevent us from
making the words polysemic by interpreting them. The turn of phrase lacks any
further direction, and as such, is not determined by Thoreau’s compositional
choices. Rather, the direction of development is placed within the powers of nature
herself, which we are a part of; specifically, the development of those words are
expected to walk, to follow the restorative development of how we understand
words to function as buds. Thoreau obviously did not invent botanical embryos, and
yet he had imported that world with only the observation that those words would
“expand like the buds at the approach of spring” (p. 668). What does that mean to
you?
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Discussion
For Thoreau, the literature that gives expression to nature is the same kind of
literature that the melancholic subject naturally produces, but it requires an
awareness of the void that it creates, a vacuum that others are induced to fill
(Golemba, 1990). It invokes a language that is imbued with analogical meaning, but
is not placed “in a fixed place in a language game” (Rorty, 1989, p. 18). It recruits
nature (e.g., us) to do the work of imbuing words with analogical meaning, just as
the melancholic crypt holds a secret that affects the trajectory of its keeper in dark
ways. What Thoreau had accomplished, through his experience with melancholia
and his desperate escape to the nowhere of walking, was a recognition of
literalization/demetaphorization. This effect is present not only in people with
encrypted melancholia, as I discussed in my review of Arsić’s and Abraham and
Torok’s research, but also in those who have received the dispensation of Heaven to
be Walkers. These populations are probably the same group of people, since I would
argue that it was the darkness of melancholia that led Thoreau’s to exile and the
swamp. Fortunately, such a process does not require a psychedelic substance. Going
on a literal trip yourself goes directly from melancholia to those nighttime walks
where one gets lost.
How does getting lost in the middle of the swamp replace the psychedelic
experience? The answer to that question was most succinctly answered in Walden
post-ether. Many of Thoreau’s written concerns about losing one’s self in Walden
appeared after his insights in “Walking.” Thoreau provided several examples of this
happening to himself, to his guests, and to other people in the town of Concord.
Becoming lost reproduces the psychedelic experience, which for many alchemists
has been “the projection of the contents of the naïve prescientific mind” so that it
can be examined (McKenna, 1992, p. 262):
Not till we are completely lost, or turned round—for a man needs only to be
turned round once with his eyes shut in this world to be lost—do we
appreciate the vastness and strangeness of nature. Every man has to learn
the points of compass again as often as he awakes, whether from sleep or any
abstraction. Not till we are lost, in other words not till we have lost the world,
do we begin to find ourselves, and realize where we are and the infinite
extent of our relations. (Thoreau, 1985, p. 459)
To find ourselves anew means that we have positioned ourselves without any
discernable relation to public culture. This makes the lost walker ideally suited to
recognize melancholia that might be buried within one’s identity. Once that
melancholia is recognized, the walker can examine the crypt and introject any
desires from it for as long as they desire. Once this occurs, the experience of
returning to civilization will force the subject to “learn the points of compass again”
and allow the subject have a wider range of introjections than before.
Coda
The quotation at the beginning of this chapter surreptitiously captures the
mechanics of melancholia. The traumatic loss of a brother caused a magical
incorporation of a whole person within one’s identity in metaphorical fashion, but
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one in which the metaphor has been lost to the keeper of that crypt, that “Egyptian
temple.” Thoreau’s journey into his mind, into the woods at night, brings us all back
to this metaphor. The process of walking, of renouncing any claim to or recognition
of the place upon which we stand, makes it possible for us to realize that our
histories often belie a resignation of what is ours in favor of an old identity that we
refuse to process.
This is the home of those so-called “many catechisms and religious books
twanging a canting peal round the earth.” Thoreau was induced, by the secret of the
fact that he was living for others even after their departure, to “involuntarily rest of
his oar.” His oar wanted to go to nature to experience the color of bruised berries, to
feel the sensation of a river on his naked body, and to write for an audience that may
turn out to be his next friend, not a mere patron who would pay him money. This
urge to generate meaning and to bury that meaning under a mountain of detail, was
the project of Thoreau’s first book. It exquisitely demonstrated the acrobatics of an
inner world that leaves most people feeling left out, resentful, and suspicious. At the
end of the day, Thoreau’s first book, a counter-monument and an autobiography of
the fusion of two men, failed to transmit the loss that he was attempting to mourn
because his quest to achieve fame as a writer led him to the ironic production of an
inflexible archive of loss.
The exit from this lack of accommodation, this identification with and
insistence on a specific non-metaphorical metaphor, is to get lost in the most
profound and literal ways possible. One must lose everything: the self and the world.
Thoreau did it by first experiencing an embarrassing commercial failure, and his
subsequent understanding that his publication opened himself to the criticism of an
industry that he did not care about. By experiencing irony first-hand, by losing
promises of fame, fortune, and friends, he retreated into the wilderness, and found
himself within it recognizing the most important friendship of his life. Nature
showed him how he had been exercising a “trained incapacity” to recognize
metaphors (Burke, 1935/1984a, p. 7). The experience of an environment utterly
elided of metaphors led Thoreau to understand how to write in a way that would
provoke his readers to contribute their own meaning, instead of assuming that they
would blindly follow the author’s enigmatic secrets.
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Chapter Three: Reading Rainbow
As I was desirous to recover the long lost bottom of Walden Pond, I surveyed
it carefully, before the ice broke up, early in ’46, with compass and chain and
sounding line.
—Walden, Version C, circa 1849 (Schacht, n.d., “The Pond in Winter,” para.
6a)
Walden’s discussion of sounding Walden Pond began as a solitary sentence. If
we restrict our reading to this sentence, we only get to know that Thoreau did it
“carefully” while the pond was frozen, using standard surveying and sounding
equipment. The matter of recovering “the long lost bottom of Walden Pond” appears
to be an unencumbered and straightforward task. Thoreau is the only subject with
whom the reader can identify.
Thoreau expanded this account significantly after his experience with
publishing A Week in 1849. Not only did Thoreau add detail about his method, but
he also discussed how other people dealt with the question of Walden Pond’s
bottom. By the time Thoreau was finished with Walden, the epigraph had expanded:
There have been many stories told about the bottom, or rather no bottom, of
this pond, which certainly had no foundation for themselves. It is remarkable
how long men will believe in the bottomlessness of a pond without taking the
trouble to sound it. I have visited two such Bottomless Ponds in one walk in
this neighborhood. Many have believed that Walden reached quite through to
the other side of the globe. Some who have lain flat on the ice for a long time,
looking down through the illusive medium, perchance with watery eyes into
the bargain, and driven to hasty conclusions by the fear of catching cold in
their breasts, have seen vast holes "into which a load of hay might be driven,"
if there were anybody to drive it, the undoubted source of the Styx and
entrance to the Infernal Regions from these parts. Others have gone down
from the village with a "fifty-six" and a wagon load of inch rope, but yet have
failed to find any bottom; for while the "fifty-six" was resting by the way, they
were paying out the rope in the vain attempt to fathom their truly
immeasurable capacity for marvellousness. But I can assure my readers that
Walden has a reasonably tight bottom at a not unreasonable, though at an
unusual, depth. I fathomed it easily with a cod-line and a stone weighing
about a pound and a half, and could tell accurately when the stone left the
bottom, by having to pull so much harder before the water got underneath to
help me. The greatest depth was exactly one hundred and two feet; to which
may be added the five feet which it has risen since, making one hundred and
seven. This is a remarkable depth for so small an area; yet not an inch of it
can be spared by the imagination. What if all ponds were shallow? Would it
not react on the minds of men? I am thankful that this pond was made deep
and pure for a symbol. While men believe in the infinite some ponds will be
thought to be bottomless. (1985, pp. 549-551)
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Interpreted literally, this is mostly a straightforward survey of surveys. It compares
Thoreau’s method to the unfounded methods of some of his neighbors. However,
despite Thoreau’s recognition that there were many stories told about the
bottomless Walden Pond, Thoreau was thankful that these stories are symbolically
sustainable. Why was Thoreau thankful that others gazed into the pond and saw
illusions? Why was Thoreau thankful that others brought their ball and chain to
Walden?
Let us return to the riddle of Thoreau’s efforts to “recover the long lost
bottom of Walden Pond” by exploring the illusions and marvels of his neighbors.
How does exploring other peoples’ methods serve the purpose of sounding Walden
Pond?
The answer to that riddle has to do with a three-fold symbol. If we begin
with the fact that Thoreau began this paragraph with a laconic and literal
description of his survey of the pond and then expanded it with the suggestion that
the pond’s depth and purity serves as a symbol that includes other people’s attempt
to assess its depth, then Thoreau’s discussion suggests that the three individuals
involved, by their mere presence, are doing interpretation. An interpretation that I
propose here has to do with the various techniques that are used to interpret
Walden. With respect to the multiple claims concerning the bottom of Walden Pond,
there are several techniques at work. These techniques fall into three categories:
illusive surveying, self-sounding, and friendship.
The first set of techniques involved villagers avoiding the activity of sounding
altogether. These people appeal to tradition and perpetuate fallacious foundations
for belief, or as Thoreau wrote, no foundation at all. However, Thoreau did not write
that he questioned his neighbors about their sounding techniques. Thoreau wrote
that he had witnessed his neighbors compromising themselves, planking on the
frozen pond, and gazing through the murky blue ice in an “illusive” attempt to
reckon the contradictory voids in the bottom of the pond with their own eyes. These
people, trusting no instruments but their eyes, fool themselves into seeing holes at
the bottom of the pond that lead to who-knows-where. Shadows, tricks of light, and
slight variations of texture are all capable of nurturing the delusion that there is only
an apparent bottom to the pond. Similarly, this attitude fosters the belief that
Walden contains holes in its bottom that carry readers to a mythology.
Still others, who did not follow folklore blindly, adhered to strict self-reliance
by using an imported fifty-six pound weight attached to a heavy one-inch rope
(Harding, 1995, p. 278). Such a monstrosity would need to be carted into the woods,
and could not have been carried by Thoreavian sauntering. These villagers came to
the pond with expectations and fancy that could not be contained within the
“reasonable” mandate of reality. These competitive weight lifters,20 similar to the ice
gazers, fooled themselves into believing that the pond was bottomless because their
equipment was more appropriate for exhibition, competition, or anchoring and less
appropriate for measuring depth. They were not measuring the pond’s depth.
According to historical records, throwing a fifty-six pound weight was a
sanctioned athletic competition (Haug, 1909).
20
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Instead, they were actually measuring their “capacity for marvellousness,” which
has “never been measured” (Thoreau, 1985, p. 330). By using an exceptionally heavy
apparatus that is more appropriate for assessing prowess than for sounding depth,
many people have approached the meaning of Walden weighed down with
technique imported from the competitive elsewhere. These people reach the same
conclusion about the bottom of the pond as the villagers who stare into the ice and
see the Styx.
Finally, Thoreau discussed his own technique, which used an instrument
deceptively similar to the other villagers who brought their burdens from the village
to the ponds. In fact, Thoreau’s technique is a kind of hybrid of illusive surveying
and self-sounding in terms of technique. The only difference was that Thoreau’s
sounding line was much lighter and more compact, borrowed from the forest and
his tackle, the stone being something that must be found with surveying eyes, and
the fishing line being an artifact from civilization that must be felt and handled like
rope. What made Thoreau’s technique successful was the fact that the lighter line
and weight allowed him to feel the alternation between when the stone was resting
on the pond floor, which cannot be directly assessed, and when the stone was
suspended in the water. Thoreau was able to feel this difference because he received
“help” from the water, or more accurately, when the sediment was not adhering to
the stone. This is similar to the calculation of a mathematical limit, which must be
done indirectly. Thoreau’s collaboration with the pond enabled him to notice that
the pond’s depth is both reasonable and unusual.
Thoreau’s decision to cast these three techniques as three different personae
suggests that we are meant to identify with (at least one of) them. According to
Burke, to identify with another only requires the partial joining of interests (1950,
pp. 20-23). Anyone who reads about these individuals is likely to identify with at
least one of them. For readers who wish to appeal to ready-made illusions or who
wish to import their own cultural background to interpret the text, then the amateur
surveyor who lays on the ice and the fifty-six pound weightlifter offer safe and
hospitable alternatives to friendship with Walden. Thoreau did not hold any ill will
toward his readers who identify with these foils. In contrast, A Week has few
accommodations for readers who may be less prepared or willing to engage or
participate with Thoreau’s swerves and riddles. There is little space for non-friends
to engage A Week, as his address to strangers is laden with intimate expectation and
promise. Instead of foisting on the reader a dilemma between friendship and
alienation, the reader of Walden encounters alternative options for rhetorical
identification. Choosing between the illusive surveyor, the self-sounder, and the
friend is a serious and continuing choice in Walden.
Yet, despite Walden’s hospitality, only friendly collaboration between reader
and text yields an accurate assessment of the depth of the text (Buell, 2010).
Thoreau had high expectations for friendship, and the demands on the reader that
are embedded in Walden demonstrate Thoreau’s hope. If the reader has any hope of
becoming Walden’s friend, then they must try to be sensitive to the text’s moments
of gravitas. Because friendship for Thoreau involved both giving and receiving
virtue (Crosswhite, 2010), Walden sometimes gives to the reader, and sometimes it
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takes from the reader, and this reader is expected to reciprocate. Often Walden’s
reader gazes into its depth and purity to see or feel the weight of one’s self or myths
reflected. Being a friend to Walden involves a manifold challenge to the reader to
generate in the space between brain and page where they should take flights of
interpretation, and where they should focus on identifying specific and carefully
constructed meaning.
Walden is not simply a chameleon that morphs to fit the reader’s fancy. It is
much more than that. It only appears that way to Walden’s non-friends. Thoreau had
many important things to say about a wide variety of activities, and so an
interpretation of Walden’s passages is not simply right or wrong. If the reader pays
attention, Walden takes the reader in and pushes back. The reader can go too far
afield and stumble into traps of irony, and these traps are not simple negations. The
reason for this is because Thoreau was not about to let the lay reader flounder into
resentment, but as Burke (1937/1984b) pointed out, they should be exposed and
then invited into the comic frame. Thoreau learned that lesson after A Week. While
Thoreau wrote that the villagers reached unfounded conclusions about the pond’s
bottom, he did not ridicule them. In fact, he was thankful for the fact that the pond is
both deep and pure, since it attracts the techniques that form the basis for friendly
collaboration. Through the polysemic nature of sounding the pond, I read Thoreau
as counting on readers to follow their own bias to reach unfounded conclusions
about the text’s meaning. Hopefully these readers notice themselves in the comic
frame, but if they do not, they must go their own way. Thoreau wanted some of his
readers to proliferate illusions of interpretation or impose their own meanings on it.
Doing so produces teachable moments, and is preferable to feeling excluded from
the experience altogether.
Reading Walden becomes richer when it is read as a possible friendship. This
is perhaps Lawrence Buell’s (1995) most important notice about Walden, and one
that requires additional work. Buell was able to make this argument by focusing on
Walden as a work of nature writing and as a work that inspired other nature writers.
This argument about friendly collaboration is bolstered by several of Buell’s
observations about Walden and other products of nature writing: (1) it deploys a
deceptive operation of metaphor, (2) the persona of Thoreau is not stable, nor does
it develop linearly, and (3) there is important intertextual matter that informs the
reader about the character of the author. These arguments are also components for
the remainder of this dissertation: The first argument about metaphor explains
Thoreau’s language of desire in Chapter Four (Golemba, 1990), the second argument
about Thoreau’s personae explains Thoreau’s language of ascent, also in Chapter
Four (Milder, 1995), and the intertextual argument helps to explain how another
nature-writer responded to Walden in Chapter Five.
In this chapter, I examine these three sub-arguments and apply them to
Walden and Pilgrim at Tinker Creek (2007). This comparison reveals textual offers of
friendship and how they accommodate faux friends. Walden bears out the
relationship between metaphor, personae, and the boundary between the text’s
inside and outside. Two of these sub-arguments support the argument about
friendship in reading through Tinker Creek. Reading Tinker Creek is strikingly
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similar to reading Walden. My main reason for selecting Tinker Creek for
comparison here has to do with how it is responsive to Walden as a polemic, an
argument I develop in Chapter Five. However, I am introducing Dillard in this
chapter because her work corroborates two of Buell’s arguments that illuminate the
friendly potential of Walden.
Introducing Pilgrim at Tinker Creek
Pilgrim at Tinker Creek was Annie Dillard’s big break. In May 1968, Dillard
earned a master’s degree in English, conducting a formal analysis of Walden’s “The
Pond in Winter.” In her thesis, Dillard argued, “Thoreau drenched himself in Walden
Pond, instilling in himself, drop by drop, a sense of the world’s reality” (1968, p. 10).
Walden Pond is responsive to her visitors, Dillard went on to elaborate, and the pure
water in its cup fosters no secrets or deceptions. It charts all disturbances and
incursions of its contents before returning to its liquid originality. For Dillard, such a
grail is a perfect metaphor: “it is not like heaven, it is heaven” (p. 24). Thoreau,
according to Dillard, literally “turns its readers into Thoreaus” (p. 4). While I am
mindful of Dillard’s notice of literalness in Thoreau’s rhetoric, I would insist that the
reader doesn’t quite become a Thoreau. Instead, a successful partnership between
Walden and its reader imbues the reader with a few drops of Walden’s purity. After
Dillard completed her thesis, she “lived quietly on Tinker Creek in Virginia’s
Roanoke Valley, observing the natural world, taking notes, and reading
voluminously in a wide variety of disciplines” (Dillard, 2007, p. 286), similar to
Thoreau. In addition, she began to read texts on philosophy, the history of science,
and biology with an unusual urgency (Dillard, 1987). She collated her research onto
note cards (Dillard, 2007, p. 280), and set herself to write her own semi-Christian
version of Walden. She published her text in 1974, and the next year, she was
rewarded with the Pulitzer Prize for Nonfiction.
Tinker Creek is not a retread of Walden, but it does bear a striking similarity
to it in several ways. One of the most salient differences between the two texts is the
fact that Tinker Creek does not cultivate the comic corrective that is so crucial in
Walden. There are few moments, if any, in which Dillard catches the reader in a
moment of irony. This is likely due to the fact that Dillard’s project was to bring her
natural explorations into her empirical and textual world to understand a personal
divine. Nevertheless, despite these differences, the two texts do contain similarities.
Most notably, the two texts are similar with respect to their arrangement into two
parts with a significant contrast between them.
Tinker Creek engages in social criticism only indirectly; for the most part,
Dillard used her text to explore the intersections between her theological
orientation and the natural world. The result is that her text has two main parts,
divided into the first and second halves and ordered according to Neoplatonic
Christian theology (p. 279). The first half consists of a series of chapters that Dillard
identified as via positiva, which theologians have described as the rigor of
identifying the positive attributes of God (pp. 279-280). The second half consists of
via negativa, which involves the identification of the traits that God does not possess
(pp. 279-280). On the one hand, Dillard’s via positiva cultivates the wholesome and
79

apparently divine aspects of her natural observations and research, such as the
presentist pleasure of rubbing and scratching a puppy’s belly, or the curious alliance
between Dillard and spiders, or the satisfaction of using praying mantises to control
garden pests without chemicals. The midpoint of the text is a chapter about a flood
at Tinker Creek (p. 280). Dillard then allows her mostly rosy picture of creation to
be dashed by the predictable brutalities of survival and the disgusting aesthetics of
animal excess, both of which are topics in the narrative. Dillard’s via negativa broods
on the disturbing and grotesque aspects of nature that defy her understanding and
acceptance. For example, she intuits that the fecundity of “‘acres and acres of rats’
has a suitably chilling ring to it that is decidedly lacking if I say, instead, ‘acres and
acres of tulips’” (p. 167). Other examples include the injustice that parasites exist,
the hard lifestyle of Eskimos, and the ravenous appetite of the locust.
Dillard’s concern with making an artistic statement about God and nature
inevitably leads her text away from concerns about Thoreauvian friendship. What
remains interesting regarding Tinker Creek, then, like Walden, is their relationships
with metaphor and the importance of intertextual details to its meaning. The
remainder of this chapter will be focused on teasing out the metaphorical, personal,
and intertextual factors in Walden’s possible friendship with its reader and
identifying the ways in which Tinker Creek validates its predecessor.
Befriending Walden and Tinker Creek
As I discussed in Chapter Two, Thoreau advanced a complex and
groundbreaking theory of friendship in A Week. This theory defined friendship as a
process that involved the reciprocal giving and taking of virtue that temporarily
joins together individuals (Crosswhite, 2010). I argued that when Thoreau
published A Week, he was prejudiced against endowing inanimate objects with the
role of friend. I also argued that the fiasco of that book’s publication caused a
sustained crisis (Milder, 1995) that made Thoreau confront this error and consider
nature itself as a candidate for his model of friendship.
In light of Thoreau’s consideration of non-human agents as potential friends,
I argue that Thoreau endeavored to make Walden do more than A Week could
accomplish: to engage in friendship between itself and (some of) its readers. To a
certain extent, Buell already made this argument in the guise of “a fuller
communication in which the reader becomes a legitimate partner, feels freer to
make what he will of Thoreau, and ultimately digests Thoreau’s texts more fully now
that the word has been made flesh” (Buell, 1995, p. 382). However, I find myself
clarifying what Buell would readily affirm regarding the finer points of what that
partnership entails and how Thoreau engaged a varied readership with parameters
on those relationships. The main reason for this, I believe, is that Buell does not
respond to Thoreau’s theory of friendship. The nature of Walden’s collaboration is
not the same for all of its readers, and not determined solely by readers or solely by
the text. Because friendship between Walden and its readers is not pre-established,
the text engages the reader as a possible friend (i.e., as a stranger). Depending on
how that relationship develops, it is an open question of whether the reader will
function as a friend, and it hinges on how the reader engages with the text on the
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three fronts that I extracted from Buell’s analysis: metaphor, personae, and the
world outside of the text.
Metaphor
The common thread between Walden and Tinker Creek with respect to
metaphor is the way in which metaphors seem to be ubiquitous, and yet when the
text is examined without relation to the reader, the metaphors are not in abundance.
This curious difference between what a New Critic would find in the text and what a
reception study would find makes the audience the critical part of textual analysis
for both Walden, Tinker Creek, or any text that deploys a rhetoric that resembles
what Henry Golemba has referred to as Thoreau’s “language of desire” (1990, p. 7),
a concept I explore in detail in Chapter Four. In terms of Walden, the textual
ecosystem of symbols appears to be a reprise of Thoreau’s ideas and practices, and
Buell (1995) has noted that there is a temptation (which should be resisted) to read
Walden as autobiography. A few of the symbols are metaphors, but most the
symbols are fertile words and phrases that invite metaphorical interpretation.
Furthermore, these symbols and metaphors are released as the text progresses.
Tinker Creek functions in a similar, albeit more explicit way. Most of Dillard’s are
reacquired; at least one of her symbols is silently allowed to escape.
The fact that Walden contains metaphors is not a controversial claim in light
of the research discussed so far, and it should be recalled that this argument did not
exist before Francis Matthiessen’s American Renaissance (1941; Buell, 1995;
Bickman, 1992). In that seminal primer of American Studies (Abelove, 2003),
Matthiessen noted that the seasons in Walden correlate with the spiritual
metamorphosis of a naturist into a social critic—an estranged student who returned
to the Emersonian promise of Transcendentalism with the boon of naturism. For
Matthiessen, Thoreau’s Walden is a gospel of political economy. Deploying the
metaphor terminology of I. A. Richards (1936) to analyze Matthiessen’s argument,
naturism was merely the vehicle for the tenor of social responsibility.
The problem with this reading of Matthiessen’s perspective is that most of
what people read as Thoreau’s metaphors are actually not ‘his’ metaphors. As Buell
pointed out, Thoreau largely abandons the economy metaphor after it is established
in the text’s opening chapter (1995, p. 281), creating a precedent for the remainder
of the text. However, the curious thing about this claim is that the vast majority of
the moments in which the reader thinks that ‘economy’ is used as a metaphor of
environmental ecology, it is not. Instead, aside from passing references to political
economy and the economy of living, the opening chapter discusses actual economy,
which derives from the Greek οἰκονομία (oikonomia), or “household management”
(economy, n.d.). In addition, the string of letters forming ‘house’ appears 93 times in
“Economy.” Thoreau’s ‘economy’ is literal, following Arsić’s proposition to read
Walden literally and resist metaphorical interpretation (2016). However, Arsić’s
directive is hardly a common sentiment; given the readiness of Thoreauvian
researchers to introduce metaphorical readings into the text, my own practice of
allegorizing Thoreau’s prose for my chapter epigraphs, as well as my repeated
question “What does that mean to you?”, it is necessary to consider both literal (to
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the author) and metaphorical (to the reader) interpretations, thereby creating an
interpretive situation in which meaning becomes polysemic.21 Walden thus uses
environmental imagery in ways that do not exhaust their potential uses, even
though there is a common and persistent belief that meaning pre-exists a given act
of interpretation. It is probable that, given the mechanism at work in the process of
reading Walden, the metaphorical functionality is the result of what Buell and
Golemba (1990; who I will discuss in more detail in the next chapter) refer to as a
co-authorship that makes it difficult to tell when the creation of meaning ends, if it
does at all.
In addition to creation, Walden appears to be in a constant process of selfdestruction and re-creation as it is read. According to Martin Bickman (1992),
Thoreau seems to have been particularly fixated on undermining his previous
chapters in the first half of the text; after “Economy” and before “The Ponds,” each
successive chapter unexpectedly appears to discuss a topic in such a way that
undermines or abandons the arguments made in previous chapters. Just as the eiron
undermines an alazon and that eiron goes on to become someone else’s alazon
(Muecke, 1969), Thoreau undermined many of his ‘past’ literary constructions,
making it difficult to identify when he believed what he wrote. These pasts are not
buried under overwhelming mountains of detail, like they are in A Week. Instead of
being lost and forgotten, the reader is left wondering when or if those details will
find a reprise. Various readers over the years have appreciated Thoreau’s catch and
release treatment of symbols, and some have used his technique more explicitly in
their own works.
Like Walden, Dillard’s Tinker Creek is a rich storehouse of fertile symbols, but
Dillard’s strategy is more explicit, making her text a useful foil. Her technique
consisted of producing a master metaphor, and then using that metaphor to pierce
an array of secondary symbols for the reader to interpret. The master metaphor of
Tinker Creek that sets off the interpretive cascade is Dillard’s identity claim as a
hunter who stalks and pierces symbols, with her book being “the straying trail of
blood” (2007, p. 15). Dillard’s narrator often releases those pierced symbols, but
Here I follow Richard Rorty’s extension of Nietzsche’s definition of truth as dead
metaphor, whereas a metaphor, properly speaking, is alive (Edwards, 1997, p. 127):
“If you want to be remembered by future generations, go in for poetry rather than
for mathematics. If you want your books to be read rather than respectfully
shrouded in tooled leather, you should try to produce tingles rather than truth.
What we call common sense—the body of widely accepted truths—is, just as
Heidegger and Nabokov thought, a collection of dead metaphors. Truths are the
skeletons which remain after the capacity to arouse the senses—to cause tingles—
has been rubbed off by familiarity and long usage. After the scales are rubbed off a
butterfly’s wing, you have transparency, but not beauty—formal structure without
sensuous content. Once the freshness wears off the metaphor, you have plain, literal,
transparent language—the sort of language which is ascribed not to any particular
person but to ‘common sense’ or ‘reason’ or ‘intuition,’ ideas so clear and distinct
you can look right through them” (Rorty, 1989, p. 152).
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they continue to be the object of a narrative stalking as they flee and leave trails, and
the narrator keeps them in the wings of the narrative proscenium—ready at hand
for the moment when they are returned to the reader’s attention for further
interpretation. In contrast, Walden overrides his statements and chapters in the
production of disturbing contradictions for readers to ponder (Bickman, 1992). As
Arsić (2016) observed, Thoreau was a meticulous editor of his Walden drafts, and
his maintenance of contradictions throughout the invention process indicates that
contradictions were a deliberate feature of Walden.
The constellations of symbols, and the way that they are reprised and cause
ironic developments, are clearly aspects of Walden and Tinker Creek that hinge on
how one relates to the texts. The readers who embrace either illusive surveying or
self-sounding have a high likelihood of overlooking these changes or concluding that
Thoreau was wrong; they conclude that all of the symbols are advocated and that
the resulting contradictions should be resolved so that some truth can be attained.
In contrast, the reader who befriends Walden realizes that we are all wrong and in
flux, a truth that should not be elided in favor of some truth that has yet to be
synthesized. Walden’s friend catches and accepts change, and understands that it is
acceptable for symbols to be receptive to metaphorical interpretation, and that
metaphors have finite and renewable lifetimes. Once this dynamic is identified, it
becomes an edifying reveal of the queerness that Thoreau and Dillard experienced
and cultivated throughout their lives. As the next section discusses, this flux is
present in Walden by what Buell referred to as multiple authorial personae that are
neither stable nor presented linearly.
Personae
Thoreau’s pursuit of fractured and nonlinear depictions of authorial
presence in Walden makes it more difficult for readers to become familiar with
‘him,’ and it makes it more difficult for the reader to know if “Thoreau”/Walden is a
friend (i.e., to name him/it as a friend). This destabilization also makes it more
difficult for the reader to predict Thoreau’s specific motives when he wrote his
prose. In other words, Walden casts Thoreau and its reader as strangers, as possible
friends, without saying so. In contrast, Tinker Creek makes great effort to cast its
reader as a witness to a glorious yet strange creation and a subject in the kingdom of
God, which does not require the fragmentation of her narrator. In the next section, I
discuss Tinker Creek’s sustained attempt to conceal the identity of the narrator
without this fragmentation.
The idea that any text is the product of a single author has been a common
target of scholarly assault, but this idea has proven to be extremely durable, eliding
Buell’s disturbing thesis that there is not a singular or coherent Thoreau who wrote
Walden. This lack of authorial stability has also given Robert Milder (1995) cause to
find what he called Thoreau’s “rhetoric of ascent” (p. 62), which I discuss in Chapter
Four. Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Roland Barthes have each argued that
the idea of an author that exercises authority over text or reader-response is
problematic (Buell, 1995, p. 372). Yet, despite the efforts of these scholars, there is
broad consensus among lay readers and scholars that “Thoreau” composed Walden
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and his philosophy can be extracted from it (see Arsić, 2016, p. 140). The reason for
this recalcitrance is that the author’s byline is a functional part of the reading
process, just as the rhetorical situation associated with a text influences the text’s
meaning (Bitzer, 1968), regardless of how much it has been constructed to fit the
needs of the communicative encounter (Vatz, 1973). When a writer posits a
conventional ‘author,’ he or she acknowledges the text’s contribution toward agency
and remains what Henry Louis Gates, Jr. referred to as “a participant in an
articulated realm of social practice” (quoted by Buell, 1995, p. 372). When a text has
a byline, it is necessary to recognize the reality of authorial agency, but it is not
necessary to posit a pre-existing singular author for a text to exercise agency on
behalf of a mutable individual who transformed during the invention of the text. The
reader constructs and reconstructs an image of the author using and interpreting a
collection of evidence. Far from being a weakening of the power of the author, this
fragmentation might even be useful, as the previous section demonstrated regarding
the discarding of symbols. Furthermore, it may also be useful to posit a non-linear
progression from naiveté to enlightenment, as Buell discussed.
Two technical facts about Walden’s composition make it obvious that the
idea of a single Thoreauvian persona within it is a verifiable illusion. First, the
composition of Walden has a complex history. It started nominally in 1845,
proceeded through eight drafts, and was eventually published nine years later in
1854 (Milder, 1995). Thoreau experienced most of the profound transformations in
his life during this time, with the obvious exception being the death of his brother.
Clapper’s examination of the extant handwritten records of Walden held at the
Huntington Library show that Thoreau was occasionally willing to preserve early
portions of the manuscript with only minimal editing.22 This means that as Thoreau
grew in environmental maturity, some of the debunked ideas and preconceptions
that he left behind were given sanctuary within Walden (Buell, 1995; Milder, 1995).
In terms of biography, Thoreau’s relationship with nature went through
several transitions. Buell has identified five phases in Thoreau’s attitude toward
nature: (1) pastime, (2) recreational resort, (3) place of comfort, (4) occupation, and
then (5) cause (1995, p. 138). In addition, as I argued in Chapter Two, Thoreau
transformed from a man who could not see inanimate objects as friends to one who
found opportunities for parity and self-transformation in his openness to friendship
with nature. This lesson about nature required considerable embarrassment and
financial stress on Thoreau’s part—a circuitous route to enlightenment that
probably did not end with Walden’s publication.
Because of this complex history of self-transformation, as well as Thoreau’s
tendency to preserve his ironic ideas without comment rather than to elide them,
Buell is right to conclude that there is a temptation to read Walden as
autobiography. However, Buell urges caution.
This statement cannot be overgeneralized. For example, “Reading” was virtually
complete by the time Thoreau left Walden Pond in 1847. In contrast, several
paragraphs in the “Spring” chapter, which appeared in the first version, especially
the sandbar paragraph, were subjected to thorough editing (Schacht, n.d.).
22
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Reading Walden as autobiography is problematic because the text tends to
disguise the historical moments in which Thoreau experienced ironic humility.
Thoreau’s story of self-transformation is highly focused on Thoreau’s “odyssey from
environmental naiveté to enlightenment” (p. 115). For the most part, I agree with
Buell’s assessment, and Thoreau’s life experiences that do not fit neatly into that
rubric tend to be disguised in the text. To find all of the autobiographical notes in
Walden, the reader must look beyond the author’s personae as projected by the text
and look to other personae in the text. For example, the carnival of authorial voices
in Walden does not have a mimetic voice of Thoreau’s attitude toward publishing
before 1849. Such a naïve Thoreau was never there undisguised in any version of
the Walden manuscript. In contrast, Thoreau’s confident unawareness about his
publishing prospects is well preserved in A Week. Instead of casting his publishing
naiveté with a fresh recollection of his past obliviousness, Thoreau told a short
anecdote about a Native American who tried and failed to make money by selling
baskets. After introducing this character, Thoreau then identified with this person
because he too tried to sell “a basket of a delicate texture” (1985, p. 338). Thoreau
protects his embarrassment and the authority of “Thoreau” by identifying with the
Native American.
Another reason why it is inappropriate to read Walden as autobiography is
because Thoreau’s personae do not progress linearly (Buell, 1995), a deliberate
distortion that defamiliarizes the reader from the author. The fact that the personae
are presented in a nonlinear series is easy to establish. The story of the Native
American basket-weaver occurs in the opening pages of the text and was added in
1852, whereas passages that were composed relatively early in the composition
process occur much later in the text’s form; “Reading” appears much later than
“Economy,” and yet it was complete by 1849 (Schacht, n.d.). One reason why
Thoreau would have presented his personae nonlinearly is because he was
deliberately trying to throw the reader off of the trail of his own path toward
enlightenment. This may have been a way for Thoreau to keep his own way from
becoming a mimetic exercise. Of course, it is possible to unravel the nonlinearity,
but the illusive surveyor and the self-sounder are less likely to make that discovery.
Only Walden’s friend has the awareness that a friend also has the responsibility of
attending to the messy nonlinearity of an individual before that person’s history of
lessons can be appreciated, and even then, one cannot be certain of the results. If
Thoreau was serious about having each person find their own way, then it makes
sense that he would obscure his own example within its pages as much as possible,
or at least until the reader has woken up.
Did Thoreau know a Native American who tried to make money by selling
woven baskets? We may never know the answer to that question because Thoreau’s
biography does not inform us whether such a person existed. Even though the
multiplicity of Thoreavian personae and their nonlinearity has affected our ability to
plumb Walden for Thoreau, it has also had the equally important side effect of
turning other matter that tells the story about Thoreau and his world into a precious
resource (Buell, 1995). As the next section shows, the relationships between
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Walden, Tinker Creek, and this “intertextual” domain is itself a matter for Thoreau,
Dillard, and their respective readers to explore (p. 93).
The Intertexual
The importance of the world outside of any given text, whether it is a pond, a
creek, or other textual sources, cannot be overestimated. As Carolyn Porter has
argued, “the traditional boundaries between the literary and the extraliterary have
faded” (quoted by Buell, 1995, p. 85). This is important for two reasons. First, as
Dwight Conquergood (Madison, 2005, pp. 169-171) and Buell (1995) have
demonstrated, troubling the boundary between fiction and non-fiction is an
important focal point for ethnographers and writers to demonstrate that there is a
fuzzy boundary between mimesis and poiesis. Second, as I discuss in this section, the
world outside the text, particularly secondary sources, shapes the reader’s
interpretation of the text. Because many other authorial texts and secondary
sources have been revealed to be either questionable or revealed something
questionable, the reader is induced to do a significant amount of detective work.
This work goes a long way toward inducing the reader to stand as a legitimate
partner of the text. Intertextual data on Annie Dillard also reveals a need for
significant work to be done to determine who is narrating Tinker Creek. This
question of who narrates Tinker Creek is an important issue that I address in
Chapter Five.
The effect of Thoreau’s biography on interpretations of Walden has been
traced throughout the waxing and waning of Walden’s fame ever since the beginning
of the 20th century. Buell went so far as to argue that it is this intertextual matter
that has produced so many interpretations of Walden. Perhaps because of Thoreau’s
guarded personal life and his ability to destabilize the narrator’s persona in Walden,
Thoreau enthusiasts and scholars alike have zealously investigated the man. This
fixation on his biographical details has led to the proliferation of apocryphal stories
by a disparate number of people who have pushed their own agendas.23
Secondary resources have circulated among Thoreau’s readers for decades,
which has led Thoreau being placed on the proverbial pedestal and in the virtual
gutter. First, James Lowell’s animosity toward Thoreau was instrumental in
producing the impression that Thoreau was nothing more than a copy of Emerson
(Fink, 1992; Harding, 1982). To compound this problem, Emerson’s infamous
The most famous apocryphal story about Thoreau concerns the night he spent in
jail. During that night, which would have occurred in July 1846, Thoreau was
supposedly visited by Emerson, who asked, “Henry, why are you in there?” Thoreau
is said to have replied, “Waldo, why are you not in here?” Neither Thoreau nor
Emerson made any mention of this meeting, but we know from Emerson’s journal
that he did not support Thoreau’s political belligerence (Sattelmeyer, 1989).
Furthermore, there has been endless speculation about who paid Thoreau’s fine. It
had to have been someone, since he was released the next day, and someone
continued to pay the poll tax repeatedly in the years following the incident (Harding,
1982).
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eulogy to Thoreau and his questionable editing of Thoreau’s posthumous
publications reinforced this illusion (Sattelmeyer, 1995). The effect of Lowell’s
iconoclasm and Emerson’s interference kept Thoreau in obscurity for the remainder
of the 19th century, and he would have remained there if it had not been for a
publisher’s use his oeuvre for profit (Buell, 1995). This delay and the capitalistic
motivation that ended it further enhanced the potential for apocryphal stories to
creep into Thoreau’s biography.
The effect of the seemingly unreliable nature of Thoreau’s intertextual details
has been to cast Thoreau as a mythical character, one that requires a significant
amount of work to sort out. In one sense, the infection of Thoreau’s biography with
apocryphal details seems to confirm Paul Ricoeur’s suggestion that we are here
engaging in hermeneutics, and that we should not be satisfied with the obvious
(Bessette, 2016, p. 149). The first temptation is to abandon the intertextual and
practice New Criticism. However, this doesn’t help, as Thoreau seems to have been
the first person to warn us off on the first few pages of Walden (Buell, 1995). Those
pages “reflect a stage of his existence now over and done with” (p. 377).
Since details about Thoreau have been infected with suspicion and intrigue,
the effect of the reading experience has been to allow the reader to be an important
and active component in the construction of meaning (p. 382). My interpretation of
the various methods of assessing the depths of Walden Pond offers the specialness
of friendship described in A Week to the text-reader relationship, while at the same
time offering safe alternatives to friendship should it not obtain. Giving special
credence to the text and the reader simultaneously is necessary, and like Pascal’s
vases, the relationship of Walden with its friends invokes a connection that dissolves
the boundary between the containers of text and reader in a dynamic way that I
discuss in the next chapter.
Like Thoreau’s Walden, background information about Annie Dillard has
been fertile ground for scholarly work, and its use has produced a predictable
divergence from New Criticism. In her biographical writings outside Tinker Creek,
Dillard revealed that she had a more affluent childhood than Thoreau. One of
Dillard’s ancestors started the company American Standard, a plumbing brass
foundry (Dillard, 1987, p. 61). She was encouraged to explore, and was allowed to
walk around her neighborhood, alone, as soon as she could say her telephone
number (p. 42). Her parents were non-conformists and showered her with
attention, and they kept her entertained with comedy, love, and an amazing amount
of permissiveness (p. 50-56), with one striking exception (pp. 9-10).
One matter from Dillard’s early life that requires close attention is the way in
which she wrote from the perspective of a man. When she was ten, her father
unexpectedly resigned from his career and sailed down the Allegheny and Ohio
rivers for six weeks (pp. 9-10), and she “was just waking up then, just barely” (p.
10). Two years later, she started to write a nature narrative “about a man, a sort of
metaphysician, in his fifties” (Dillard, 1988, p. 165 as quoted in part by Clark, 1991,
p. 168 and as cited by Slovic, 1992, p. 67). After showing it around, she decided to
stop the practice of writing as a man, probably because she did not like people’s
reactions (Dillard, 1988). This sample, with its gender-nonconforming writing,
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perhaps even transgender writing, was the beginning of Tinker Creek (pp. 165-166).
Tinker Creek is curiously agender, displaying a striking “effacement of authorial
identity” (Slovic, 1992, p. 66). Twenty-five years after its publication, Dillard
confessed that “Because a great many otherwise admirable men do not read books
American women write, I wanted to use a decidedly male pseudonym” (2007, p.
280). Even after using her real name when Harpers published serialized portions of
the text, she continued have a desire to elide her true gender; she wanted to publish
her book “with a decidedly male pseudonym” (p. 280) as
A. Dillard, hoping—as we all hope, and hope in vain—someone might notice
only the text, not considering the jacket, its picture, or the advertising; and
not remembering some one else’s impression of the book, or its writer, or its
other readers; not knowing the writer’s gender, or age, or nationality—just
read the book, starting cold with the first sentence. (pp. 280-281)
The publishers talked her out of it, and also convinced her to allow a picture of her
to appear on the dust jacket (p. 281). Dillard adds, “I regret both decisions. I
acknowledge, however, that living in hiding would be cumbersome” (p. 281).
I suggest that Dillard’s choice to write from the perspective of a man enabled
her to be a deft observer and nature-writer. Compared to Thoreau, Dillard had none
of the Thoreauvian frugality, no problems with employment, and no traumatic
deaths of siblings. However, her father did stage a brief abandonment of his family,
enabled by her mother, and she did experience heteronomy by allowing her queer
desire to write with a male style and byline to conform to conventional norms. In
any event, Dillard induced literalization/demetaphorization: she “enact[ed] a
stylistics of bias, writing out the very gesture of perception as a kind of poetics”
(Clark, 1989, p. 107). Suzanne Clark argued that Dillard invented this stylistic tool,
resisting the postmodern argument that “the subjective pronoun I is always male”
(1991, p. 157, p. 169). In terms of rhetorical invention, this is true. The eliding style
to which Clark refers is nothing new, and it is a powerful way to induce melancholia.
Transgender people invent this style by presenting a persona that is different from
one’s “subconscious sex” and the effects of it often require medical assistance
(Serano, 2007, p. 82). It may even be possible that writing from the perspective of a
man was what her psyche wanted, since she wanted to use a male pseudonym. Even
in that case, her choice to abandon that male style and byline at the behest of others
would have had the same result. Julia Serano, a professional biologist and a
transfemale activist, has described the experience of gender dissonance as “a sort of
gender sadness—a chronic and persistent grief over the fact that I felt so wrong in
my body” (p. 85). As time goes on this feeling of persistent grief becomes a kind of
gender melancholia, buried under a layer of what Butler has referred to as
“antimetaphorical activity” (quoted by Prosser, 2006, p. 268).
Clark (1991) argued that Dillard’s deliberate eliding of feminine identity in
Tinker Creek produces a dissonance between the text and the obvious picture and
name of a female on the book cover. The narrating subject is agender, but there are
several references to men. For example, Dillard wrote, “Like a blind man at the ball
game, I need a radio” (Dillard, 2007, p. 54). The narrator makes no reference to a
woman or femininity at all in this fashion. The only uses of female pronouns are in
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reference to other insects, animals, or specifically to other women and girls that are
clearly differentiated from the narrator. The narrator is a hunter, a stalker of
symbols who stabs them and forces them to let their blood mark the ground. If I did
not know who had written the text, I would probably have guessed that the author
was a man who was attempting to conceal his sex.
Walden and Tinker Creek are alike in the sense that interpretations of their
meaning can change dramatically depending on what the reader knows about them.
Thoreau was reluctant to allow his readers to know too much about him through his
journal, and he carried his secretive practices into his masterpiece by eliding himself
to the point that other people filled in the gaps with legends and assumptions.
Perhaps he did this in the hopes that his book would attain its own life and be
treated as an equal to its reader. In the cases of Walden and Tinker Creek, both
authored by literary giants, illusive surveyors and self-sounders are likely to idolize
and fetishize the text, respectively. Friends see Walden eye-to-text. Likewise, Dillard
went to great lengths to conceal her gender, first by hiding it from herself, and then,
when the prospect of book publication approached reality, she almost hid it from
her readers in the hopes of achieving parity with them.
Coda
Readers of Walden are free to identify themselves with the text in any way
that they please. This is a welcome improvement on A Week. Thoreau’s readers can
choose the role of illusive surveyor, self-sounder, or friend. If the reader chooses to
trust tradition and lays prone on its surface for answers, they will coldly see what is
readily at hand. If the reader chooses self-sounding and expects to compete for the
right to its answers, they will import an endless supply of what they have and their
resolve will only become stronger. If the reader chooses to befriend it with a sharing
of substance and meaning, they will work with Walden and become something
unexpected.
No matter what paths they take, the experience is sure to encounter some
metaphors. If the reader is attentive enough, they might even notice that many of
those metaphors are like newly minted coins that are constantly burying the
defaced metaphors of old. This may make the reader aware that the person who
wrote the text experienced profound changes across a decade of discoveries,
setbacks, and insights. They will realize this path, like any path through life, is a
disorganized mess of ironic lessons and loving offers of friendship with the world.
Stable boundaries, binaries, and bodies become recognized as useful illusions.
Finally, if the reader is motivated enough, they can seek to become more familiar
with these myths, and gain an unexpected success in becoming a whole individual,
one that finds satisfaction in the knowledge that true friendship involves parity, not
deference or agony. As more friendships are formed with Walden, it appears less
like a rigid codex filled with monochromatic letters, and more like a virtual rainbow
of life.
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Chapter Four: Walden’s Forms
At a certain season of our life we are accustomed to consider every spot as
the possible site of a house. I have thus surveyed the country on every side
within a dozen miles of where I live. In imagination I have bought all the
farms in succession, for all were to be bought, and I knew their price. I
walked over each farmer's premises, tasted his wild apples, discoursed on
husbandry with him, took his farm at his price, at any price, mortgaging it to
him in my mind; even put a higher price on it—took everything but a deed of
it—took his word for his deed, for I dearly love to talk—cultivated it, and him
too to some extent, I trust, and withdrew when I had enjoyed it long enough,
leaving him to carry it on. This experience entitled me to be regarded as a
sort of real-estate broker by my friends. Wherever I sat, there I might live,
and the landscape radiated from me accordingly. What is a house but a sedes,
a seat?—better if a country seat. I discovered many a site for a house not
likely to be soon improved, which some might have thought too far from the
village, but to my eyes the village was too far from it. Well, there I might live, I
said; and there I did live, for an hour, a summer and a winter life; saw how I
could let the years run off, buffet the winter through, and see the spring come
in. The future inhabitants of this region, wherever they may place their
houses, may be sure that they have been anticipated. An afternoon sufficed to
lay out the land into orchard, wood-lot, and pasture, and to decide what fine
oaks or pines should be left to stand before the door, and whence each
blasted tree could be seen to the best advantage; and then I let it lie, fallow,
perchance, for a man is rich in proportion to the number of things which he
can afford to let alone.
—Walden, Version E, circa 1852-1853 (Schacht, n.d., “Where I Lived, and
What I Lived For,” para. 1)
At face value, the epigraph to this chapter appears to be an autobiographical
account of Thoreau’s life and passion. It begins with a casual account of himself as a
surveyor, which involves communication and interaction with his neighbors and the
environment. However, the reader makes it not even halfway through the paragraph
before Thoreau leaves his imagined series of neighbors and their partitioned lots
behind, and goes on to summarize the moments when he rested during his daily
walks. He sat long enough for time to come full circle, and followed where the
seasons would take him. He took up residence at the place where he was sitting, and
contemplated the modifications and divisions that he would have liked to make to
that site. He considered each tree near his curtilage and whether the tree should be
removed, and even thought of relocating his house in deference to an array of
diseased trees. He concluded that it is most profitable to do neither, but to stand
again and continue sauntering. This creates a mystical confidence that the next place
in which he chooses to rest will also be suitable for residence and imaginary
partitioning, and a healthy relationship with his surroundings.
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Beyond its face value, the epigraph perhaps symbolizes the relationship
between Walden and its reader. The paragraph was a relatively late addition to
Walden. In 1849, when Thoreau had published A Week, the beginning of “Where I
Lived, and What I Lived For” opened promptly with the business of establishing his
residence at Walden Pond. Since the epigraph was produced by a much more
mature Thoreau than the one who first endeavored to explain where he lived and
for what purpose, it makes sense that Henry Golemba argued that it is an example of
rhetorical play (1990, p. 214). I accept this invitation to play, and I cultivate this
fertile plot of text and use it to introduce the business of this chapter.
Walden uses an impressive array of literary devices as its rhetorical toolkit.
Play is just one example of what Golemba referred to as Thoreau’s “language of
desire” (1990, p. 233, p. 234), “a language whose meaning seems to evaporate as the
reader’s eye follows Thoreau’s words, enticing the reader to fill the gaps with his or
her own meaning, transforming the reader into a coauthor of the text” (p. 7).
Additionally, in the spirit of a language that feeds upon the desires of the reader,
Golemba appropriates the words of Thoreau’s friend, H. G. O. Blake, who described
Thoreau’s prose as “a letter posted but never quite delivered” (p. 228). We are then
asked to speculate as to what that letter contains without having it in our
possession. We cannot ask Thoreau what he wrote, since he (other than being
deceased) does not have the letter in his possession either. Its status seems
perpetually in the delivery24 between author and reader.
Beyond Thoreau’s language of desire, Walden also exhibits larger formal
structures that potentially disrupt the purported locations of Thoreau’s language of
desire. Irony is the main trope that emerges from Thoreau’s “rhetoric of ascent”
(Milder, 1995, p. 62). Unlike Golemba’s coining of Thoreau’s language of desire,
Milder defined Thoreau’s rhetoric of ascent as “the architectural staircase designed
to conduct the reader gradationally from one plane of being to another and to
prompt, methodize, and confirm the writer’s self-transcendence” (p. 62). Thoreau’s
rhetoric of ascent turns its self-transcendence on the text itself, sowing doubt about
whether those sentences that embody Thoreau’s language of desire and the
structure of his rhetoric are correct.
In the previous chapter, I discussed the relationship between Walden and its
reader, defining that relationship as a possible friendship. In Chapter Two, I
discussed Thoreau’s theory of friendship and Crosswhite’s (2010) analysis of it. In
Walden, friendship occurs on a larger and a smaller scale. The smaller scale is the
context of a collection of Pascal’s vases, in which friends are actively locked in an
evanescent embrace of “indwelling” (p. 166) that allows them to give and receive
appropriations of virtue, and because this indwelling is a process, that virtuous
process transcends the individuals who at any given moment are engaged in
friendship (pp. 168-171). The process will survive particular friendships,
transcending to the larger scale of friendship; when friends drift apart, they carry on
Delivery, besides being a canon of rhetoric, derives from the Anglo-Norman
French delivrer (delivery, n.d.), which means “to render free, independent” (délivrer,
n.d.).
24
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echoes of their past friendships, and when they indwell with new friends, the
processes of friendship that had passed out of sight resurface, demonstrating the
immortality of friendship. At the same time, friends and their old processes of
friendship are subjected to revision, destabilizing virtue.
Like the “indwelling” of friendship (Crosswhite, 2010, p. 166), Thoreau’s
language of desire passes underneath his rhetoric of ascent like water under a
bridge. There are two basic scales of form. The smaller scale is Thoreau’s language
of desire. It is the stream of Thoreau’s language of desire that makes it necessary for
the bridge to be built. The larger scale is Thoreau’s rhetoric of ascent, which allows
Walden’s reader and persona to cross over Thoreau’s language of desire, change,
and move forward in the adventure of life. These two simultaneous occurrences of
form make for a complex interaction, making it necessary for me to read the
epigraph allegorically so that this chapter can review rhetorical analyses of Walden.
I see myself as one of those farmers who hopes that Thoreau’s persona will
walk over the foundations of my lifestyle, taste the fruit of my wild flavor, improve
the future of my stock in life, and make a convincing claim that my word, my deed, is
worth more than it is. The ease with which the epigraph lends itself to this kind of
reading suggests that there is something queerly playful going on here. Thoreau will
play this game in the world of imagination until just before a permanent transaction
is made. Then, we will part ways so that I may continue to cultivate the place of my
residence with the belief that I have increased the value of my world.
Walden saunters through this world, sometimes with wild unpredictability,
and then disrupts this routine each hour. If the reader needs more of a hint that
Thoreau is in a serious mood to play, consider the fact that Thoreau’s hour lived
through the four seasons and somehow induced the future residents to believe that
Thoreau knew that they—we—were coming. Walden does not sit still for more than
an hour. In that hour, it is possible to review the contents of the text and reexperience the transcendence of opposed chapters, the descent into winter, and the
recovery of spring (Buell, 1995; Milder, 1995; Bickman, 1992). Then, after that hour
is done, the text and the reader continue sauntering through a wilderness, having
remade themselves and updated their moral foundations.
The epigraph’s two-part structure, folded within a single block of text, is a
heuristic for Walden’s form and framework for friendship. In the first half, Walden
tells the reader that its interactions with the reader are happening in a sequential
structure, with each interaction occurring in the proceeding present within the
reading experience. This is form that occurs on a small scale, conversing with each
discrete grower-of-meaning as they are encountered. Walden converses with each
moment of the reader, flourishes with the presence of the reader, confers advantage
to its dynamic companion, and then moves on, having done service with a language
of desire. In the second half of the epigraph, Walden centers itself for a longer period
of time, and beholds the reader as a prospective friend. The intervals of these longer
periods of contemplation have moral significance. This is form that occurs on a large
scale, anticipating what will appear after the writer and reader alike have learned
what they can from each other and moved on as different personae.
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This chapter engages in the always-risky practice of creating perspective by
incongruity. As James Jasinski (2001) has argued, the most common way that
scholars execute Burke’s perspective by incongruity is through rhetorical invention.
“Extending Burke’s insight into the relationship between metaphor and perspective
by incongruity,” Jasinski pointed out, “a number of scholars have examined the use
of radical metaphor (or catachresis) as a way of generating perspective by
incongruity” (p. 434). Golemba and Milder represent the two perspectives that
constitute the raw material for my analysis. Like my treatment of Buell’s analysis of
Thoreau’s nature-writing in the previous chapter, I will be engaging with both
Golemba and Milder on the finer points of how they conceptualize Thoreau’s form—
specifically, how their forms interact. Since Golemba and Milder have different
interests regarding what Walden has to offer, their two perspectives are somewhat
incongruous. Buell, Golemba, and Milder are each invested in the idea of
collaboration between reader and text, but in different ways.
In this chapter, I examine the patterns created by the interaction of Thoreau’s
language of desire and rhetoric of ascent. Before I engage Golemba’s and Milder’s
arguments, I review two projects that are helpful in showing how they interact. The
first project has to do with Burke’s concepts of literature as form (1931/1968) and
literature as equipment for living (1941/1973). The second cluster of research has
to do with Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) spatial analysis of the interactions
between nomadic peoples, the institutions of civilization, and the hybrid groups of
itinerant artisans. Once I have provided this theoretical framework, I discuss the
forms as they appear in Walden. It will not be possible to provide an exhaustive
inventory of these forms for two reasons. First, the particular forms as they exist in
Walden by itself are multiple, and a complete inventory would exceed the scope of a
dissertation (none of the sources cited here attempt an exhaustive inventory either).
Second, because the forms are due to change, dissolve, and regenerate depending on
who is reading the text and which pages are being read, the potential number of
forms can be proliferated ad infinitum.
Review of Theory
Burke, Deleuze, and Guattari are the main theory sources for this chapter.
Burke’s theoretical contributions are needed for two reasons. First, Burke has
provided a framework for the form of Thoreau’s language of desire. Second, Burke
has defined literature as equipment for living, which highlights the importance of
the interaction between Thoreau’s language of desire and his rhetoric of ascent as a
model for friendship. Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) contributions are needed to
show how Thoreau’s language of desire and his rhetoric of ascent interact in a way
that produces mere agony for some readers and robust friendship for others.
Burke’s Literature
In this section, I discuss Burke’s discussion of literature as form (1931/1968)
and literature as equipment for living (1941/1973). I argue that Thoreau’s language
of desire has Burkean form. That form interacts with Thoreau’s rhetoric of ascent to
demonstrate to the reader how friendship provides frameworks for accepting how
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the world works (Burke, 1937/1984b). That model demonstration of friendship
updates those frames to create and adapt to a dynamic moral environment. The
ethical updating exhibited by the Thoreauvian friendship in Walden is equipment
for living.
Burkean Form
Burke’s form is useful here because it helps illuminate the multiple
individuated forms of Thoreau’s language of desire within Walden. Burke proposed
a relatively narrow definition of form for literary experiences (1931/1968), and it is
compatible with Deleuze and Guattari’s (2009) concept of desire (i.e., desiringproduction) that I use in this dissertation. Thoreau’s language of desire is the second
component of the two-part sequential structure that Burke called literary form
(1931/1968, p. 31). In Burke’s typology (pp. 124-183), Thoreau’s language of desire
fulfills what he would refer to as repetitive qualitative form. As far as where form
comes from, Burke’s tracing of individuated forms to an abstract Symbol and then to
a pattern of experience (pp. 152-153) also applies in this case; Thoreau’s language
of desire derives from the pattern of experience known as melancholia, which for
many people is a constant companion under capitalism, a primary reason why
Walden is durable.
Burke’s form is a two-part sequence, and it is compatible with Deleuze and
Guattari’s philosophy. In Burke’s Counter-statement, form is a sequence that consists
of two steps: the first step arouses an appetite, followed by a second step that
adequately satisfies that appetite (p. 31). At first glance, it may appear that this
definition will have to be modified because it assumes that desire is a lack, and as
such, it is incompatible with my deployment of Deleuze and Guattari’s (2009)
positive understanding of desire. However, this is not the case. The important point
to keep in mind here is that Burkean form is designed specifically to account for
desires in the context of reading. With the exception of some texts generated by
interactive computer software, choose-your-own-adventure stories, or suggestive
prose/poetry (of which Walden is a member), the relevant desires that may be
pursued by a reader are done at the behest of conventional meaning that is decoded
during reading. For the most part, readers simply do not practice their desires the
way they normally do in the business of living. Specifically, the only degrees of
freedom that readers have are the affirmative yet binary choice to stop or continue
reading and the relatively narrow but positive freedom to interpret the text. This is
why it is appropriate to describe the initial step in Burkean form as the arousing of
the reader’s desire in a context that immediately, by virtue of the reading
experience, restricts its independent pursuit by the reader until the second step. The
reader actually desires a lack. If this lack is to be satisfied, the reader chooses to wait
for the text to do the desiring for them or finds some way into greater interpretive
freedom.
In addition to laying out form’s textual structure as a simple two-part
sequence, Burke also found it necessary to posit a typology of forms (1931/1968,
pp. 123-138), and some of those types apply to Thoreau’s language of desire. That
language tends to exhibit qualitative progressions of form, which escapes the
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audience’s notice until the sequence completes, similar to inductive conclusions (see
pp. 124-125). The Burkean form that I identify in Walden also tends to repeat (see p.
125).
How artists invent the various progressions of literary form was of particular
interest to Burke (pp. 138-183), and Thoreau’s language of desire can be traced
through this inventional process. Artists have various patterns of experience that
they use as the material for formal progression, and when a pattern is put into a
formula, it assumes the guise of a Symbol (pp. 149-153). Burkean Symbols are
derived from bodily processes, such as sleeping and awakening, natural rhythms
and cycles, such as the seasons, and recurring human situations or conditions, such
as melancholia (see pp. 149-152). Thoreau’s melancholia is a pattern of his
experience, which I argue produced what I call a “Clarity-Mystery Symbol,” of which
Thoreau’s language of desire is the second part that satisfies the reader’s appetite.
Various literary forms owe their success to the existence of certain
expectations that audiences have when they read literature, and artists are keen to
engineer their works to appeal to enduring expectations (pp. 153-158). Part of the
durability of Walden as a work of literature is due to the persistence of melancholia
as a condition of life under capitalism. Thoreau’s language of desire is instrumental
in helping readers recover from that condition.
This review of Burkean form helps to illuminate the diversity of ways in
which Thoreau’s language of desire manifests within Walden, and the addition of
Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) spatial analysis will bring a dynamism to this
framework. Because Walden’s text was designed to work with meaning recovered
by readers at strategic points (Golemba, 1990), the text owes much of its enduring
importance to the contributions of readers who became published authors
themselves (Buell, 1995), not to mention the countless lay readers who only have
themselves and their acquaintances for an audience. There are endless examples in
which a particular scholar argues that a particular passage in Walden has a
particular meaning. Years later, another scholar is likely to produce, and indeed has
produced, another reading of the same passage with a wildly and fortuitously
different result.25 In response to this freedom, Golemba argued that there are limits
on Walden’s meaning. I partially agree with Golemba. My contention, however, is
that Walden’s perceived patterns of elasticity of meaning mutate at different points
in the reading process. As Golemba pointed out, there are moments when Walden
reserves the reader’s interpretive freedoms; there, the prose does not lend itself to
multiple meanings. In other locations, Golemba continued, Walden deploys a
rhetorical device that presents a supple turn of phrase. Both of these moments are a
product of text-reader interaction. The challenge seems to be that we should
ascertain the ley lines dividing elasticity and rigidity, as Golemba does, but my
approach appreciates Thoreau’s rhetoric of ascent, which I argue causes those ley
lines to move, and explaining that movement requires the theoretical assistance of
The most frequently analyzed passage in Walden, concerning Thoreau’s loss of a
dove, horse, and hound, has resulted in a cornucopia of interpretations (Cavell,
1972).
25
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Deleuze and Guattari (1987). The advantage of this approach is that it becomes
possible to understand why it would be useful to publish a document that is often
put to seemingly inappropriate purposes (and within a social environment in which
the standard of appropriateness is fluid).26 In other words, my approach has the
advantage of explaining aberrant readings rather than dismissing them as outliers.
The next section shows how this dynamism can be an effective demonstration of
how friendship helps us be and stay ethical.
Burke’s Literature as Equipment for Living
Burke’s theory of literature as equipment for living reveals that the process
of reading Walden yields directions that help us locate the important lessons for the
changing circumstances of life. Burke saw in pragmatism a call to analyze
literature’s status as a perspective of a situation so that it might be recognized, put
to use, tested, and proliferated (1935/1984a, 1941/1973). Walden does this by
showing that the necessary tools in its kit are not located ‘in’ its pages. Burke’s
analysis of literature as equipment for living can be broken down into three key
lessons: transforming liabilities into assets, producing perspective by incongruity,
and responding to changing situations.
Abandoning a strict focus on inert aesthetic beauty, which is created by the
comfortable for the comfortable, Burke argued that the most important pragmatic
power of literature is through its function of equipping readers to deal with threats,
with irony being simultaneously the most volatile and useful of the lot (1941/1973),
which builds frames of rejection and acceptance (Burke, 1937/1984b). Literature
furnishes this equipment through the various formal progressions, showing the
interrelations of situations and desires (1931/1968). Arousing appetites in the
midst of various situations and forcing readers to learn lessons about how
characters or personae pursue their desires helps prepare readers to turn “liabilities
into assets” (1941/1973, p. 17). Doing this requires readers to be able to question
their pieties and recognize the advantages and deficiencies of their “trained
incapacities” (1935/1984a, p. 7). Trained incapacities are important, partially
Golemba provided an example of inappropriate interpreting of Walden. When
Golemba was “gnawing on this problem” of positing an interpretation that went too
far, he saw a television advertisement by the National Bank of Detroit that exploited
one of the most famous and most elastic passages in the “Conclusion” chapter: “If
one advances confidently in the direction of his dreams, and endeavors to live the
life which he has imagined, he will meet with a success unexpected in common
hours” (1990, p. 184). The video that Golemba recalled focused on a boy who was
“traipsing through the woods,” and simultaneously dreaming about his future (p.
184). According to Golemba’s account, images of a new car, a house, a boat, and
other images of middle-class status flashed on the screen, obviously enticing
viewers to contemplate the bank’s ability to provide low-interest loans so that they
could make their similar dreams a reality. I would argue, however, that it is because
of the advertisement’s use of the sentence out of its context that allowed for such a
wild interpretation to take place.
26
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because it is the unfortunate side effect of specialization that affects all life, but also
because our interests govern the critical tests of success that would indicate
whether it is time to change our perspective and reset our trained incapacities (p.
16, p. 100-102). A change of perspective requires a change in piety, and a change in
piety requires a change in our interests (p. 37-49). There are two different kinds of
perspectives, or frames: frames of rejection, or “debunking,” and frames of
acceptance (Burke, 1937/1984b, pp. 21-25, pp. 92-107). The most common frames
simply debunk, as it happens in tragedy, but it is possible to combine debunking
with a frame of acceptance, which hybridizes it into the comic frame (p. 93-94, p.
166 as discussed by Carlson, 1986, pp. 447-448 as discussed by LeBaron, 2010). A
comic frame is powerful, as it accepts our foibles without making ourselves
impervious to change, but it is still one perspective. Our ability to see a situation
from more than one set of interests creates a new perspective of a situation, a
perspective by incongruity (Burke, 1935/1984a, pp. 89-96).
A perspective by incongruity is a parallax view of a situation and the
classificatory means of ordering it (p. 69-70, p. 74). Since any perspective involves
disciplinary bracketing and the deliberate overlooking of various patterns and
phenomena, it is simply not possible for incompatible perspectives to be reconciled
so that they can be retired in favor of a superior perspective (Anders, 2011). The
deliberate cultivation of incongruent perspectives is akin to the discovery that there
are many ways to slice a block of cheese, and that there is no way for a critic to
completely avoid the disappointment (or outrage) that one feels when we discover
that our favorite method of cheese-cutting is violated by others; the judgment of
impiety is a natural reaction, and is sometimes appropriate (Burke, 1935/1984a, p.
102-107). The abandonment of one’s ability to impugn impiety interferes with one’s
critical abilities, making perspective by incongruity useful for studying the
metaphorical dimensions of a situation (p. 107-111). A metaphor is a coin: it has
two sides, and those sides cannot be reconciled into a single image without
destroying the material and form of the coin.
Adequately responding to situations is one of the main reasons to read
literature, and as critical beings, we look to literature as equipment for living so that
we can deploy the correct strategy competently (Burke, 1941/1973, p. 293-304).
According to Burke, artists create literature by programming their own situational
strategies into their art (p. 301). We read these stories so that we can hope to learn
the strategies vicariously. There are a few important factors that make this a
challenging enterprise. First, as it is often difficult to recognize which strategies we
read should be applied to the various situations in our lives, similar situations may
require subtle strategies and we need to know why difficult strategies are needed
when easier ones are available (p. 298-299). Second, and more importantly, some
strategies, such as irony, cannot be learned vicariously, and must be learned the
hard way by experiencing what it is like to be an alazon or by identifying with one in
the process of reading (Burke, 1945/1969). Irony is arguably the most difficult
strategy of all, and as such, probably requires the use of qualitative progression to
convey. Since there is no static guide on “How to Avoid Becoming an Alazon,” the
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strategy that deals with it as a human situation cannot skirt the necessity of
becoming or identifying with an alazon (p. 512).
Burke’s analyses on form and literature as equipment for living are
important for the proceeding discussion of how forms are constructed and
dissolved. There are definite forms that operate within the reading experience of
Walden, but what makes the reading experience impossible master is Golemba’s
(1990) notice that Thoreau’s language of desire has a tendency to “evaporate” (p. 7).
In the next section, I discuss Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis of the historical
struggle between nomadic peoples, sedentary peoples, and itinerant peoples (1987).
Their analysis has identified an asymmetrical process that causes space to become
striated, smoothened, and excavated. Their spatial analysis provides an
understanding of why Thoreau’s language of desire evaporates, why that special
language seems to be nomadic, and helps the current project to capitalize on that
instability and use it as equipment for living with friends instead of merely
tolerating its agonizing effects.
Deleuze and Guattari’s Spatial Analysis of the War Machine
Deleuze and Guattari’s main use in this chapter is to analyze Thoreau’s
language of desire and his rhetoric of ascent as two parallel processes that interact
in important ways. A Thousand Plateaus (1987) spent a significant amount of space
discussing the epic history of civilization and how it involves various different
processes. Deleuze and Guattari were process philosophers, and so their interest in
how and why spatial structures appear to change over time is important for
explaining how and why Thoreau’s language of desire interacts and morphs with his
rhetoric of ascent. In this section, I first discuss Deleuze and Guattari’s account of the
struggle between nomadic peoples, sedentary peoples, and itinerant peoples. Then, I
present their analysis of the three respective spaces that are created by those
peoples: smooth space, striated space, and holey space.
The War Machine
Deleuze and Guattari were interested in the historical antagonism between
human groups and how their interaction provokes war, and I am interested in their
investigation here because it provides an insight into why critics have described
Walden as an agony. The human groups that Deleuze and Guattari used to theorize
about the war machine were the steppe nomads in Mongolia, the sedentary
civilizations that provoked them to fight, and the itinerant metallurgists who were
struggling to find professional survival in their midst. The conquests of the Kahn
family led to bloody battles in northeast Asia, but there was a notorious inability of
the nomads themselves to disband or destroy; as Deleuze and Guattari wrote, “The
hesitation of the nomad is legendary,” which led civilization to assimilate the
techniques of the nomadic warriors so that it could wage war (p. 418).
Unfortunately, this appropriation of nomadic techniques and its development into
organized warfare has proven to be just as dangerous to civilization as the nomads
themselves (p. 419). This danger came as a result of the State’s inability to allow
nomadic technique to derive from its “rhythmic” nature and not from “statistical”
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analysis (p. 390). In the midst of war, itinerant metallurgists found a way to form
underground connections between these two worlds (pp. 412-413). As I argue later
in this chapter, the danger that the State creates for itself in this interaction
manifests in the literature on Walden in terms of New Critics who wished to distill
the nomadic war machine that they surmised as an essential property of Thoreau’s
prose, ignoring the fact that that agony was a product of Walden failing to conform
to a framework that ignored the role of the interpreter.
In this section, I proceed through this presentation in three steps. First, I
compare Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis of nomadic peoples and sedentary peoples.
Second, I discuss their analysis of the hesitation on the part of the nomads and the
apparatus of capture that sedentary peoples deploy to assimilate the nomad’s war
technique. Finally, I address their discussion of the itinerant peoples and how they
maintain contact with both nomadic peoples and sedentary peoples.
For Deleuze and Guattari, war is produced by a continuing interaction
between nomadic peoples and sedentary peoples (pp. 412-413). For Deleuze and
Guattari, the home of the nomad is nowhere, similar to the Thoreauvian who walks
“sans terre” (Thoreau, 1862, p. 657). On the one hand, the steppe nomads were
fearsome warriors, but they were, strictly speaking, undisciplined and had a trained
incapacity for organizing themselves into armies, following the commands of civil
leaders, or becoming civil leaders themselves (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 418).
They knew how to set their horses to graze and how to rejuvenate themselves by
eating their dead animals (Rubruck, 1900), but they could not become civilized,
since that would require becoming sedentary and adopting a home (Deleuze &
Guattari, 1987, p. 418). The battle prowess of nomads was a significant source of
interest to sedentary societies (p. 404). The difficulty here is that it is a moot task to
identify where the actual innovation comes from: the nomads or the State (p. 404)?
The inability of nomadic peoples to take control of civilization leads to a
legendary hesitation that gives sedentary peoples an opportunity to seize the
nomad warrior’s mode of operation, impose statistical analysis, and adapt the art of
war for sedentary purpose (p. 390). The leaders of civilization had an uneasy
success in integrating the nomad’s horse and technique into its forces, hence
Deleuze and Guattari’s naming of the process a war machine, as they explain that it
is the encroachment of sedentary society and its appropriation of land that induces
nomads to fight. The State rationalizes this provocation in the names of national
security and resource availability. However, the way that nomadic peoples lived and
fought was fundamentally different from the way that civilization builds up
structures and performs analysis (pp. 390-391). In the end, the attempts by
sedentary peoples to take nomadic warfare turned out to be enormously productive
and destructive at the same time, leading to an epic seesaw between nomadic and
sedentary ways of life (pp. 474-500).
The danger that the nomadic war machine posed to the State came as a result
of the State’s inability to allow nomadic techniques to remain nomadic (p. 389).
When the State appropriates nomadic techniques, it tends to cherry pick and warps
those techniques to suit the ideologies and traditions of civilization through
statistics (p. 390). Nomads, by contrast, allow the “rhythms” of nature to dictate
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those techniques directly (p. 390). For Deleuze and Guattari, nomads deploy a
science based on what they called the “Numbering Number” (1987, p. 389) a
quantitative value that acts autonomously. In contrast, States deploy a science that
is based on what Deleuze and Guattari referred to as “the numbered number” (p.
391). The difficulty in distinguishing between the numbering number, which is
“rhythmic” (p. 390) “with several [numerical] bases at the same time” (p. 391), and
the numbered number, which is “a statistical element” (p. 390), is arguably the
largest source of problems in modern military organizations. An example that
illustrates this problem is the “rule of three” found in the U.S. Marine Corps;
according to military lore, the basic military organization, the fireteam, functions
effectively only if the fireteam leader is in command of three fireteam members
(Freedman, 1998, para. 12). The same principle is in place for squad leaders who
usually command three fireteams, and this sometimes is true for even larger
command structures. State science would say that any more than three subordinates
always leads to inefficiency, and this conclusion has been reached because military
strategists have experimented with other command structures and concluded
through statistical analysis that deviating from the rule of three is inferior. In
practice, however, as command structures become larger in scale, this rule actually
becomes less and less important, and high rank officers are often in charge of more
than three subordinate units simultaneously. These deviations from the rule are
simply an example of nomadic science permitting the numbering number to dictate
the most advantageous command configuration.
As Deleuze and Guattari have explained, because there is no clear connection
between the wilderness homelessness of the nomad and the sedentary center of the
agrarian, anyone who can make a connection stands to reap advantages (pp. 404415). The period of time of interest to Deleuze and Guattari for this analysis was the
fifth to fourth centuries BCE in Asia (p. 351). In this time period, metallurgy was a
trade that could be pursued professionally, and Deleuze and Guattari came upon this
topic because they asked, “How do the nomads invent or find their weapons?” (p.
403). The nature of the job of the metallurgist required resources that had to come
from the wilderness, and required technology and infrastructure that only
civilization could provide (p. 409). There had to be some way for these workers to
get resources to their foundries, and for Deleuze and Guattari, there were two
primary ways that this was done. First, the most primitive way was to follow others
until they could find it, and then bring it back to the workshop (p. 409). However,
this is obviously risky, since going into the wilderness opened these artisans to
attack by the nomads. The artisans were able to avoid confrontation with the
nomads by inventing a second strategy: hiring specialized merchants to do the job
(p. 409, p. 415).
The story of the war machine is an important empirical basis for what has
been a notoriously abstract discussion of three kinds of spaces. In the next section, I
present Deleuze and Guattari’s use of the story of the war machine, which shows
how spatial structures affect each other.
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Three Spaces: Smooth, Striated, Holey
For Deleuze and Guattari, the phenomenon of space is itself dynamic and
subject to perceptual changes, and these changes can be observed in how the text of
Walden is perceived: smoothening, striating, and excavating. Deleuze and Guattari
argued that these processes are mutually created: space is striated because it is
experienced as smooth, space is smoothened because it has been experienced as
striated, and space is excavated because it is difficult to discern the boundary
between smooth and striated space. These processes also have asymmetrical
existence (p. 480). Because these processes operate in directions that undermine
and form the conditions for each other’s existence, there is no space that is purely
smooth, striated, or excavated (p. 388). As I discuss later in this chapter, this
forbidden purity and stability also applies to Walden’s prose; its text is never
perceived as purely smooth, striated, or holey, and that mixture is in flux.
Smooth space embodies the principle of nomos (p. 481), which means ‘law,’
‘custom,’ or ‘melody’ (nomos, n.d.). This principle is not published by civil scientists
or lawyers, is not ad hoc, and is not represented by creative songwriters. Instead,
this ‘melody’ refers to the self-caused patterns and rhythms of nature. It is the idea
that when the ice cracks in the spring, it is best to listen and walk elsewhere. Sailors
know that the sea manages its own affairs, and all historical efforts to chart the
spatial limits of nautical reality have eventually highlighted the ways in which the
current understanding does not fit reality (p. 479). Charts of individual oceans
needed to be redrawn and navigational techniques had to be reviewed when the
globe’s structure was unveiled (p. 479). Furthermore, even after the whole surface
of the globe was charted, the exploration of the air and the abyss of space at “a
tangent to this sphere” (Thoreau, 1985, p. 579) caused a strangely familiar
revolution in charting and navigation techniques. For the nomad as well as the
saunterer, a space is smoothened simply because someone else tried to striate it,
and it is the moment in which those striations are invalidated during major Kuhnian
paradigm shifts (Kuhn, 1996) that space is instantly set smooth in our perception.
At some point, people did settle down and became sedentary, and they
needed to articulate the principle of logos (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 369, p. 478),
which means ‘word’ (logos, n.d.). This is the enunciation of the world, its laws, and
the efforts of civilization to improve upon mere survival. The sea is a dangerous
place, and it can be made immensely safer if ship captains know how to expedite
their crossing and have maps at their disposal. When logos dominates, the sailor
goes the way the calculations indicate, even when those calculations are slightly
wrong (p. 479). Shipping lanes facilitate and enable trade, which is enormously
profitable for shrinking the size of the global village. For the sedentary member of
civilization, a space is striated by considerable effort, and that effort is seen as
worthwhile only when there is no chart that adequately accounts for its contours
and when Kuhnian normal science experiences a crisis. It only takes one story of a
saunterer stumbling beyond the boundaries of a map to inspire new theories of
cartography.
The smoothness of nomos and the striations of logos are constantly revising
each other, and this two-way interaction is asymmetrical (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987,
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p. 480). It is helpful to compare this interaction with the processes of science and
performance. The process of science has been described by Thomas Kuhn (1996),
since Kuhn’s framework exhibits the same kind of asymmetry. The performance
model has been described by Dwight Conquergood (1998). Kuhn made waves in
academia when he argued that science does not progress linearly, but instead
progresses through an alternation between normal science and periods of crisis. In
his framework, the crises sometimes give rise to paradigm shifts, and some theories
are abandoned and new ones are created to serve as the basis for the next period of
normal science. In terms of scientific progress, this framework can be simplified into
the idea that science sometimes has to take one step backward to take two steps
forward. In addition to Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Conquergood
offered an argument that addresses the problematic relationship between mimesis
and poiesis. Conquergood noticed that it is in the circumstances where there are
performing bodies in relationship with other performing bodies that a space of
kinesis becomes possible, giving rise to a process of “breaking and remaking” that
has been a powerful aid in pedagogy, since it dissolves the difference between
teacher and student (p. 32). These two kinds of process, the cycle of normal science
and periods of crisis for Kuhn, and the rhythm of breaking and remaking for
Conquergood (following Homi Bhabha; p. 32), is the same kind of asymmetry that
Deleuze and Guattari identified in the interaction between smooth space and
striated space. The smoothening of space does not erase the progress achieved by
the striation of space, but it does involve a crisis in which an upheaval resets a
striated space into a smooth space (p. 480). The gradient of the next space
smoothening is dictated by the misalignment between nomos and logos, which is an
epistemic problem. Over time, each movement of striation and smoothening brings
about some kind of revision, and the revision harbors the seeds of a future
smoothening of space. It is impossible to predict the places and scales that space will
be smoothened or striated next.
The volatile interaction between smoothening and striating space creates a
hybrid method of following that unveils the exciting life of matter (pp. 404-415). The
itinerant follows the work, and stays as long as there is a living to be made (p. 409).
For carpenters and woodworkers, the act of transforming wood into lumber
requires the artisan to follow the grain of the wood and to understand the itinerant
lives of trees (p. 409). However, for woodworkers, this following has a stationary
base of operation: a workshop with heavy equipment and controlled environmental
conditions. This fusion of deference to nature and sedentary accumulation of
infrastructure produces many surprises regarding how matter functions. For
Deleuze and Guattari, “what metal and metallurgy bring to light is a life proper to
matter, a vital state of matter as such, a material vitalism that doubtless exists
everywhere but is ordinarily hidden or covered, rendered unrecognizable,
dissociated” (p. 411). According to Deleuze and Guattari, metallurgists were the first
specialized artisans, and their emergence coincided with the formation of secret
groups, guilds, and associations (p. 412). The opacity of these groups and the
secrecy of their machinations produce the appearance of subterranean networks,
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with artisans who seem to disappear and reappear elsewhere, unexpectedly (p.
412).
Deleuze and Guattari’s development of the smooth, the striated, and the
excavated is an important way of thinking about how Walden’s forms causes
changes to how it appears to readers. These changes are not caused entirely by the
text itself, and the reader is not solely responsible for Walden’s instability. The
remainder of this chapter is devoted to analyzing different levels of scale in Walden
and how they interact.
Thoreau’s Language of Desire
Thoreau’s “language of desire” (Golemba, 1990, p. 7) fulfills the reader’s
appetites, rounding out the second step of Burkean form. It should be pointed out
that, before 1849, Thoreau was already familiar with the art of writing vagueness
into his prose, due to his process of literalization (Arsić, 2016). More than simply
writing with an occasional flair for the mysterious, Thoreau’s breakthrough
involved the development of a Burkean Symbol that utilized his ability to construct
sentences with mysterious deficits of clarity. Clarity is the foundation, interspersed
with Thoreau’s language of desire (Golemba, 1990). In each of the individuated
forms, more inviting sentences and paragraphs provide special contrast, producing
a striated alternation between a check on the free exercise of interpretation and an
open permission to interpret (p. 7). This give and take is the same kind of giving and
receiving that occurs in healthy friendship.
To substantiate this argument, this section proceeds in two steps. First, I use
J. Lyndon Shanley’s (1957) first version of Walden to prove that Thoreau already
knew how to construct vague passages before 1849. Second, I present Golemba’s
arguments and discuss some examples that he extracted from Walden that exhibit
Thoreau’s language of desire.
Before I discuss these topics in this section, it is important to point out that
the boundary between this section and the next section, which discusses Thoreau’s
rhetoric of ascent, cannot be perfectly discrete. Ultimately, I argue that these scales
of form have a fuzzy boundary that gives rise to a holey space at the borderlands.
Because of this fuzziness, it will not be possible to separate the scales of form
completely.
Walden’s Form before the Crisis
Thanks to Shanley’s reconstruction of the first version of Walden, it is easy to
establish that Thoreau knew how to deploy sentences that ended up inviting
interpretive play before 1849. To provide an example, I analyze Thoreau’s famous
passage about losing a dog, a horse, and a bird. The context in which the passage
appears does not lend itself to the alternations of rigidity and elasticity that Thoreau
added to Walden after 1849. Instead, this passage is vague because it was written so
that almost any contemporary reader would identify with the author, connect with
his feelings of loss and his quest for recovery, and agree with his conclusion. The
purpose of this identification is to induce the reader to understand that Thoreau and
the reader shared a kinship regarding their experiences of nature’s secrets.
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Before I analyze the passage about Thoreau’s lost dog, horse, and bird, I want
to quote the passage closer to its original context and then make an easy conclusion
about why the passage has sparked so many interpretations:
You will pardon some obscurities, for there are more secrets in my trade
than in most men’s and yet not voluntarily kept, but inseparable from its very
nature. I would gladly tell all that I know about it, and never paint “No
Admittance” on my gate. [para. 23]
I long ago lost a hound, a bay horse, and a turtledove, and am still on their
trail. Many are the travellers I have spoken concerning them, describing their
tracks and what calls they answered to. I have met one or two who had heard
the hound, and the tramp of the horse, and even seen the dove disappear
behind a cloud, and they seemed as anxious to recover them as if they had
lost them themselves. [para. 24]
To anticipate, not the sunrise and the dawn merely, but, if possible, Nature
herself! How many mornings, summer and winter, before yet any neighbor
was stirring about his business, have I been about mine! No doubt, many of
my townsmen have met me returning from this enterprise, farmers starting
for Boston in the twilight, or woodchoppers going to their work. It is true, I
never assisted the sun materially in his rising, but doubt not, it was of the last
importance only to be present at it. [para. 25]
So many autumn, ay, and winter days, spent outside the town, trying to hear
what was in the wind, to hear and carry it express! I well-nigh sunk all my
capital in it, and lost my own breath into the bargain, running in the face of it.
If it had concerned either of the political parties, depend upon it, it would
have appeared in the Gazette with the earliest intelligence. At other times
watching from the observatory of some cliff or tree, to telegraph any new
arrival; or waiting at evening on the hill-tops for the sky to fall, that I might
catch something, though I never caught much, and that manna-wise, would
dissolve again in the sun. [para. 26] (1985, p. 336)
It is safe to say that the passage that discusses the dog, the horse, and the bird—
paragraph 24—is not about animals. Since Thoreau probably did not own any
animals beyond feeding them on occasion, the reader is waved away from a literal
interpretation, and this is what has inspired so many interpretations. Their use here
seems to be a parable about something else, which can be informed by examining
the context of the surrounding paragraphs.
Thoreau’s dog, horse, and bird were lost so that his reader could identify
with a persona who is about to show that the secret of nature is secure; alternative
interpretations exist because of a failure to consider text that appears before and
after the passage. Stanley Cavell (1972) argued that it is not important to decode the
symbols that connect with these specific animals. Instead, argued Cavell, we connect
with the topic of loss more deeply than our connections with these animals or
whatever they may represent, as Thoreau was supposedly connecting with loss
because “he has not reached the secrets of his trade” (p. 49). If I had quoted the
passage out of context, then Cavell’s reading would seem to be appropriate and
complete. Indeed, we are supposed to identify with Thoreau. However, I have a
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larger reading; there is more to this form, reaching into the surrounding text and
enveloping paragraph 24. The theme of this form is anticipation of an unbreakable
secret, being exposed to it, and then learning that it is secure. Before my quotation
begins in paragraph 23, Thoreau had been offering his awkward forensic
deliberations about how he had “desired to spend” his past years and thinking about
how to get more time out of each second (1985, pp. 335-336). Ignoring the passages
after paragraph 24, it makes sense that Cavell would fixate on an allegory of loss.
Nevertheless, after paragraph 24, Thoreau then applies this urge to recover loss to
his nature walks in the early morning. Like the reader trying to recover a lost secret
from Thoreau’s lost-animals-paragraph, Thoreau too had tried to do the same in the
blowing wind. Alas, he merely “lost [his] own breath into the bargain.” Thoreau’s
use of the word “bargain” is ironic, since it only occurs in Walden when loss is
conspicuous.27 Besides, nature’s secret has never really been lost because we never
had it, just as Thoreau never really had those animals. My reading of the vagueness
of the animals-paragraph is a way for Thoreau to speak to many audiences who
have experienced their own particular losses when they thought they had a bargain.
Trying to listen for words uttered by gusts of wind, or trying to watch all come and
go, or trying to catch the falling sun, or something that you thought you had… none
of these are likely to be remembered beyond childhood, and so the losses of various
animals, which were common in the 19th century, would make for better rhetorical
identification so that the reader can be warned that the symbolism of the dog, horse,
and bird is truly Thoreau’s secret.28
“Bargain” is always used ironically in Walden. In “Economy,” ‘bargain’ is used
three times. The first use is in the quoted passage, providing maturity to his attempt
to hear the wind speak. The second use of ‘bargain’ in “Economy” refers to the Irish
shanty that Thoreau purchased for the lumber that would be used to sheathe his
cabin. There, Thoreau had carefully pulled the nails from the lumber and gathered
them for reuse in his cabin. Unfortunately, another Irishman stole them while
Thoreau was gone. The last occurrence of ‘bargain’ in “Economy” refers to Thoreau’s
years teaching, and he laments that he had lost his “time into the bargain” (1985, p.
377). After “Economy,” ‘bargain’ reappears in “Baker Farm.” There, Thoreau uses
the word ‘bargain’ twice to describe the bad deals that John Field received in his
lifestyle choices involving his work and his extravagant diet. The last occurrence of
‘bargain’ in Walden is in “The Pond in Winter.” The epigraph to Chapter Three of this
dissertation contains this appearance of ‘bargain,’ which refers to the illusive
surveyor getting “watery eyes” by lying on the ice.
28 Thoreau’s insight into this kind of unbreakable secret may have been discovered
early in his relationship with Emerson’s daughter, Edith. In a letter on February 10,
1843, he wrote about her unique words, praising the way in which “she talks a
language of her own while she understands ours” (quoted by Golemba, 1990, p.
223). This semi-baby-talk produces a mode of communication that “never descends
to explanation,” and secures an uncommon secret with “an eternal silence” (p. 224).
It is interesting that Thoreau should notice that Edith’s stories should be so effective
27
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Vague and mysterious sentences are not the key to Thoreau’s language of
desire. If they were, religious scripture would be far less interesting and enduring,
and the wind’s political secrets would be old hat. Furthermore, it would be enough
simply to tell a story about irony that did not require the audience to identify with
an alazon, rather than inducing the reader to experience irony for themselves.29
Nevertheless, symbolic obscurity is a key to the Symbol that I am trying to articulate.
Symbolizing Thoreau’s Language of Desire
Thoreau’s language of desire participates in what I call a “Clarity-Mystery”
Symbol. The initial step in the Burkean format, the arousal of appetite, is “Clarity.”
This is the textual moment in which we are searching for a way to adapt Thoreau’s
uncompromising philosophies to our lives. Alternately, the consummating step in
the Burkean format, the adequate satisfaction of appetite, is “Mystery.” This is the
textual moment in which Thoreau hands us the reins, and we indulge in our
interpretive freedom. This Symbol often repeats itself using different rhetorical
devices. When Walden is analyzed in this way, the space of the text is striated,
sometimes repeating itself with grooves of Clarity-Mystery-Clarity-Mystery-etc. It is
important to recognize that this analysis does not exclude other forms and other
ways of reading the text. The Clarity-Mystery Symbol is not ubiquitous in Walden; it
is simply one part of its formal ecosystem, and there are structural patterns that do
not appear to be instances of Burkean form. Some portions maintain clarity, while
other portions, such as the ‘Secrecy-Identification-Clarity’ passage about Thoreau’s
animals, do not neatly fit into the Clarity-Mystery Symbol.
In this section, I present my argument in two steps. First, I present Golemba’s
argument and my remedial objections. Then, once the framework for Thoreau’s
language of desire has been laid out, I discuss some examples.
Befriending Thoreau’s Agony of Language
Golemba’s analysis of Thoreau’s language of desire is the basis for my
presentation of the Clarity-Mystery Symbol. Golemba argued that there are repeated
instances in which Walden alternates between two different kinds of voices. One of
these voices is what Golemba referred to as the “primary voice” (1990, p. 214). This
primary voice gives way to Thoreau’s language of desire long enough for a rhetorical
device to stage its disruption of clarity. Then, once order has been toppled, the
primary voice returns, leaving the reader perpetually off balance and unable to
because of her refusal to explain herself; his argument predates a similar argument
made by Walter Benjamin, who argued that “it is half the art of storytelling to keep a
story free from explanation as one reproduces it” (2007, p. 89).
29 The first paragraph of “The Ponds” contains an allegory that tells the reader that
the true flavor of the huckleberry cannot be carted to town, but must be eaten by the
hand that picked it. If it is not, then the vessel used to transport the fruit to will rub
off the “ambrosial and essential part of the fruit” (Thoreau, 1985, p. 461). The fact
that Thoreau added this observation in Clapper’s Version E (1852-1853; Schacht,
n.d.) reinforces the point that irony cannot be learned vicariously.
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locate truth anywhere except in the “agon over language’s inability to communicate
profound truths” (p. 233). Like Deleuze and Guattari’s war machine, this agon is
real, but it is hardly the whole story. The diversity of these rhetorical devices not
only conceals its underlying Symbol, but it also forms connections to other portions
of the text. Furthermore, beyond the tension between Thoreau’s primary voice and
his language of desire, it is possible to glimpse a calming demonstration of
friendship that engages friends both near and far.
I believe that the primary voice, which Golemba posited in Walden, is an
unnecessarily agonizing fusion of voices that Thoreau uttered during the nine years
of the book’s composition. One of these pictures of a primary voice that Golemba
painted solidifies the coauthoring process into one specific message about
“language’s inability to communicate profound truths” (p. 233), and puts Golemba
temporarily, self-consciously, out of Buell’s company. Golemba’s thinking at this
point is Hegelian in his insistence that Walden’s co-authoring ultimately drives
toward a purpose, and that purpose is the discounting of the truth-finding powers of
language. Here Golemba has presented a “Thoreau” in such a way that there is a
primus inter pares (“first among equals”; primus inter pares, n.d.; Burke, 1941/1973,
p. 516), a kind of fusion of Thoreauvian voices that subversively assaults language
simply to expose its limitations. Ironically, Golemba’s attempt to synthesize a
purpose for this carnival diminishes Walden’s interpretive fertility. As
indeterminate as Golemba found Walden, deeming the text’s meaning indeterminate
is itself determining. Golemba even noticed this, which suggests that even he
acknowledged that it is necessary to know what it is like to become the alazon:
Regardless whatever value has been found, his language involves loss. His
wild rhetoric finds power in that loss as a way to intensify desire, to enkindle
the hope that writer and reader could correspond if only they practiced more
“ardor and devotion.” If only we read his letters more closely, or more often,
or read more of his writings, or more interpretations of other readers, or
more writings by authors he has read, somehow we could arrive at a settled
understanding of what he means. Some of us will pretend that we have in fact
achieved such an understanding. Then the “Expedition” can end, the
searching cease, the frustration rest. In that hubristic moment when readers
pose as “some Oedipus,” proud about having “solved” one of language’s
enigmas, the Sphinx of language “will go dash her head against a rock.”
(Golemba, 1990, p. 235)
Even though Golemba hedged his claim by admitting that “indeterminacy may be
indeterminate” (p. 8), his answer to Thoreau’s Sphinx (especially his fixed matrix of
alternation between clarity and mystery) limits the possibilities. If Thoreau’s point
in 1854 was simply to show that there is a higher order of truth that language
cannot adequately describe, then the final pages of A Week, which concluded that
“the most excellent speech finally falls into Silence” (Thoreau, 1985, p. 318), would
have made another labor-intensive book superfluous. Golemba was closer to being
correct by linking Thoreau’s rhetoric to a carnival (1990, p. 2014), which is forever
open to change. A carnival is also not necessarily agonizing for all witnesses,
although it does have that relationship with the State (Stallybrass & White, 1986). If
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the reader accepts Burke’s ironic conclusion about adopting the position of the
primus inter pares and instead prepares for the necessity of returning to a smooth
space, then the agony of language that Golemba posited can be adjusted into a comic
relationship that fosters and challenges the limits of friendship.
The language of desire, which Golemba positioned in the interstices of
Walden’s primary voice, is a collection of rhetorical devices that gives the reader
clearance to take flights of interpretation. There are two reasons for this variety.
First, diversity maintains the subtlety of the Clarity-Mystery Symbol. Second, and
more importantly, this diversity conceals the fact that there are two types of
Mystery devices: one that functions as a self-contained Mystery in the textual hereand-now, and another that requires a reference to a faraway moment elsewhere in
Walden or outside the text.
The rhetorical devices that Thoreau used to execute his language of desire
are diverse, and this variety conceals the underlying Clarity-Mystery Symbol.
Golemba named several devices that Thoreau used to create his language of desire:
ambiguity, exaggeration, indirection, paradox, parody, and play (1990, p. 214). My
impression is that Golemba thought that these devices are items in a kind of writer’s
grab bag, whereby Thoreau had access to enough of a diversity of rhetorical devices
to produce Mystery that the reader would be unlikely to recognize the underlying
Symbol. If a species of life is diverse enough, it cannot be recognized as a species. To
some extent, I think this is true for Walden as well, since as soon as the reader starts
to track the Symbol through the text, the reader is no longer participating in the
alternation between frustration and freedom, but is instead fixated on recognizing
the devices. As long as the Symbol remains subtle, the reader can be called on to give
meaning. Nevertheless, I think that there is a more important reason for this
diversity than simply keeping the reader on task.
The rhetorical devices that Golemba identified can be divided into two
groups by how they function. Some of these devices function without much else than
to be placed in the Clarity-Mystery sequence. For instance, an ambiguous sentence
does not cease being ambiguous if it is taken out of context. If anything, it becomes
more ambiguous. This is also the case with indirection. These devices can be quoted
out of context without them devolving. However, the other devices, which include
exaggeration, paradox, parody, and especially play (Bateson, 2000), cannot be
removed from their contexts without harming our ability to recognize them. To
know exaggeration, we need to know what is being exaggerated. Paradox requires
awareness of statements elsewhere in the intratextual environment to produce the
experience of inconsistency. If the inconsistent passages are severed from each
other, then paradox disappears. Parody also requires awareness of statements made
elsewhere, but it is different from paradox because it refers to styles that exist
intertextually. If the reader lacks awareness of the shadow style to which parody
refers, then parody devolves into mere absurdity. Similarly, if a witness to play
misses the “metacommunicative” (p. 188) “play frame” (p. 185), then play becomes
serious.
This functionality of the rhetorical devices used to execute Thoreau’s
language of desire can be read as an allegory of friendships that exist in our midst as
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well as distant friendships that do not exist here and now. Since the variety of
rhetorical devices keeps the reader on the task of giving or recovering meaning,
these devices keep the friendship between text and reader alive. Without the
variety, the reader is at a higher risk of discovering the Clarity-Mystery Symbol and
disrupting the receiving and giving that needs to occur for the process of friendship
to take place. There is a real price to be paid for this formal understanding.
Furthermore, beyond the immediate possibility of friendship between Walden and
its reader, there is an echo of the kind of relationship that we have with our friends
that are not in our immediate circle. Most of our friends are distant from us in terms
of sheer proximity; long-distance by itself does not dissolve friendship. The use of
exaggeration, paradox, parody, and play—the rhetorical devices that function by
virtue of distance—are analogies for long-distance friendship when they fulfill
Thoreau’s language of desire. Our acquaintances might do or say things in our
presence that enter our long term memories, and most of the time those memories
are given no further thought. Then, when we encounter a situation that causes those
memories to resurface, and if we are lucky to remember where the memory came
from, we might realize that our old acquaintance was perhaps a friend. The same
happens to others who have received our pearls of wisdom. Walden helps us
recognize this potential, and shows us that all strangers, even the sour ones long
gone, may continue to impart virtue.
The giving and receiving that occurs during the individuated forms of the
Clarity-Mystery Symbol can feel like a struggle. The affinity between agony and
friendship demonstrates that the negotiation of meaning in speech communication
can be either beneficial or harmful, with a thin line in between, a topic that I return
to later in this chapter. Ambiguity, exaggeration, indirection, paradox, parody, and
play is a diverse set of rhetorical devices that maintain the subtlety of Thoreau’s
Mystery, and this population is large enough that they can function locally and
globally in Walden’s textual environment. This maintains the alternation between
giving and receiving meaning between text and reader that does friendship in a way
that Thoreau merely described in exquisite detail in A Week. Not only does this
move Thoreau beyond the theoretical into the practical, a matter that is of critical
importance in Chapter Five and the Conclusion, but it also furnishes the current
discussion with some examples of formal progression.
Individuated Forms of Thoreau’s Clarity-Mystery Symbol
While there is no shortage of examples of Thoreau’s Clarity-Mystery Symbol,
it makes sense to begin with one that has already been quoted in this chapter. The
epigraph for this chapter, the opening paragraph of “Where I Lived, and What I
Lived For,” individuates the Symbol. The first seven paragraphs of that chapter were
added after 1849 (Schacht, n.d.), and those passages were central to Golemba’s
attempt to reverse engineer Thoreau’s language of desire. The frequency with which
Thoreau repeated the Clarity-Mystery Symbol in these seven paragraphs is reason
enough to tap the beginning of its rich vein of examples. In addition to the epigraph,
I also discuss an example of paradox in Thoreau’s “Higher Laws” chapter, which
later in this chapter serves as the breaking of ground into the holey space of Walden.
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According to Golemba, Thoreau interrupts his primary voice several times in
the opening paragraphs of “Where I Lived, and What I Lived For.” It is perhaps
important to clarify that Golemba did not define this pattern in terms of Burkean
form. For Golemba, the first pattern that he noticed there was a “three-part
structural pattern—Play, then Sentence, followed by Parodic Release” (p. 214).
These elements are often sparsely diffused in larger passages. Sentence “echoes the
primary voice,” whereas Play and Parodic Release are incarnations of punning and
exaggeration, respectively (p. 214). While my formal analysis does not fit Golemba’s
reading, since Burkean form consists of two parts, not three, Golemba’s Parodic
Release can be read as an initiation of repetitive Burkean form.
The epigraph contains several instances of play; Golemba noticed one of
them and recovered its meaning with his desire to see Thoreau play, which makes
for a case study of Thoreau’s language of desire. When Thoreau identified the
etymological origin of house in the word “seat,” or sedes, he also quipped that it
would be better if the seat were a country seat. Golemba read it as a playful pun. I
did not read the statement in that way. Instead, I read it as paradox. In the previous
chapter in Walden, “Economy,” Thoreau claimed that he intended to build “a house
which will surpass any on the main street in Concord in grandeur and luxury, as
soon as it pleases me as much and will cost me no more than my present one” (1985,
p. 361). If Thoreau had such an irritation with expensive houses, why would he play
on the word “seat” and suggest in a later version of the manuscript that it is better if
the stone under him were upgraded to an aristocratic mansion (see Schacht, n.d.)?
Yes, this passage is a play on words, but it can also be a paradox, depending on how
it is read. The playfulness is diminished if the paradox is made salient, and casting
the statement as play minimizes the seriousness of the paradox. This is to be
expected when it comes to Thoreau’s language of desire, and it is therefore against
the spirit of that language to discount Golemba’s desire to read it his way.
The other example that I want to discuss is located in “Higher Laws” and
develops an instance of the Clarity-Mystery Symbol through Thoreau’s careful and
paradoxical use of ‘respect.’ There, the term ‘respect’ is used several times as a key
to Thoreau’s philosophy. At the end of the chapter, however, the final word is
‘respect,’ and it is used in a way that clashes with the entire chapter like a braying
donkey. In fact, that alarm is so striking that it opens a network of holes in the text
for a new nonlinear itinerary of friendship to be explored.
For most of “Higher Laws,” Thoreau’s philosophy of ‘respect’ is focused on
the context of his vegetarian diet. In a striking change from the younger Thoreau
who went fishing with Edward Sherman Hoar, Thoreau confessed (in Version A,
Schacht, n.d.), “I have found repeatedly, of late years, that I cannot fish without
falling a little in self-respect” (1985, p. 493). He went on to explain that he used to be
a fisher, and that he still feels the urge to eat meat. Nevertheless, his urges were
gradually lessening, and his access to a variety of grains and vegetables allowed him
to lessen the temptation. His primary reasons for leaving fishing behind were that it
produced “trouble and filth” (p. 493). The trouble for Thoreau was his sense of
disappointment that the catching, fileting, and cooking produces such little edible
fish. The filth for Thoreau was his awareness that an omnivore’s kitchen requires far
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more cleaning to keep up a “respectable appearance each day, to keep the house
sweet and free from all ill odors and sights” (p. 493).
The last paragraph of “Higher Laws” produces a paradox by again referring
to ‘respect.’ There, Thoreau tells a story about John Farmer, who was ending a hard
day of work, had just bathed, and was about to think about the possibility of a frost
that evening. Before he could attend to this problem, however, he heard the sound
of a flute player, which is almost certainly a Thoreau disguise (Buell, 1995, p. 376).
The sound “harmonized with his mood” and seemed to awaken a voice from within,
asking, “Why do you stay here and live this mean moiling life, when a glorious
existence is possible for you? Those same stars twinkle over other fields than these”
(Thoreau, 1985, pp. 499-500). Alas, John Farmer could not understand how to
accomplish such a migration. “All that he could think of was to practise some new
austerity, to let his mind descend into his body and redeem it, and treat himself with
ever increasing respect” (p. 500).
Thoreau’s paradoxical use of ‘respect’ in “Higher Laws” produces a holey
space in Walden, but it is difficult to see where the hole goes if one merely looks for
incidents of ‘respect’ in other sentences throughout the chapter. If one does that,
then the reader will most certainly stop following the hole before it reaches its
destinations. In the next section, I return to Thoreau’s use of and engagement with
the topic of ‘respect.’ This wait is necessary, because (as far as I can see, which may
not be the whole distance) Thoreau had in mind a lesson that had to do with the
principles of striation and smoothening themselves, and goes far beyond a lecture
about ‘respect.’ Recognizing this lesson depends on the reader’s crossing of a
striation that produces a lesson about friendship and its ability to reconstruct our
morals.
It does not take too much imagination to notice that the repeated iterations
of the Clarity-Mystery Symbol striate the space of Walden. How Thoreau’s prose is
striated depends on the reader. In the next section, I discuss Thoreau’s rhetoric of
ascent, which identifies structural forms that occur on larger scales than Thoreau’s
language of desire. The addition of this scale of structural arrangement complexifies
the Clarity-Mystery Symbol considerably, breaking the established understandings
of what sentences belong to Clarity or Mystery, and giving opportunities for new
striations and glimpses of a subterranean network of intratextual holes.
Thoreau’s Rhetoric of Ascent
Thoreau’s ‘rhetoric of ascent’ is a term invented by Milder to refer to the
experience of reading Walden and observing a Thoreau that transforms and elides
his transformations. This produces a tension between Thoreau’s endorsement of
diversity and his presentation of his own way as a respected truth. According to
Milder, Thoreau out-feints this paradox and the reader’s suspicions, but the irony of
this effort eventually becomes salient. The insight that emerges from this irony
settles into another “way,” only to be exposed as merely another face of the alazon.
This cycle of upheaval and regrouping repeats over and over again. What makes this
ascent so difficult to track is that Thoreau does not properly order those steps
(Buell, 1995), nor does he specify the intervals of the rise and run (Bickman, 1992),
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leaving the reader with little illumination concerning where the next step is located
and where it is going. The obscurity actually gives Thoreau the needed cover to
produce his language of desire, since it is already difficult to identify what he
believed at any specific point in the text. To understand the text, we striate it, and
this has two effects. In each possible version of the striated ascent, individual steps
taken through the text tend to smoothen how the reader has striated Thoreau’s
language of desire. In addition, the elusiveness of Walden’s grand structure
smoothens all candidates for striation. The only “structure” that seems to survive
revision is the seasonal progression. I refer to this “structure” in quotation marks
because Thoreau’s daily observations in “Spring” indicate that earth’s seasons,
which can be articulated by the cycle of a single day, tend to undermine this
simplicity. Without structure, the reader is asked to be familiar with the text in its
entirety. Once that happens, we are able to see the moments of Thoreau’s itinerancy.
One of Thoreau’s moments of itinerancy is his preoccupation with the problem of
respectability, which can only be solved with irony and friendship.
This section makes this argument in three steps. First, I present the
arrangement form of Thoreau’s rhetoric of ascent. Robert Milder (1995) and Martin
Bickman (1992) have done the most research in this area. I apply Deleuze and
Guattari’s spatial analysis of the war machine to the efforts by New Critics to striate
Thoreau’s rhetoric of ascent. Then, once I have discussed how these efforts to
decode Thoreau’s rhetoric of ascent led to the agony that Golemba named as the
purpose of Thoreau’s language of desire, I discuss a fuzzy area where Thoreau’s
rhetoric of ascent resets the striations that readers keep creating to track his
language of desire. This fuzzy area is a fertile ground for us to open a subterranean
network in Thoreau’s text. My own journey resurrects a specific occurrence of
‘respect’ that belongs to Thoreau’s language of desire. Finally, I address the larger
discussion that comes into view thanks to the holey space and the access points that
are flagged by those instances of ‘respect.’ Ultimately, I argue that Thoreau’s
engagement with respectability is a problem that is insoluble by us in isolation. We
need to adjust our assessment of what is respectable through the comic corrective,
and that requires an ironic counterpart. However, that comic corrective merely
helps us to ascend one level. To maintain our ascent, we also need friendship.
The Spatial Effects of Thoreau’s Rhetoric of Ascent
Thoreau’s rhetoric of ascent induces readers to posit large-scale striations
that disrupt patterns found in Thoreau’s language of desire, and the ambiguous
middle ground of this process reveals a subterranean network of connections.
Thoreau’s version of the “organic principle” (Matthiessen, 1941, pp. 133-175 as
discussed by Buell, 1995 and Bickman, 1992), his numbering number, has been
agonizingly difficult to describe in more concrete terms, and many have been lured
into that project. Thoreauvian scholars have inadvertently striated Walden’s form,
changing its nomos into the academic logos of New Criticism. This perception of war
between text and reader is itself evidence of Walden’s ability to make the reader
experience irony and understand Thoreau’s friendly aspirations. Each step of
Thoreau’s rhetoric of ascent lingers long enough for the reader to striate
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individuated forms of the Clarity-Mystery Symbol. Then, irony becomes salient
when the next step of the ascent smoothens the forms and makes Thoreau’s
language of desire possible and obscures authorial intent. The steps that make up
that ascent are rough and difficult to identify, but significant progress has been
made. The vagueness of the ascent not only creates voids in the language, but it also
leaves room for holes where Walden and reader can co-create an itinerary that turns
the reader into a kind of artisan that follows both the smoothness of the text as well
as the striations. One of these moments of itinerancy is Thoreau’s engagement with
the concept of ‘respect.’ Assessing what is respectable is a significant issue during
one’s ethical journey through life, one that is insoluble without the assistance of
irony and friendship.
In this section, I make this argument in three steps. First, I show that
Walden’s examination by New Critics has produced an agonizing reading tradition.
Second, I discuss how a transition from agony to friendship can be made. Finally, I
discuss the particulars of the interaction between Thoreau’s rhetoric of ascent and
his language of desire.
New Criticism’s Agony over Walden
Attempts to structure Walden’s form have been underway since 1941 and the
resulting theories have been problematic because of the legacy of New Criticism.
According to Bickman (1992), Francis Matthiessen’s (1941) groundbreaking
analysis of Walden marked the moment in which academia suddenly intensified its
efforts to striate the text’s larger forms. The reason for this surge, argued Bickman,
was because Matthiessen borrowed a term from Coleridge and described the book’s
structure as “organic form” (p. 134). This organic form is an “architectural beauty,”
which “has gradually grown from within outward, out of the necessities and
character of the indweller, who is the only builder, —out of some unconscious
truthfulness, and nobleness, without ever a thought for the appearance” (quoted by
Bickman, 1992, p. 41). After Matthiessen, R. P. Adams (1952 as cited by Bickman,
1992) made the next major attempt to crack this organic form. Adams argued that
Thoreau accomplished the organic form through a “pattern of symbolic death and
rebirth” that projects “a revolt against static mechanism in favor of dynamic
organicism” (1952, p. 424). Later, other scholars, such as Sherman Paul, Charles
Anderson, and Lauriat Lane, Jr., proposed their own ideas of this organic form in
terms of Walden’s seasons (Bickman, 1992). Bickman concluded that although
Matthiessen’s followers used organicism to “provide insight into the book and make
previously unseen connections among its parts, the entire notion of organic form
became too vague and automatic, a critical commonplace that served to stop further
examination” (p. 42). Bickman pointed out that the organic form filtered out the
“many readers’ experience of the book as asymmetrical and self-contradictory, of
being constantly off balance” (p. 42). He also admitted that this was due to the
dominance of New Criticism that has been present in his discipline ever since
Matthiessen. The present occupation of this area of research is now supposedly less
concerned with the production of new readings of Walden, and more concerned
with the problem of explaining why there are so many divergent readings (p. 43).
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However, the legacy of New Criticism is powerful, which sequesters text from
reader. It seems that Bickman’s version of the project was still unwilling to consider
an interaction between text and reader: Bickman concluded that the “text itself is
always moving toward structuring itself, yet always pulling back from doing so” (p.
44). Thus Bickman defended Matthiessen’s claim that Walden’s meaning is built only
by its solitary indweller, Thoreau.
The agony between structure and disorganization in Walden is a unique
product of interaction with New Critics, not a structure or a meaning that is housed
entirely within the text. Thoreau’s organic form has been grist for the production of
academic agony in Thoreauvian studies. This organic form was made possible
because of Thoreau’s literalization/demetaphorization, which allows nature to take
responsibility for his prose’s polysemic potential. As Walden’s legacy grew, New
Critics targeted the symbolic fertility of its organic form. These critics, for
theoretical and professional reasons, were obliged to assume that any structuration
of the text had to occur without collaboration with the reader. This meant that the
pattern of giving and receiving between text and reader was recast as strictly
internal to the text, not so much erasing the diversity of reader interpretations as
projecting the process of reading into the artifact. The conclusion that Bickman
made in seeing the text as self-structuring and self-de-structuring thereby alters
Thoreau’s numbering number into a numbered number. This move instigates the
Walden experience to become an agony of language, as Golemba noted. In other
words, critics find Walden becoming warlike because they sought to appropriate
Walden’s nomos and change it into the logos of New Criticism. This effort by New
Critics to diminish what could be an interaction of Walden with the reader and
instead stuff it into the text unwittingly reproduced the same emergence of war that
Deleuze and Guattari identified between nomads and the State.
Transitioning from Agony to Friendship
The experience of reading Walden can change from agonizing to friendly, but
change is difficult, and it will not avoid the alternation of striation and smoothening.
The difference between agonizing over Walden’s prose and befriending it is
relational and attitudinal.
The relational difference between agony and friendship is found in the
various ways that people debate with each other (Brockriede, 1972). Wayne
Brockriede pointed out that it is remarkably productive to examine the relationship
between arguers in terms of a metaphor of sexual relationship. Any arguer who uses
coercion or subterfuge to force or trick someone else into having sex or adopting a
belief fails to realize the greater possibilities of love and philosophical
argumentation (p. 6). Philosophical love, Brockriede argued, cannot take place
without reciprocity on both sides of the debate; each side must be equal and willing
to change (pp. 6-7). Unfortunately, most texts are unable to change because most
authors write with a unified and imperious voice. The beautiful thing about Walden
is that the text does change its mind (both as a property of Thoreau’s rhetoric of
ascent and as a property of the multiple encounters with Thoreau’s language of
desire), and so it is possible to engage with Walden as a friend during the reading
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process. What makes this so difficult to do in the case of Walden is that there is still a
powerful expectation that Thoreau’s rhetoric is a competition. Even Milder (1995)
fell into this trap when he argued that Walden’s reader is “a rival for interpretive
honors whose function is to run a fine race yet place a distant second to the author”
(p. 80). What friendship with Walden requires is the recognition that the reader is
expected and able to keep up with it in a bi-directional relay, to be willing to striate
the text and be receptive and responsive when those striations are smoothened by
Thoreau’s ascent.
The attitudinal difference between agony and friendship is found in the ways
that we understand friendship, according to Thoreau’s own account in A Week.
Recall that he posited two different understandings, one that followed a structural
framework as an achievement, and another that followed a process framework as an
ongoing saga of giving and receiving that survives the denouement of particular
relationships. As the irony of Golemba’s analysis of Thoreau’s language of desire
demonstrates, any statement about how Walden’s rhetoric functions, even if it
accounts for the reader, is itself a striation. The agony of Thoreau’s language of
desire will be reproduced if we conceive of friendship with Walden as a relationship.
This produces the expectation of a certain relational identity as a foundation for the
proceeding analysis, and the shock that occurs when supposedly foundational
identity fails to be durable is the war that Deleuze and Guattari found between
nomadic peoples and sedentary peoples (1987). A key to avoiding the agony
associated with Deleuze and Guattari’s war machine is to appreciate their technique
to avoid immuring the process. Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis has itself avoided
war because they expected resmoothening. All striations are bound to be
smoothened, and the current analysis is no different. Therefore, my orientation in
my striation is not to capture the nomadic nature of the reading experience and take
friendship for granted. Eventually, Thoreau moved on, and left his renewed
companions to tend to their own improved farms. I expect the same to happen here,
and so I shall not make any claims about how Walden essentially functions. Instead, I
catalog the rhetorical effects that have been observed and to offer an explanation for
why it happened. This move avoids the imposition of purpose, and allows the nomos
of Walden to sing its own desires. To do otherwise would halt the procession of my
friendship with Walden that survives in this text. I have appropriated my own virtue
from Walden; that virtue also has its own life and does not oblige Walden to
continue grinding against the river of this dissertation. In other words, Walden does
not have to remain my friend, for the virtue that I appropriated lives on.
Furthermore, as the next chapter makes clear, this friendship will be challenged.
From Striated Ascent to Smoothened Language
Thoreau’s rhetoric of ascent in Walden sets the pace for a rhythmic striation
and smoothening of Thoreau’s language of desire. Matthiessen and his followers
have produced the beginning strokes of a stable picture of Walden’s structure, since
Walden’s structure involves its readers’ contributions to a degree that the State of
New Criticism is not prepared to accept. Nevertheless, the accumulated work by
these scholars is still important. At an archival level, Walden is (mostly) the same
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thing it was in 1854.30 Large-scale structural forms are visible and can be readily
verified, although this does not preclude the existence of others. As the epigraph to
this chapter suggests, Walden accommodates a wide variety of arrangement
theories. Whatever the pattern, changes to the author’s personae are frequent
enough that the changes are noticeable, but not so frequent that it is impossible to
discern any structure at all. What is important is the reader’s perception of Thoreau.
In other words, Walden contains personae that linger just long enough to develop an
apparent relationship with the reader. These brief and recurring relationships
generate expectations about Thoreau’s agenda, and these expectations affect how
the reader engages with his prose. Specifically, how the reader striates Thoreau’s
prose into iterations of the Clarity-Mystery Symbol is affected by how the reader
perceives the text’s persona. The reader uses Thoreau’s persona as a lens to read the
text, and so when Thoreau changes, the reading changes. This dynamic is a matter of
reader perception, and when that perception changes, the striations of the ClarityMystery Symbol are reset and the text is smoothened, which makes it available for
striation once more.
The research on Walden’s rhetoric of ascent has identified various different
scales of structure in Walden. There are grand-level, chapter-level, and paragraphlevel scales, each with different kinds of structure. At its most grand scale, Walden
has a two-part structure; the first part consists of a series of essay-like chapters
(Bickman, 1992). The early chapters tend to be preoccupied with whatever topic is
named by the chapter’s title, and show less concern for narrative (p. 54). The second
part flips this priority, focusing more on narrative and the progression of the
seasons (Buell, 1995). When the text is examined at the scale of whole chapters, the
early chapters exhibit a certain kind of structure that is less obvious in the later
chapters (Bickman, 1992). The early chapters co-exist as contrasting pairs, with
each chapter complementing and contradicting its companion (p. 51). At the still
smaller scale of individual paragraphs, each chapter contains paragraphs that
appear to disagree with the rest of the chapter, and these errant paragraphs are less
obvious in the second part of the book in which narrative and seasonal progression
dominate (p. 53).
While there is consensus that Walden has structures that change depending
on the scale being considered, there is far less agreement over the particular details
of those structures. At the grand-level, there is much disagreement over where the
grand-level transition happens. When I first began to contemplate this question, my
initial conclusion was that the transition occurs in Chapter 9, “The Ponds.” Bickman
located some semblance of a transition at the end of Chapter 12, “Brute Neighbors”
Thoreau did not issue a second edition of Walden during his lifetime (Thoreau,
2007). He did, however, make written alterations to his print copy, which had
involved a number of typographic corrections (p. 379). In addition, editors over the
decades have continued in this tradition of being faithful to the original text, and
only changing it to amend obvious punctuation errors and make the text’s
conventions of hyphenation and spelling consistent throughout the document (pp.
379-396).
30
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(p. 52). Like Thoreau’s own research identifying the boundary separating winter
from spring, I would suggest that the transition between Walden’s two grand parts
is not a single discrete boundary, but is instead many transitions that do not line up
with each other and are themselves vague. At the smaller scales of chapters and
paragraphs, the structural research has been far more successful in identifying the
chapter pairings and errant paragraphs in the first part of Walden (p. 53). The
second portion of the text has been more difficult to striate, since the major
organizing device are the seasons themselves (p. 54). In “Spring,” the second-to-last
chapter, Thoreau observes that a day is a synecdoche of the seasons, indicating to
the reader that the second segment may be exceptionally difficult to striate. If each
day is a cycle within the larger cycle of the seasons (with perhaps more than one
process at work), then it is equally as difficult to apply such an oscillation to the text.
Even though Walden becomes more like a narrative as it attends to the seasonal
changes (p. 54), Thoreau does not track the progressions of individual days.
My reading of the text places a significant transition from the first to the
second parts of Walden in Chapters 11-13: “Higher Laws,” “Brute Neighbors,” and
“House Warming.” These chapters were expanded considerably after 1849 (see the
chart by Adams & Ross, 1988, p. 58 as reproduced by Schacht, n.d.). Bickman made a
similar notice of a boundary in Chapter 12, and it is important to keep in mind that
Chapter 11 is a contrast-pair with Chapter 12 (Bickman, 1992, p. 51). It is likely that
a shift towards narrative emphasis begins in earnest in “The Ponds” (Chapter 9,
which also received significant revisions after 1849, Schacht, n.d.), and that the
custom of positing contrast-pairs gradually tapers off after “Brute Neighbors”
(Bickman, 1992, p. 52). Of course, it is likely that there are other transition markers,
which would make the change from the first to second parts less like a boundary
and more like a natural process with many degrees of freedom.
The vague boundary that exists in the gray area of Chapters 11-13 is a
staging ground for a holely space where Thoreau creates a subterranean
passageway that can be followed. I discussed the first indicator of a hole in the
previous section where Thoreau ironically deployed ‘respect’ in “Higher Laws.” In
addition, up until this point in Walden, the chapters had been matched into selfcontained contrast pairs, and these chapters tended to contain paragraphs that
contradicted their own chapters (pp. 51-55). This custom signals to the reader that
the contradiction over ‘respect’ was a phenomenon that was contained within
“Higher Laws.” “Higher Laws” ends with a “cul-de-sac” of morality (Milder, 1995, p.
138), and the beginning of “Brute Neighbors” initiates a sharp descent from that
“spiritual peak” (p. 138), almost as if Thoreau was trying to “recover the upward
direction of his life by cleansing himself through nature” (p. 137). The turn is
obviously located at the chapter boundary. The following chapter in Walden, “Brute
Neighbors,” begins with the archetypal dialogue between the self-respecting Hermit
and the charming Poet about the prospect of fishing, giving the impression that the
author was eating his pride and was on the cusp of abandoning his vegetarian diet
for the sake of socializing with a charismatic friend. Nevertheless, if the holely space
is explored, it becomes evident that ‘respect’ is about much more than just
Thoreau’s diet. In the next section, I discuss the passages immediately after this
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dialogue and in “House Warming,” which is immediately after Bickman’s transition
point for Walden’s grand structure.
Thoreau’s unpredictable and incongruous personae, which come and go like
Thoreau’s sauntering through his bog, smooth the space of the text, sometimes
overwriting previous understandings of Thoreau’s language of desire with
subsequent re-readings. The ground of the space shifts and exposes the familiar
tension between striating and smoothening. Finally, the third kind of space is
involved, which shares affinities with both striating and smoothening—an itinerant
Clarity-Mystery Symbol. This is a hybrid space that exists in between individual
rhetorical devices and Thoreau’s shifts of personae. This hybrid space excavates
holes in Thoreau’s text and illuminates a subterranean intratextual network.
Spatial Excavation between Thoreau’s Forms
The most interesting channel of interaction between Thoreau’s rhetoric of
ascent and his language of desire has to do with a holey space. There is definitely a
channel of interaction between the striations of his rhetoric of ascent and the
smoothening of his language of desire. At its most simple, Thoreau’s rhetoric of
ascent is how he keeps his personae obscure, which allows his language of desire to
appear as a collection of voids of meaning. In addition, the phenomenon of
Thoreau’s language of desire becoming resmoothened is easy to establish virtually
everywhere in the text… except where the boundary between smoothening and
striating is difficult to identify: The smoothening that Thoreau creates with his
Clarity-Mystery Symbol regarding respect in “Higher Laws” breaks this mold in the
middle of his text, along with the transition from the first half of the text to the
second half of the text, opens a subterranean network that connects to multiple
places like a constellation of word associations with a secret pattern embedded in
the text. This network has a center in “Higher Laws,” and the radiating arms are
indicated by hints that are found in “Brute Neighbors” and “House Warming.”
In this section, I make this argument in two steps. First, I briefly show how
the crossing of the striations of Thoreau’s rhetoric of ascent induces a temporary
smoothening of his language of desire. Then, I explore how the fuzzy boundary
between the striated and smooth regions uncovers a holey space that reaches into
(at least) ten other chapters. This exploration sets the stage for my discussion in the
next section regarding Thoreau’s itinerant discussion of respect, friendship, and
ethics.
Interaction between the Smooth and the Striated Forms of Walden
It is easy to establish that, using the epigraph to this chapter, crossing the
striations of Thoreau’s rhetoric of ascent can smoothen his language of desire. In
Golemba’s analysis of the language of desire at the beginning of “Where I Lived,” he
identified only one instance of play in the epigraph. I find this to be interesting, since
there is more than just one instance there that can serve as Mystery. In addition to
the play on ‘seat,’ Thoreau also played on several other words and phrases. Before
the ‘seat’ comment, Thoreau mentioned that he “walked over each farmer's
premises.” This is also wordplay, but it is subtler, since Thoreau does not provide an
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etymological connection. For those readers who do not have a philosophical or
argumentation background, it is likely that they will miss the complex meaning of
‘premises’ until they reach the “Reading” chapter and are warned to be aware of
such tricks. If Golemba noticed it, he did not let on. In addition, Thoreau deploys a
more complex play when he wrote, “Wherever I sat, there I might live, and the
landscape radiated from me accordingly.” The latter half of this sentence runs
counter to scientific principles of light and visual observation, and perfectly
summarizes Thoreau’s phenomenology, which becomes the source of surrealism in
“The Ponds.” After one reads “The Ponds” the phrase is no longer a mystery,
showing that how the reader striates Thoreau’s language of desire depends in large
part on what version of Thoreau the reader has in mind. This shift in striation is the
domain of smooth space.
Following the Holey Space in Walden
The gap between smooth space and striated space is the ground of holey
space (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987). The previous paragraph just demonstrated that
the gap in Walden exists at the lowest level of individual statements. At the higher
levels, especially his chapter headings, Thoreau casts his structural arrangements
into doubt with careful phrasing and framing in “Brute Neighbors.” In addition, he
makes an even more explicit signal in the following chapter, “House Warming.”
Together, these hints suggest a larger philosophy about ‘respect’ that can be found
by following that word to another individuation of the Clarity-Mystery Symbol in
“Economy,” as well as abundant instances of Clarity in which ‘respect’ is used.
In “Brute Neighbors,” Thoreau casts doubt on the chapter organization of his
text through deliberate ambiguity. In that chapter, Thoreau begins with the dialogue
between the Hermit and the Poet, and then proceeds, after a short paragraph of
rhetorical questioning, to tell fable after fable featuring local wildlife. These fables
round out the remainder of that chapter. The rhetorical questions that precede
these fables are curiously crafted: “Why do precisely these objects which we behold
make a world? Why has man just these species of animals for his neighbors; as if
nothing but a mouse could have filled this crevice?” (1985, p. 502). What are “these”
objects and creatures? What is “this” crevice? One way to read “these” is in reference
to the animals and objects referred to in the remainder of the chapter. However,
however populous the chapter is, the selection is not complete. There are mice,
phoebes, otters, turtledoves, chickens, ants, squirrels, cats, a few loons, ducks, and a
common name for a dog. There is a brief mention of a horse in the abstract, but
where did the owls go? Warring ants and the loons receive by far the most attention,
leaving the rest of the animals with minimal narrative resolution. “These” is
ambiguous—a reoccurrence of Thoreau’s language of desire made possible by his
reference to them before they appear to the reader. Why do what objects make up
the world? Is it because they happen to be the subjects that constitute the fables
contained within that chapter? My reading of these rhetorical questions is that
“these” are the objects extrapolated from phenomena, and that question goes
beyond the crevice of “Brute Neighbors.” Thoreau is asking why it is that our
ordering of objects into a bracketed chapter should be taken for granted. When the
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question is posed to the reading of Walden, Thoreau is asking why it is that the text’s
world is ordered into discrete chapters. This comparison seems particularly apt,
since the book up until this point had been listing a procession of various chapter
animals, each with their own companion (Bickman, 1992), almost as if Thoreau
were some kind of Noah and Walden were his ark.
Thoreau’s deconstruction of Walden’s internal structural arrangement is
made more explicit in the following chapter, “House Warming.” There, Thoreau
describes what made him feel at home and what he thought would be his ideal
house. Instead of a conventional house divided into separate rooms with each
serving a special function, Thoreau preferred a house with an open loft and no inner
walls that would striate the space into rooms. The ceiling would be decorated with
dynamic and tricky shadows, thrown by fire. All the utilities and conveniences
would be ready at hand. Our monarchs used such grand halls during a golden age,
and visitors were assumed to be familiar as soon as the door was opened. It is not
necessary to suggest that Thoreau is speaking of language and metaphor. He makes
the connection explicit in the next paragraphs:
It would seem as if the very language of our parlors would lose all its nerve
and degenerate into paralaver [parlor talk] wholly, our lives pass at such
remoteness from its symbols, and its metaphors and tropes are necessarily
so far fetched, through slides and dumb-waiters, as it were; in other words,
the parlor is so far from the kitchen and workshop. The dinner even is only
the parable of a dinner, commonly. As if only the savage dwelt near enough to
Nature and Truth to borrow a trope from them. How can the scholar, who
dwells away in the North West Territory or the Isle of Man, tell what is
parliamentary in the kitchen?
However, only one or two of my guests were ever bold enough to stay and
eat a hasty pudding with me; but when they saw that crisis approaching they
beat a hasty retreat rather, as if it would shake the house to its foundations.
Nevertheless, it stood through a great many hasty-puddings. (p. 517)
Scholars tend to interpret these statements as a nudge by Thoreau to attend to the
etymological histories of the words that he uses. Doing so helps the reader to realize
just how subtle and specific his language is. I agree that the reader should be
prepared to maintain this awareness of language’s metaphorical origins. However, I
think that there is more to this analogy than just a reminder that we need to be
aware that “dinner” meant something that took place earlier in the day, a meaning
that is itself located earlier in our history. The area where cooking occurs (i.e., the
kitchen) is not just a history of meaning located in the past—it is also a location that
exists now.31 Furthermore, the wink of “far fetched” is explained, made far too
obvious, and the metaphors of chutes and elevators linking the rooms are too
closely associated with the ways that we need to be aware that Thoreau would do
away with various rooms and that we must be on familiar terms with his royal hall
of text when we open its pages. In Walden’s first version, which he completed before
As I discuss in the Conclusion chapter, Deleuze (1994) deploys Hume’s concept of
‘contraction’ (pp. 70-71) to argue that the past exists in the present.
31
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he left Walden Pond in 1847, his text had no chapter divisions (Shanley, 1957), and
we would be wise to read and be familiar with the text without limiting our view to
each room, just as ecology seeks to make us aware that no system is closed.
Once the divider names of Walden’s chapters are seen to be less like walls
and more like survey markers, it quickly becomes apparent to a seasoned surveyor
of Walden that Thoreau means for us to be shocked by how many connections can
appear when we follow other markers. I am, of course, restricting myself to
occurrences of ‘respect,’ and the marker appears in the text many times. Most of the
appearances of ‘respect’ have to do with aspects of meaning, and I am not concerned
with the word when it is used in that slight respect. I am interested in its more
intense usage, which is related to a traditional angle of view, enhanced with a charge
of deference and admiration. We can look at something in a certain respect, but that
does not denote the same degree of esteem compared to when we treat something
or someone with respect. ‘Respect’ is used to denote deference or admiration (or
lack thereof) 17 times in Walden, not including the three times it is used in “Higher
Laws.” Ten other chapters feature at least one usage of the word, and some have
several.
There are likely many other caverns that wait unearthing in the holey space
of Walden. These holes may be discovered by attending to symbols deployed in any
of the various chapters and accounting for them outside of their usual crevices. Once
the subterranean network is mapped, it should be possible to enjoy a moment with
Thoreau to experience a problem that he perhaps feels is worthy of consideration,
and witness the solutions that he would consider. There are most likely other
subterranean networks concealed underneath the hall of Walden, but it seems to me
that the topic of ‘respect’ is important enough that it deserves a focused discussion.
This discussion finds Thoreau subtly identifying friendship as the critical
mechanism that makes us virtuous.
Discussion
Thoreau’s networked discussion of ‘respect’ exposes an ethical crisis that
must be solved with irony and friendship. This crisis becomes salient when Thoreau
tells the reader a lot about what he does not respect, less about what he does
respect, and far less about what is respectable. In other words, since Thoreau
locates ethical truth out in the world and limits our knowledge to our own
experience, knowing what is ethical is a paradox. The most helpful key to
understand this paradox comes from a specific instance of the Clarity-Mystery
Symbol in Thoreau’s discussion of fashion. This paradox reaches fever pitch as well
as solvency when it comes to our self-respect. It reaches fever pitch because selfrespect is all-too-commonly understood to be individualistic self-respect, which is
capable of many frames of rejection, but only affords one frame of acceptance
(Burke, 1937/1984b). The paradox eventually reaches solvency when
individualistic self-respect is understood to be an illusion and replaced with selfconsideration and friendship.
Thoreau’s usages of ‘respect’ in Walden tell us very little about what he
thinks is respectable. Most of the relevant occurrences of ‘respect’ in Walden have to
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do with specific things, animals, and people, who are respected by society, a few
things respected by Thoreau, and many things that he does not respect. Thoreau is
far less clear regarding what or who is truly respectable. He wrote in two separate
places in Walden that it is respectable to do without salt when one cannot afford it,
or to be poor as a farmer. However, these are particular things and conditions; they
merely give us economic advice. This partly explains why Buell (1995) noted that
Thoreau abandoned the economic metaphor of nature. It is also a reason why Milder
(1995) argued that Thoreau was far clearer about what he rejected than what he
endorsed.
An instance of the Clarity-Mystery Symbol featuring ‘respect’ helps illustrate
the problem of respectability. The problem of respectability is that it is hard to know
what is respectable. Thoreau grappled with this problem when he tried to please his
mentor and sold his writing to make a living. What he thought would be respectable
was mistaken, and it required a lesson in irony to learn that it is a problem. This is
why he demonstrates the irony of self-respect in “Higher Laws.” An ambiguous
statement in “Economy” captures this conundrum more explicitly. There, Thoreau
gives the details of his critique of modern fashion, telling the reader about the
superfluous fashionable expenses that many people make to get respect from
others. The passage in question follows a report by Thoreau of the attitudes of his
neighbors who “behave as if they believed that their prospects for life would be
ruined if they should” repair their fancy pantaloons with patches or add extra seams
to make them more durable (1985, p. 340). Thoreau muses that a person would
sooner attempt to walk to town with a broken leg than with a broken pant leg, and
then observes that this person “considers, not what is truly respectable, but what is
respected” (p. 340). What does that mean to you? What I find amazing about this
statement, which was added after 1849, is that ‘respect’ derives from the Latin
‘speciō,’ which means, “to look at” (respect, n.d.; specere, n.d.; Schacht, n.d.). ‘Speciō’
itself derives from the Greek ‘σκέπτομαι’ (sképtomai; specio, n.d.), the philosophy of
the skeptic. In Representative Men, Emerson showed that the skeptic’s philosophy,
like the word’s meaning, is “to consider” (1983. p. 694). To respect is to give great
consideration. In short, what Thoreau wrote was that the man who does not want to
consider repairing his fashionable pantaloons does not look back and consider what
is truly worthy of great consideration. No wonder respectability is so hard to assess:
it appears to be circular, requiring the very thing that would enable its assessment.
The paradox of a person’s ability to give an answer to what is truly
respectable reaches a fever pitch with individualistic self-respect. Thoreau’s usage
of self-respect in “Higher Laws” suggests that self-respect equips us with frames of
“rejection” or “debunking” (Burke, 1937/1984b, pp. 21-25, pp. 92-107) to resist
peer pressure. The ironic use of self-respect at the end of “Higher Laws” allowed
John Farmer to appeal to his own bodily authority as a “Farmer” and reject
Thoreau’s flute. In the second paragraph of “Conclusion,” Thoreau observes that
patriotic individuals all-too-often do not have self-respect. They use the frame of
patriotism to reject their own desires. A hasty reading of that “Conclusion”
paragraph indicates that Thoreau would have us explore the world in isolation,
encouraging the brutality of nature to deploy the severest storms of correction in a
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costly series of learning experiences that would make our lives a depressing
solitude. In this version of respectability, the only frame of acceptance is economic
necessity, a frame that Thoreau left behind after the first chapter (Buell, 1995).
Even if we could tolerate isolation, individualistic self-respect does not get
us very far. The second paragraph of “Conclusion” goes to great effort to produce the
illusion that individualistic self-respect is the key to Thoreau’s philosophy. Indeed,
Walden presents different faces to different kinds of readers. To the critic who
thinks that Walden must stand on its own, it produces a simple lesson: war is to be
expected, and one should be prepared to withdraw from it on occasion until the
situation becomes tractable. Indeed, this seems to be the lesson that Shannon
Mariotti (2010) gleaned from Thoreau. That conclusion is inevitable as long as the
options are restricted to a binary opposition between nomadic existence and
sedentary life in the city. The smoothening nomos is bound to be consolidated by the
striating logos of the State, which is bound to be resmoothened, and so on (Deleuze
& Guattari, 1987). This “stealing back and forth” (Burke, 1937/1984b, p. 103, p. 104,
p. 141) can go on as long as there are nomads and States; that agony is interminable.
The irony here is that Thoreau’s presentation of self-respect only appears to be
individualistic. It is easy to construct frames of rejection, but it is hard to construct
frames of acceptance; both are needed for the comic corrective (p. 93-94, p. 166 as
discussed by Carlson, 1986, pp. 447-448 as discussed by LeBaron, 2010).
Thoreau’s story of individualistic self-respect is an enigma, and the challenge
is to follow its pieces until the puzzle gives way. The second paragraph of
“Conclusion” contains clues that show that Thoreau did not mean for self-respect to
be purely individualistic. Thoreau challenged us “explore the private sea, the
Atlantic and Pacific Ocean of one’s being alone” (1985, p. 578). “Private” and “alone”
seem to be sound indications of solitude. However, etymologically, they derive from
words that do not indicate isolation at all. “Private” derives from the Latin “prīvō,”
which means, “to set free” (privo, n.d.). “Alone” derives from the Middle English,
contracting “all one” (alone, n.d.). These words indicate that Thoreau wants us to
explore the pantheistic world of oneness, a possibility of connecting to anything and
everything that is immediately confirmed when Thoreau goes on to claim that he
has “more of God, they more of the road” (1985, p. 578). Then in the next two
sentences, Thoreau wrote that “It is not worth the while to go round the world to
count the cats in Zanzibar” (p. 578), which is an island, or isolated place, and yet we
should do precisely that until we “find some ‘Symmes’ Hole’ by which to get at the
inside at last” (p. 578). Counting the instances of ‘respect’ on the island of Walden
until a hole is found is just one way into its holey space, and there are likely other
ways in.
Thoreau’s story of individualistic self-respect is an allegory for the fact that
the friendship that I have been analyzing in this dissertation looks a lot like
stereotypical individualistic self-respect. Friendship is giving and receiving
(Crosswhite, 2010), and that giving and receiving leaves behind individual friends,
even ourselves, since it is the appropriation of virtue that is friendship, not the
union of particular individuals. The advantage that this friendship has for the
current discussion is that the virtues that are appropriated are frames of
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acceptance. Friendship produces frames of acceptance: In Thoreau’s discussion of
how to explore “our own higher latitudes,” Thoreau reminded us that “there are
continents and seas in the moral world to which every man is an isthmus or an inlet,
yet unexplored by him” (p. 578). Each person is guaranteed to have a connection to
the moral world, which exists outside of ourselves, and yet we can only see inward,
and so we must introject our virtue from one another. For Thoreau, the examination
of our own desires is the template for our frame of acceptance. The challenge, then,
is how to adjust our own frames of rejection and acceptance so that our self-respect
can keep us from falling into the same striations of morality. That isthmus or inlet
that keeps us connected to the moral world is friendship.
Coda
The two-part structure of this chapter’s epigraph is a useful heuristic for
interpreting Walden in different ways.
At one level, the epigraph is Thoreau’s language of desire and his rhetoric of
ascent. The first part takes place with interlocutors; Thoreau is taking turns with
others in his effort to improve them and their corner of the earth, the cycle of a
Clarity-Mystery Symbol. The second part takes place wherever the author’s persona
sits, with a landscape that radiates out from him, indicating that the appearance of
the world depends largely on how the reader understands the author, and that the
author is going to move to his next point of ascent after an hour, or a year or two of
residence.
At another level, the epigraph suggests the possibilities of our friendship
with Walden. The first part is a stream of words and sentences that require both
author and reader. Walden gives wisdom to the reader, and the reader gives
meaning to the text, refreshing both. This stream carves what appears to be a
canyon into the larger body of the text, and when we are exploring the terrain on
foot, the cliffs must be crossed at various bridges. These bridges are the steps of
transition in Thoreau’s rhetoric of ascent, but at some point, the canyon smoothens
and the steps feel more natural, like a story. There are many bridges, and many
maps have been published and revised.
We can bring a map, or we can saunter and make new discoveries. If we
wander the terrain without a map, we will probably get lost and fall into traps.
Without a map, the reader eventually becomes familiar with the text’s subterranean
geology and its pitfalls, and it becomes less and less necessary to walk on the given
path. The canyons that previously challenged the reader are recognized as merely
grooves, striations on the surface, and that it is possible follow a network of holes to
other parts of the terrain and leave the bridges behind. The entire landscape opens
up to us, and we can experience new itineraries.
The giving and receiving does not stop, and we are made aware that many of
our past acquaintances are actually good friends. Walden trains us to recognize this
and help each other build our own comic correctives. Our friendships are not always
withdraws from civilization, but rather are sometimes proceedings that happen
without particular regard for public life or democracy. Friendship is often thought of
as a private affair. It is, but that does not necessarily mean that it is opposed to
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public life. It is set free from it. Its only concerns are giving, receiving, and it pays
dividends through our cultivations of each other so that we are equipped to live.
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Chapter Five: Walden’s Queer Agency
There was an artist in the city of Kouroo who was disposed to strive after
perfection. One day it came into his mind to make a staff. Having considered
that in an imperfect work time is an ingredient, but into a perfect work time
does not enter, he said to himself, It shall be perfect in all respects, though I
should do nothing else in my life. He proceeded instantly to the forest for
wood, being resolved that it should not be made of unsuitable material; and
as he searched for and rejected stick after stick, his friends gradually
deserted him, for they grew old in their works and died, but he grew not
older by a moment. His singleness of purpose and resolution, and his
elevated piety, endowed him, without his knowledge, with perennial youth.
As he made no compromise with Time, Time kept out of his way, and only
sighed at a distance because he could not overcome him. Before he had
found a stock in all respects suitable the city of Kouroo was a hoary ruin, and
he sat on one of its mounds to peel the stick. Before he had given it the
proper shape the dynasty of the Candahars was at an end, and with the point
of the stick he wrote the name of the last of that race in the sand, and then
resumed his work. By the time he had smoothed and polished the staff
Kalpa was no longer the pole-star; and ere he had put on the ferrule and the
head adorned with precious stones, Brahma had awoke and slumbered many
times. But why do I stay to mention these things? When the finishing stroke
was put to his work, it suddenly expanded before the eyes of the astonished
artist into the fairest of all the creations of Brahma. He had made a new
system in making a staff, a world with full and fair proportions; in which,
though the old cities and dynasties had passed away, fairer and more
glorious ones had taken their places. And now he saw by the heap of shavings
still fresh at his feet, that, for him and his work, the former lapse of time had
been an illusion, and that no more time had elapsed than is required for a
single scintillation from the brain of Brahma to fall on and inflame the tinder
of a mortal brain. The material was pure, and his art was pure; how could the
result be other than wonderful?
—Walden, “Conclusion” (Thoreau, 1985, pp. 582-583)
To those who are not familiar with world history and Indian mythology, the
epigraph to this chapter appears to be a simple tale of artistic serendipity and
integrity: an allegory of Walden’s transformation from divine scintillation into “a
world with full and fair proportions.” An artist endeavors to make something that is
perfect, and his refusal to compromise with time endows him with endless life.
While he does nothing but work, his friends fall away, and his civilization and others
decay, and they make room for better ones to parallel the artist’s quest. Then, when
the work is completed, the staff blossoms and gives rise to something even more
wonderful than anything that the artist could anticipate. Walden began as something
that was a simple striving for a humble yet perfect wooden staff, but it grew over
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several drafts. After its completion and even after the death of the author, it has
exceeded anything that a Thoreau could anticipate when he went into the woods to
practice his art.
This story is far more complex than it appears. The reason for this subtle
complexity is the story’s containment of large amounts of content within several
words: “Kouroo,” “Candahar,” and “Kalpa.” Although the contents of these three
words do not suffice to account for the form of Thoreau’s story, it begins to reveal
the important contrast between content and form, two key concepts in this chapter.
Kouroo for Thoreau was a symbol of epic conflict from which the artist
turned away. Kurukshetra, in Hindu mythology, was the site of a devastating
vendetta that involved the Lord Krishna as a principal character (Lochtefeld, 2002).
The tale of the motivations for the mythical war, the counsel Krishna provided to his
friend Arjuna before the fighting, and the battle, is detailed in the Mahabharata, “the
longest poem ever written” (Akademi, 1960, p. 137; Lochtefeld, 2002). There is no
other mention of the conflict or its lost origins in Thoreau’s story. Ultimately, the
war that takes place in the artist’s nation is implicitly acknowledged and set aside all
at once, similar to Thoreau’s almost complete disregard for the Mexican-American
war that broke out during his residence at Walden Pond. Thoreau briefly engages
with the topic of war and the Mexican-American war explicitly in Walden where he
discusses the battle of the ants in “Brute Neighbors;” instead of retreating from the
battle and withdrawing from the political issue, he allows the symbols of his warrior
specimens to fall out of his window-frame, his frame of the world, before they finish
fighting. The war becomes, in Erin Rand’s words, a “distant enemy” (2008, p. 307).
The dynasty of the Candahars for Thoreau was a symbol of the exhaustion of
imperial ambition after Kouroo, which will not happen in the foreseeable future. The
story of the Mahabharata presents Krisha’s mission as a quest to wage a war to end
wars; however, his obvious failure to do so by direct confrontation was ultimately
an open-ended lesson. The artist’s inscription of the last race of the Candahars into
sand is Thoreau’s way of identifying when Krishna’s quest will be complete. The
name “Candahar” is a reference to the city of Kandahar, the second largest city in
Afghanistan. It is likely that, given the strategic value of the Kandahar province,
conflict in the region will not end in the foreseeable future (Holt, 2012; Azami,
2008). Therefore, it is significant that Thoreau indicated that Kandahar will cease to
exist and the name of its people will wash like sand long before the artist of Kouroo
completes his work. It is plausible that as long as there is a tradition of nation states
that use words to represent resources as scarce, Kandahar will always be a tempting
military target. Nevertheless, the artist does make the transition.
Kalpa for Thoreau was a designation for a transition beyond the intervals of
time. Consider the statement, “By the time he had smoothed and polished the staff
Kalpa was no longer the pole-star.” The statement appears to be a reference to the
fact that the stars are not in a fixed position in the sky, and that the artist’s quest
proceeded to such lengths that the stars shifted and changed configuration. If that
were the significance of the statement, then Thoreau’s preceding reference to
Kandahar would have made it redundant. The statement about Kalpa actually means
something more specific than cosmic duration, since Kalpa is not a star (Thoreau,
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1995). A kalpa is a single day in the life of Brahma (p. 318). To write that kalpa was
no longer the standard indicates that Thoreau was referring to a conceptual shift to
a view of time that did not use an interval as a unit. In other words, Thoreau was
saying that the artist had graduated into eternity—beyond the intervals of time.
Thoreau’s Kouroo myth exposes an impossible dilemma that is caused by
representation, which poses the question of whether agency is structure or
process—form or content. What matters more: the staff’s flowering that turned the
artist to stone (Bickman, 1992, p. 46) and the tinder shavings that timelessly await
inspiration, or the burning intensity that unfolded during its production and the
slow exhuming of its content? After all, the artist’s quest involved the departing of
his friends, the extinction of whole civilizations, and the development of better ones.
Which is more important: the ruination of past relationships, civilizations, and the
buried artifacts, or the current ones that depend on their ruination? The staff had to
be completed before it expanded, and the embodiment of the art was distilled by the
artist’s “astonishment.” Seen as a representation, a specific structure represents an
essential content, and the artist’s agency culminates in the achievement of a solid
artifact. Yet, the completion is marked by a sudden expansion from within, and it is
the searching, shaving, abandoning, fruiting, and creative destruction that has
agency. Structures are objects of analysis in the myth, but the system that was
produced in the process of reading and analyzing it is the introduction of a spark to
a pile of wood shavings and its interval into fire. A representation of becoming of
structure over time relies equally on the concepts of form and content; the artist
transitioned into an eternal process, but the artist—Thoreau’s persona—also stayed
to represent the tale.
The unpredictable depth of Thoreau’s story and the “undecidability” about
how to represent (rhetorical) agency (Rand, 2008, p. 314) are entangled topics.
Thoreau’s story, both in the microscopic version of the artist of Kouroo and in the
macroscopic version of Walden, is rhetorical, meant to have an effect that fractures
content from form, and I am trying to reproduce part of that effect in this
introduction. When represented, the unpredictability of a reading of Walden cannot
be surmised by either its structural form, its content, or by a coherent fusion
between the two. In the same way, the represented agency of the epigraph story
cannot be resolved as either structural form or its content. The research on the topic
of agency in rhetorical studies has tried to resolve the dichotomy, and yet even our
best—Burke (1945/1969), Karlyn Kohrs Campbell (see Rand, 2008), and Erin Rand
(2008)—are affected by a paradox over how to analyze agency, and our
representations are the cause.
This chapter demonstrates Walden’s rhetorical principle of difference that,
for all its investment in friendship as a mechanism that allows ethics to be shared,
actually alienates some of us from friendship: Walden provokes the reader,
contorting agency in ways that are contingent on how the reader responds. Erin
Rand (2008) has identified the polemic as one particular kind of rhetorical form that
does this by jeopardizing friendship (Flannery, 2001), queering the usual conduit
between rhetor and audience. This rhetorical form is coextensive with what Sarah
Hallenbeck has called the “crisis of agency” (2012, p. 18). In this chapter, I follow
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Burke’s statements about the paradox of substance that indicate that the crisis of
agency cannot be solved from within a representational medium. Burke’s paradox of
substance, the crisis of agency, and even the crisis of representation, are cut of the
same cloth, and the only way out of this chapter is not just through an analysis of
what Walden as a polemic is or represents, but through a pragmatic assessment of
what the reader does when the Walden friendship is jeopardized. Addressing the
rhetorical form of the polemic with necessary and sufficient formal conditions and
indeterminate purpose, as Rand has done, cannot suffice, since such a move
essentializes polemics in the rubric of process philosophy (DeLanda, 2002). To get
beyond essentialism, it is necessary to deploy the concept of a multiplicity, a tool
that Deleuze developed for the question of becoming (p. 10). Using the concept of a
multiplicity to analyze Rand’s proposed characteristics of the polemic allows me to
discuss a number of causal mechanisms to explain why the apparent conventions
that Rand posited exist, and to show why Rand’s own polemic violates those
conventions. We have not exhausted the ways in which a polemic may function.
This chapter makes this argument in two main phases. The first phase
focuses on the crisis of agency. Burke’s (1945/1969) writings about agency
exemplify the paradox of substance, revealing that it is impossible to separate
agency from purpose in a representational medium. Deleuze deployed the concept
of a multiplicity to finesse this impossibility (Holland, 2013; DeLanda, 2002). The
second phase of this chapter centers and then decenters Erin Rand’s (2008) theory
of the polemic. I show that, arguendo, Walden qualifies as a polemic under Rand’s
rubric, and then I use the Deleuzian concept of the multiplicity to explain why many
(but not all) polemics have common characteristics. I do this by responding to
Rand's polemic with a polemic of my own to map the contingent possibilities of
polemics, and then I use Tinker Creek as an example of one of those contingencies,
which responded to the polemic of Walden and maintained friendship.
The Crisis of Agency
The “crisis of agency” (Hallenbeck, 2012, p. 18) is a symptom of
contradictions that are inherent in traditional systems of representation. Two
missions that undermine each other are responsible for this crisis (Arditi &
Valentine, 1999, p. 71). The first mission is to describe and control the intricate
motions of the universe; this is the main function of science, which views reality
through a physicalist frame. The second mission is to describe and control the
intricate actions of agents/actors; this is the main function of free will, which views
agents/actors through an accountability frame. Because the universe and
agents/actors are of the same substance, from the perspective of action, the forces
of motion and action are integrated into a feedback loop and it is impossible to
understand either in isolation (Burke, 1945/1969). Deleuze deployed the concept of
the multiplicity to provide a perspective from motion, since a multiplicity focuses on
causal mechanisms to explain common structural forms (DeLanda, 2002). This
makes it possible to analyze the polemic and explain why Rand described it using
four formal characteristics, and why it would be a mistake to conclude that those
characteristics cause unpredictable rhetorical effects.
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I make this argument in two steps. First, I discuss Burke’s agency. Burke’s
treatment of agency makes it evident that there is something paradoxical when the
passive universe of motion is supplemented with agents/actors and viewed from
the perspective of those agents/actors. Burke’s paradox is not an error of analysis—
it is a consequence of representation. Second, I discuss Deleuze’s concept of a
multiplicity, which explains identity as an effect by making it necessary to think
about purpose from the perspective of polemical agency (i.e., “thinking with” a
polemic, Holland, 2013, p. 37). A multiplicity makes it possible to understand why
Rand selected essential formal characteristics to describe polemics.
Burke’s Agency
Burke’s representation of agency shows that it is entangled with questions of
purpose. In Burke’s Grammar of Motives (1945/1969), Burke shifts his
conceptualization of agency between motion and action throughout his short
treatment of it. Agency ended up disappearing in a discussion about mysticism,
since it shares space with purpose (pp. 292-320). This characterization,
embarrassing as it seems, is not unique to Burke. Rather, it indicates a problem
inherent in Burke’s representational medium of discussion that necessarily involves
a moving world populated with actors who must grapple with questions of purpose.
Burke’s representation of agency was driven by a necessarily inconsistent
commitment between action and motion. The first part of the reason for this was
Burke’s tracing of the concept to Emerson’s Nature, where he found the kernel of
agency within Emerson’s analysis of the endless uses to which natural kinds of
“commodity” can be put (p. 277). Emerson’s treatment of natural commodities casts
agency as a series of means (pp. 277-278). It is made subservient to agents because
they are the ones who order the selection of means (p. 277-278). This selection of
means to fulfill ends makes agency conceptually derivative of action. Purposive
action is required to ‘appropriate’ those commodities toward the ‘appropriate’ ends.
The second part of the reason for Burke’s inconsistency was that he also relied on P.
W. Bridgman’s development of operationalism; to construct a functional concept of
operationalism, Burke acknowledged that science needs a vast array of instruments
that “themselves are totally without purpose” (p. 279). For example, a thermometer
does not act—it moves, even though it exists “only as a result of human purpose” (p.
281). For Burke, purpose snuck back into agency when he included the acting
scientist with the instrument and defined agency as a “corresponding set of
operations” that are performed by a scientist (p. 280). The set of operations fulfills
purpose by adding the scientist’s recording of measurement, which is simply a
means for analysis, since “stress upon agency fails to notice the demands of the
remaining motivational domains” (p. 280). Agency is motion only so long as purpose
is not a part of the discussion, but it becomes action as soon as purpose becomes a
salient factor. Historians are fixated on describing history as a series of intervals in
time, each of which is “a stage in some historical development” toward a purpose (p.
282). This is illustrated in Thoreau’s story of Kouroo because purpose briefly
stopped being considered when Kalpa ceased to have significance until the author
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explained to the reader that the bodhisattva artist has stayed to tell the tale and
added another spark of serendipity.
Agency disappears as a function of the proliferation of purpose. Burke
argued, in a striking anticipation of Deleuze and Guattari’s social critique, that
capitalism is responsible for a transformation of sexual desire “as-agency” into
sexual desire “as-purpose” (p. 285). For Burke, the transformation is accomplished
through the mechanism of money (pp. 285-286). It would be useful to say that
Deleuze and Guattari refined this description as the actions of capitalists to add and
delete axioms to maximize profit (Deleuze & Guattari, 2009; Holland, 1999). Burke
tried to deny the necessity of purpose by defending the purifiability of agency
(1945/1969, p. 287). He wrote, “Since agents act through the medium of motion, the
reduction of action to motion can be treated as reduction to Agency” (p. 286).
However, he did not even complete the next paragraph before he runs into the agent
feedback mechanism that denies this reduction. Because agents act with a purpose
in view, a simple movement is subject to “adjustments rather than purpose” (p. 287).
This move is an attempt to separate movement from purpose through the
transitivity of adjustment. I find this move unpersuasive. As Deleuze (1994)
explained in his appropriation of Hume, agents/actors have memory, which is a
container for purpose located in the contracted future, and this intervenes in the
world of motion. As long as there are agents/actors, ”reduction of action to motion”
is impossible.
Burke’s (1945/1969) paradoxical engagement with agency and purpose is an
implication of describing it in representational language—an instance of the
“paradox of substance” (p. 21). Despite the best efforts of language users, any
representation of agency is going to put action and motion, process and structure,
form and content, into mixture. Furthermore, the transitive power of grammar is
not sufficient cover to finesse the paradox, and no amount of defining is going to
solve the “crisis of agency” (Hallenbeck, 2012, p. 18). In fact, Burke argued that it is
defining that causes the paradox of substance (1945/1969). In the next section, I
discuss Deleuze’s process philosophy to show how it is possible to avoid the mixture
through a non-representational analysis; solving the problem of essentializing
polemics requires attacking the problem by thinking with polemics.
Deleuze’s Process Philosophy
Reading Deleuze (1994) solves the problem of identity by refusing its
foundational status, and my deployment of Deleuze’s philosophy solves the problem
caused by the positing of a stable polemical form. One of the most important
missions of Deleuze’s process philosophy is to analyze identity in terms of a
multiplicity (DeLanda, 2002). Using a multiplicity in process philosophy escapes
from representational thinking (Holland, 2013). Resisting representational thinking
is important when analyzing the nature of polemics, since polemics are queer, a
form marked with an unpredictability (Rand, 2008) that is curtailed when it is
analyzed in terms of conventional characteristics. Analyzing the polemical form as a
multiplicity preserves and explains its unpredictability.
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In Deleuze’s discussion of Hegel in Difference and Repetition (1994), the
problem becomes an issue when identity is taken as foundational and difference is
viewed as derivative. When identity is foundational, identities can be opposed,
essences can be generalized to other contexts, universals can be complexified so
that resemblances can be detected, and analysis can end. Deleuze intervened on this
basic assumption of representation by making difference foundational, and viewing
identity as derivative. It is important to clarify that Deleuze did not abandon
identity. Deleuze was invested in explaining identity rather than assuming identity
(DeLanda, 2002). Deleuze still relied on foundations, but his foundations were not
structural or essential. Rather, Deleuze’s foundation was reading and thinking.
One of the most important missions of Deleuze’s process philosophy is to
analyze identity in terms of a multiplicity (p. 9). Deleuze (1994) proposed that we
should analyze process through an appeal to the concept of difference, which he
associated with the mathematical concept of the differential (p. 46). The differential
is an open-ended array of ways to analyze change, and it is interesting to point out
that the methodology of differential analysis in mathematics itself changes
depending on the conditions of the problem (which makes it an effective device to
demonstrate difference), rather than remaining a static method. DeLanda (2002)
explained that when a process is analyzed, it is inevitable that the examination of
many examples of it will reveal that there are similarities (p. 10). It is tempting to
fixate on those similarities and then conclude that those similarities constitute an
essence (p. 10). However, “These would not be essences of objects or kinds of
objects, but essences of processes, yet essences nonetheless. It is in order to break
this vicious circle that multiplicities are introduced” (p. 10). For Deleuzian analysis,
multiplicities are the only way to account for similarities of form without returning
to a structuralist analysis of form (p. 10). According to Jonathan Roffe (2010), “A
multiplicity is, in the most basic sense, a complex structure that does not reference a
prior unity” (p. 181). A useful example of a multiplicity for Roffe is a house:
A house is a patchwork of concrete structures and habits. Even though we
can list these things, there is finally no way of determining what the essence
of a particular house is, because we cannot point to anything out of the house
itself to explain or to sum it up—it is simply a patchwork. (p. 181)
A house houses, and houses house. In other words, a multiplicity is not defined by a
set of essences or forms, since it is those essences or forms which need to be
explained by a multiplicity in the first place. Instead, a multiplicity is an expansive
catalog of the possibilities (or ‘contingencies,’ if we follow Farrell, 1993, p. 77) that
may happen during a process. A house might be built of wall frames by carpenters
and be inhabited with great success; the same plan could be followed by amateurs
and might be a complete disaster. In addition, “We can imagine a time when, in the
infancy of the human race, some enterprising mortal crept into a hollow in a rock for
shelter” (Thoreau, 1985, p. 344), defying the current stereotype of construction and
creating a house merely by occupying it, perhaps for the first time. The causal
mechanisms that attend to prior conditions, such as the distribution of weight and
the consequences of the choices made by those who constructed the house (e.g.,
carpenters, geological forces, occupants), explain the emergent similarities that are
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found among houses. The identity of a house is something to be explained rather
than taken for granted.
Using a multiplicity in process philosophy enables escape from
representational thinking. However, it is not possible to do this by using a
multiplicity merely to think about something. In other words, to use a multiplicity
for solving the problem of identity, it is not enough to think “about the world”—
rather, a multiplicity works by “thinking with the world” (Holland, 2013, p. 37). For
example, to create a multiplicity of a house and have it work with houses, it would
be necessary also to account for the causal mechanisms that affect how a house is
built, and the best way to do that is by building a house. It is possible to build a
house in the virtual space of thought using the framework of a multiplicity if one
follows the causal mechanisms that influence the degrees of freedom that affect
builders in their quest to actualize a house. Alternatively, and more topical for the
current project, it is also possible to deploy a multiplicity of a polemic. The
advantage to this approach is that this dissertation’s medium and status as a
polemic features the causal mechanisms that influence the degrees of freedom that
affect polemicists and their audiences, and it does this automatically. We are thus in
the position of actualizing the possibilities that a polemic unfolds just by reading,
thinking, and responding, achieving a non-representational analysis of polemics
through rhetorical agency.
As this chapter moves into the next section, which addresses the polemical
scope of queer studies, it is important to keep Deleuze’s concept of the multiplicity
geared toward explaining a situation of an unpredictable form with characteristics
that have been predicted. The current situation is a polemic, a concept that Erin
Rand (2008) identified as queer with certain characteristics that she herself
predicted. She brought attention to the polemic in order to address the question of
rhetorical agency, and answered the issue of whether agency belongs to texts or
audiences by focusing on both sides of the rhetorical equation (p. 299). She
answered this question by “suggesting that the formal features of texts enable
agency” (p. 299). Her definition of rhetorical agency as “the capacity for words
and/or actions to come to make sense and therefore to create effects through their
particular formal and stylistic conventions” has the advantage of including texts and
audiences into the topic of agency (pp. 299-300). However, this view is also
problematic because it posited conventions, which do precisely what DeLanda
warned is what happens when essences of process are posited without a continued
effort to explain the intensive processes that sustain those characteristics. The next
section focuses on deploying a multiplicity to demonstrate the mortality of those
conventions, and to show that they are not essential to the rhetorical form of the
polemic. This lack of essence is critical to retaining the queerness of polemics, which
is arguably the most important insight of Rand’s arguments about polemics.
The Polemic’s Queer Rhetoric
Erin Rand’s rhetoric has failed to resolve the crisis of agency. This is good
news. In fact, her attempts at definition have simultaneously reified Burke’s paradox
of substance and shown that the polemic is a multiplicity. Her strategy was to define
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the polemic as a queer rhetorical form and to posit conventional requirements for
any empirical test cases and to define the polemic in terms of unexpected purposes
to which audiences have appropriated it. The characteristics and the purposive
characteristic that she posited are specific, predicable, and generalizable. However,
because of Rand’s dual definition of the polemic, it becomes clear that audiences of
her text, herself included, should be prepared for adjustments to the formal
characteristics and purposes of the polemic. This becomes clear toward the end of
her article where she identified her article as itself a form of “queer polemicization”
(p. 314), and as such, she rightly flouted, whether or not she realized it, the arguably
essentializing characteristics that she laid out and queered them in a striking display
of adjustability. My reaction to Rand’s polemic is a provisional acceptance of the
formal characteristics that she laid out, but displacing its implicit Hegelian
framework with Deleuze’s process-oriented multiplicity framework to explain those
characteristics. Therefore, I argue that, even though Rand’s theory qualifies Walden
as a polemic, it (like any polemic) requires openness to alternative processes of
fulfillment (Arditi & Valentine, 1999). Paradoxically, because Rand’s rhetoric was
itself polemical, my reaction to her theory has given her a significant measure of
success in causing a change in direction that expands the scope of queer studies
beyond a framework that has been defined by Hegelian thinking. Walden functions
in the same way: it is guaranteed success by making Thoreau’s thesis a possible
“falling away of a friend” (Flannery, 2001, p. 122 quoted by Rand, 2008, p. 307).
I make this argument in two steps. First, I engage Erin Rand’s theory on her
own initial terms. I follow the characteristics that Rand set out as the necessary and
sufficient conditions for the constitution of a polemic and show that, arguendo,
Walden qualifies as a polemic under her conventional analysis. Second, I consider
Rand’s definitional duality and cast the polemic as a multiplicity. By producing a
polemic, this permits a non-representational demonstration of a polemic’s
characteristics. Rand’s failure to control the uptake of her polemic within this
project ensures that her polemic has been successful, just as Walden guarantees
success by insisting that others go their own way, especially when that means
leaving Walden behind. The reader is then invited to read and respond to this
polemic, which actualizes its contingent possibilities and produces queerness.
Rand’s Polemic
The first part of Rand’s theory of the polemic is an elegant exercise in formal
theory that has exploded the scope of queer studies (2008). She produced a
groundbreaking theory and took seriously the old idea that queerness is not always
about sex, but is instead a matter of an unpredictable relationship between speech
and its uptake by audiences, which may involve sex. This was made possible
because she produced a theory that is capable of focusing exclusively on the formal
characteristics of a rhetorical act and its effects rather than its institutional context.
This is particularly important to the current project because it has made it possible
to analyze the queer dimensions of Walden, a text that followed the 19th century’s
zeitgeist and reduced the topic of sex to a single sentence: “Chastity is the flowering
of man” (Thoreau, 1985, p. 497). Rand’s archetypal example was Larry Kramer’s
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inflammatory gay rights rhetoric, and she was able to refrain from making Kramer’s
topic essential to her proof.
Rand laid out four characteristics that are the necessary and sufficient
conventional conditions for polemical rhetoric: “[1] alienating expressions of
emotion, [2] non-contingent assertions of truth, [3] presumptions of shared
morality, and [4] the constitution of enemies, audiences, and publics” (2008, p. 301).
As they stand, Walden meets these requirements, but Walden is more complex than
Kramer’s rhetoric with respect to how people have responded, which is the concern
of the fourth characteristic.
Alienating Expressions of Emotion
According to Rand, the first formal feature of polemics is that they have
alienating expressions of emotion. Citing Katheryn Thomas Flannery, Rand found
that “the salience of anger is often noted as a primary component of polemics in
general” (p. 302). Alienation is accomplished without recourse to content, with
polemics deploying emotion in a way that is different from rhetorical pathos (p.
302). This form, for Rand, is through a sequence of non-emotional descriptions that
build up to an emotional outburst.
Walden accomplishes emotional alienation from its reader in two ways. The
first way that this is accomplished is indirectly through its heroic demands on the
reader. The second way that Walden accomplishes this is through the same way that
Kramer did: following a string of descriptions and building to an explicit emotional
crescendo.
The first way that Walden alienates its reader is through its high demands on
its reader. To show why this can result in alienation, it is useful to compare Walden
to another set of polemics than Kramer’s diatribes. A more Waldenesque set of
examples of a polemic that alienates the reader with high demands on its reader are
John Milton’s classical writings. Richard Weaver (1953) described Milton’s writings
as a kind of “heroic rhetoric”; what is heroic about Milton’s writings is that “the
perception of his judgments requires an active sensibility incompatible with a state
of relaxation” (p. 143). One has to focus to understand Milton’s verse. It is also
interesting to note that Weaver himself characterized Milton’s writings as polemical.
Walden is similar. As I discussed in the previous chapter, Golemba (1990) argued
that Walden was written with “a language that speaks in riddles, a tormenting
language that threatens to devour those who fail to decode its mysteries” (p. 232).
Walden violates our expectations, does not allow us to rest, and brutally challenges
his friends to adapt to its literary wilderness. Such a challenge can be profoundly
alienating once it is discovered. This is why the faux friendships of illusive surveying
and self-sounding, which are discussed in Chapter Three, delay the recognition of
the intensity of Walden’s terms of friendship.
The second way that Walden accomplishes emotional alienation from the
reader is particularly salient in two places in the text. One place that this occurs is in
“The Ponds.” Another place is in the latter part of “Baker Farm” and the beginning of
“Higher Laws.”
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The most obvious example, in my opinion, of Walden’s alienation of the
reader through direct emotional expression is in “The Ponds.” The topic that led to
the outburst is Thoreau’s description of a pond where Thoreau wanted to build a
cabin after he graduated from college, with a Mr. Flint denying his desire. In “The
Ponds,” Thoreau provides a detailed description of Flint’s Pond, or Sandy Pond, and
the activities that he engaged in and the sights and sensations that he enjoyed while
there, describing the small waves that are produced by the wind and memorialized
in the sand. Then, in a fresh paragraph, Thoreau emitted his outburst: “What right
had the unclean and stupid farmer, whose farm abutted on this sky water, whose
shores he has ruthlessly laid bare, to give his name to it?” (1985, p. 478). He
followed up this judgment with a critique of the ways that Flint’s capitalistic
behavior undermined the true value of the pond. Today, just as in the 19th century,
such a revelation of values is highly divisive, alienating most people who identify
with Flint and embarrassing the rest of the population that has allowed a country to
be “manured with the hearts and brains of men! As if you were to raise your
potatoes in the church-yard! Such is a model farm” (p. 479). Historically,
churchyards have been used as burial grounds, and so Thoreau is indicting us for
being like zombies who have acquired a taste for farmers. We are either like Flint
and Emerson and guilty of naming the ponds and waves as “commodities” of nature,
or we are complicit through our slow and plodding pursuit of American dreams.
Another way that Walden accomplishes emotional alienation from the reader
through direct emotional expression is particularly salient in Thoreau’s reaction in
“Higher Laws” to John Field’s American dreaming in “Baker Farm.” In “Baker Farm,”
Thoreau was a guest in the house of the Field family, a family of Irish immigrants.
Mrs. Field is perpetually cleaning, and yet the shack remains dirty. The reason,
Thoreau claims, is because of the several amenities that the Fields indulged in: a rich
diet that included tea, coffee, and meat. Thoreau attempted to intervene with
rationality, and treated the Fields like philosophers who would carefully consider
evidence. John Field “heaved a sigh” and his wife stared at Thoreau “with arms akimbo.” (p. 487). On his way home, Thoreau heard a voice of conscience in his head
telling him to go live a wild life, and not to concern himself with the self-defeating
pursuits and stubbornness of John Field and his ilk. Then, at the beginning of
“Higher Laws,” Thoreau’s emotions literally go raw:
As I came home through the woods with my string of fish, trailing my pole, it
being now quite dark, I caught a glimpse of a woodchuck stealing across my
path, and felt a strange thrill of savage delight, and was strongly tempted to
seize and devour him raw; not that I was hungry then, except for that
wildness which he represented. (p. 490)
Many Thoreavians quote this passage out of context, taking it as a representative
anecdote for Thoreau’s honor of wildness and how it contradicted his vegetarian
preferences. However, when it is combined with the narrative in the previous
chapter, it becomes clear that Thoreau’s urge is tied to his frustration at his failure
to reach the Fields with reason, and his urge to seize the woodchuck is a pendulum
effect of the situation. Thoreau’s reaction can be savage and alienating, since not
everyone would want to eat a woodchuck, let alone a raw one that might still be
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alive. It is also unexpected, not only because of Thoreau’s transition from philosophy
to savagery, but also because the woodchuck encounter was separated from
Thoreau’s encounter with John Field by the striation of a new chapter.
Non-Contingent Assertions of Truth
According to Rand, the second formal feature that polemics have is the
assertion of non-contingent truths. This characteristic is linked to the first
characteristic: the reason for polemic’s emotional alienation is because of the
author’s “passionate conviction in a particular version of the truth, even when that
truth may not be evident to others” (Rand, 2008, p. 303). Although non-contingent
truths do not form the totality of claims made by a polemic, a polemic always has a
foundation without a footing. In Rand’s words, “Polemics forego the expected
methodological construction of an argument through the presentation of evidence
and logic in favor of a simple declaration or indictment” (p. 303). This effectively
alienates polemics as non-normal from the rhetorical tradition, since “Kenneth J. E.
Graham, for instance, explains that the rhetorical is marked by dialogue and debate,
involves arguing on both sides of an issue, and is necessarily social in outlook” (p.
303). The polemic runs the risk of being called ‘antirhetorical’ (Kenneth Graham, as
quoted by Flannery, 2001, p. 116 and Rand, 2008, p. 303), and as such, it “violates
the norms of rhetoric” (Rand, 2008, pp. 303-304).
In the case of Walden, its non-contingent truth is its thesis: each person
should find their own way. This truth finds no direct support anywhere in the text; it
vanishes soon after it appears, only to re-appear in the conclusion. Thoreau’s
violation of the norms of rhetoric is evident when his “population thinking”32 in
“Economy” and “Conclusion” is compared to the reasoned pantheism found in the
rest of the book. In particular, the placid enlightenment found in “Spring” is jarringly
disrupted when Thoreau admonishes the reader to “love your life, poor as it is” (see
Buell, 1995, p. 249).
Presumptions of Shared Morality
According to Rand, the third formal feature that polemics have is a
presumption of a shared morality. This presumption leads polemics to “take on a
discomfortingly moralistic or self-righteous tone. Rather than moving an audience
through a series of logical steps to forward his argument,” Rand argued, the
polemicist “describes his polemical truth as a moral—rather than rational—choice.
The audience is therefore not so much persuaded as they are expected or morally
obliged to believe” (2008, p. 304). This move displaces “the primacy of reason” (p.
305) and introduces one’s moral conscience as a constituent of reason and rhetoric.
Manuel DeLanda (2002) used this term to describe Deleuze’s process philosophy.
DeLanda argued that Deleuze’s philosophy requires the existence of a population of
individual cases that form the basis for manifold analysis. According to Ernst Mayr,
“the populationist thinker stresses the uniqueness of everything in the organic
world” (quoted by DeLanda, 2002, p. 58).
32
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Walden is replete with the presumption that each of our consciences is
sacrosanct. This led Buell to write:
Thoreau seems to have assumed at some rather early point that readers (as
opposed to the general public) will stay with him and complete the process of
conversion to which they were already somewhat disposed by immersing
themselves so completely in the life according to nature that they will refuse
to reenter civilized life again on the same terms as before. Thoreau’s refusal
to organize the Walden landscape tidily for his readers may be one sign of his
intent to get us lost in it. (1995, p. 135)
Walden’s reader is free to leave at any time. There are no appeals to fear or vanity
designed to induce the reader to stay. In addition, Thoreau’s claim that each person
should find their own way is coupled with his argument in “Resistance to Civil
Government” where he insisted that each citizen has an obligation never to “resign
his conscience to the legislator” (1849, p. 190). Thoreau also defended John Brown’s
morally motivated raid on Harpers Ferry (2001). Rand found that Kramer embraced
the role of “moralist,” Foucault identified as one as well (Rand, 2008, p. 305); the
same description fits Walden’s persona and Thoreau as an individual.
Constitution of Enemies, Audiences, and Publics
This characteristic addresses the polemic’s contextual relationship with its
audiences by “dissolv[ing] the distance between the audience and the text by
implicating the audience as the cause of the problem” (p. 306). While Kramer’s
polemic divides his audience into partisan groups that produce the serendipity of
new theories of queerness (pp. 309-311), Walden differs because it not only keeps
itself a focus of attention, but also invites its surviving friends to take advantage of
that attention by acting with the knowledge that the enemy has been provoked.
The special adversarial relationship that polemics have with their audiences
proves to be divisive rhetoric (p. 306). Rand characterized polemics as a rhetorical
form in which “allegiances of the reader or audience are shaped by the text itself” (p.
306). Polemics target an audience that is complicit with a true adversary and
“cultivates the partisanship of the audience” (p. 306). Polemics do this by indicting
their audiences for being enablers (pp. 306-307). What this accomplishes is the
construction of two different kinds of enemies: a proximate enemy and a distant
enemy (p. 307). This construction of two different kinds of enemies that differ in
terms of their relative proximity or distance from the rhetor is reminiscent of
grammatical third persons in Algonquian and Salishan languages (both of which are
Native American) in which the third person actually has two parts: a proximate, or a
more topical third person, and an obviative, or a less topical third person (Mithun,
2001).33 The proximate enemy in polemics is, provocatively and paradoxically, the
audience itself (p. 307). This is why Kathryn Thomas Flannery described the warlike
This division of one’s enemies into proximate and primary groups seems have a
history that could be further explored. For example, Michael Hardt has noted that
Deleuze staged a response to Hegel through his “care in positioning the relation to
proximate and fundamental enemies” (1993, p. 53).
33
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quality of the polemic with its invoked audience and the relationship as being like
“the falling away of a friend” (Flannery, 2001, p. 122 quoted by Rand, 2008, p. 307).
The audience is posited as an enemy because of its complicity with the distant
enemy, and the polemic proposes to “activate agency among the proximate
audience” to stop enabling the distant enemy (Rand, 2008, p. 308). However,
because some audience members may have actually fallen away from friendship
because of the alienating effects of the polemic, some audience members would be
untethered from the polemic’s second persona (Black, 1970 as cited by Rand, 2008).
As Rand pointed out, “polemics might be used against the grain, or be taken up by
other audiences and for other purposes” (2008, p. 308). In Rand’s rubric, this
proximate enemy gives rise to a contest over what to do with the polemic: follow the
polemicist’s demands, or move against it (p. 309). Because the audience of a polemic
faces an implicit choice about the future of its relationship with the rhetor, the
audience is challenged to create deliberative rhetoric (p. 309).
Walden’s constitution of audiences, enemies, and public space is complex.
While it is true that Walden invokes a proximate enemy that enables capitalism, that
problem does not completely bracket the fertility of the experience of responding to
Walden. In the next section, I discuss a response that has been able to maintain
friendship with the text and took it in an unpredictable direction, despite the
repelling force that “offends the constituency” (p. 307). For the remainder of this
section, I discuss the standard pattern identified by Rand, of Walden’s invocation of
its proximate enemy, an oppositional response, and the controversy that was
generated by that response.
The invoked audience of Walden is a discontented crowd, and Thoreau casts
many of us as proximate enemies. The text is replete with references to its readers,
identifying them as ordinary people who are doing an endless series of labors to
rival Hercules. Other references attached to the “you” pronoun in the text identify
the reader as spiritually poor and hungry, finding it hard to live and wondering why,
and driven into exhausting debt or guilty thievery by capitalism. Thoreau also
elaborates his attack in a single sentence that requires heroic attention to follow:
It is very evident what mean and sneaking lives many of you live, for my sight
has been whetted by experience; always on the limits, trying to get into
business and trying to get out of debt, a very ancient slough, called by the
Latins æs alienum, another’s brass, for some of their coins were made of
brass; still living, and dying, and buried by this other’s brass; always
promising to pay, promising to pay, tomorrow, and dying today, insolvent;
seeking to curry favor, to get custom, by how many modes, only not stateprison offenses; lying, flattering, voting, contracting yourselves into a
nutshell of civility or dilating into an atmosphere of thin and vaporous
generosity, that you may persuade your neighbor to let you make his shoes,
or his hat, or his coat, or his carriage, or import his groceries for him; making
yourselves sick, that you may lay up something against a sick day, something
to be tucked away in an old chest, or in a stocking behind the plastering, or,
more safely, in the brick bank; no matter where, no matter how much or how
little. (1985, p. 328)
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In other words, Thoreau is speaking to everyone who has ever stared at a coin as a
child, wondering who the face belonged to, and then later felt resentment for the
fact that they will never to appear on one—æs alienum. It is what we get when we
try to get ahead by getting other people into debt with the retail smile or when we
cause inflation with conspicuous consumption. It is any activity that defrauds
another in a way that is just outside of the reach of law. It is the result of the
corrupting quest to own another’s brass… the sustaining force of capitalism… the
essence of what qualifies one to be Thoreau’s proximate enemy. Thoreau is not
addressing Flint, or John Farmer, or John Field. These archetypes either have no
motive to read Thoreau, or have confirmed their desperation by resigning their lives
to a dog-eat-dog world. Instead, Thoreau is addressing the mass of his readers who
live “lives of quiet desperation” (p. 329), still have the Thoreauvian dream of living
free and wild, and yet have acquired the habit of squandering their lives so that they
may “play life, or study it merely” (p. 363).
Walden’s indictment of the users of capitalism has attracted its own
collection of detractors. In fact, it seems to be particularly good at attracting them.
Shortly after Thoreau’s death, his old nemesis, Lowell (1914), accused Thoreau of
being a mere strawberry from Emerson’s garden (p. 298). Lowell’s distaste for
Thoreau became most salient in his pronouncement that he “discovered nothing” (p.
300). Since then, Thoreau’s legacy has lived on seemingly in Emerson’s shadow,
leaving him with the short shrift that would find his major contribution in his essay
“Resistance to Civil Government.”
It is worth pointing out one recent attack on Thoreau in The New Yorker.
Kathryn Schultz (2015) came forward to renew Lowell’s vitriol, assailing Thoreau’s
supposed “moral myopia” and reducing him to “pond scum” (her article’s title).
Schulz’s complaint against Thoreau was against Thoreau’s supposedly excessive
stoicism, the fact that he was “narcissistic, fanatical about self-control, adamant that
he required nothing beyond himself to understand and thrive in the world” (para.
6). She seemed to have the same contempt that 19th century entrepreneurs had
toward Thoreau, lambasting him for having the temerity to turn his back on the
world, and indulging in “original cabin porn” (para. 6). Most of this pro-capitalism
rant is factually suspect and partisan, but one claim in it I have to admit is partially
true: “Nor was he interested in subjecting his claims to logical scrutiny” (para. 26).
The response to The New Yorker piece was substantial, with a mixture of
apologia and dismissal, making it an interesting contrast to Kramer’s rhetoric.
Writers came out of the proverbial woodwork from a variety of naturist and
Thoreauvian strongholds, such as the Sierra Club (Mark, 2015), the Boston Globe
(Primack & Miller-Rushing, 2015), the New Republic (Hohn, 2015), and the Boston
Review (Waxman, 2015). Shultz’s article drew so much attention that one of my
colleagues, Dr. Joseph Rhodes, notified my advisor and me about the article. Sandy
Scott, writing for a blog from Concord, Massachusetts, summed up Shultz’s critique
as “an amazing, it seems willful, misreading of Thoreau’s work” (2015, para. 2).
Matthew Towles, in a more investigatory response, traced Shultz’s motives to an
“effort to contrast our sentimental view of Thoreau with how he lived his life”
(2015, para. 4). Donovan Hohn, writing for the New Republic (2015), questioned the
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very need for such a correction, pointing out that so much time has passed that it is
now exceptionally difficult to separate the apocryphal from the genuine origin, and
that such a quest is quite beside the point of Walden. While each generation has its
Thoreau critics, there is no shortage of defenders and realists, making Thoreau’s
polemical legacy different from Kramer’s inflammatory rhetoric. The polemical
rhetoric that brought Kramer waves of rejection and serendipitous response has
been a tool to increase Walden’s visibility in the moments when the public fails to
understand its power.
Readjusting the Polemic
The polemic induces its own polemicization, which makes it hard to pin
down (Arditi & Valentine, 1999), just like queerness (Warner, 2002). Rand’s (2008)
article is one such example of this morphing; the first opportunity for adjustment to
it was made in the article itself through its own polemicization (p. 314). In addition,
I offer more adjustment here. Specifically, I observe that Rand’s own empirical
analysis ‘fails’ to move outside of an implicit Hegelian identity framework, since the
formal “characteristics of polemics make them especially prone to being put to
unforeseen uses” (p. 310). The ‘failure’ of Rand’s argument is the same brand of
failure that Rand found in Campbell’s and Flannery’s statements about agency.
These failures are fuel for adjustment of the polemic as a multiplicity. When the
polemic is analyzed as a multiplicity, the unpredictability of the polemic is explained
and its connection to queerness becomes an effect of process.
I make this argument in three steps. The first step reviews the adjustment
that Rand made to the four necessary and sufficient characteristics of the polemic. In
this review, I show how the appeal to purpose allowed Rand to depart from those
characteristics and identify her article as a polemic, even though it does not meet
those four characteristics. The second step in this argument addresses the Hegelian
language in Rand’s article (the clear empirical preference towards analyzing
oppositional provocations to Kramer’s rhetoric) and the need to recast the polemic
as a multiplicity. I bring attention to the fact that the work that she did to validate
the polemic’s characteristics favors attention toward provocations that are clearly
against Kramer’s rhetoric.34 This means that Rand’s language leaves open the
possibility that polemics can inspire non-oppositional provocations from the
polemic’s friends. Recasting the polemic as a multiplicity overcomes this oversight.
The last step in this argument actualizes this possibility. To do this, I create a
polemic, making the contingent possibilities of polemical multiplicity actual by
involving the reader in this process of actualizing the possibilities of polemical
multiplicity through thinking and considering how to respond. In addition, I
extrapolate from the virtual possibilities of my multiplicity to return to Annie
Dillard’s Pilgrim at Tinker Creek to inform a missing possibility that Rand
overlooked.
Rand (2008) did mention “skeptics or believers” (p. 306), but her article clearly
spent most of its audience analysis attending to the opponents of Kramer’s polemics.
34
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Rand’s Adjustment of the Polemic
The adjustment that Rand made to the polemical form was a move that
displaced the structural essence of the polemic and defined it in terms of purpose.
Rand’s own article displays the mutability of the polemical form, since by identifying
her own text as polemical, she demonstrates that it is possible to produce a polemic
without adhering to the formal characteristics that she defined. This proves, by her
purposive definition and her own example, that it is possible to provoke an
unpredictable response in such a way that adjusts the conventional structure of
polemical agency.
Rand’s additional definition of the polemic sets her definition up for revision.
Citing Arditi and Valentine, Rand argued that the polemic
introduces a critical gap through which the possibility of political dissent
arises. . . . It is by virtue of the iterability of the rules of political participation
that polemics can intervene both to cite and redefine the rules and therefore
potentially to promote radical social change. (p. 313)
This potentiality of having one’s own iteration of the rules altered or subverted
“necessarily introduces risk” (p. 314). To that end, Rand redefined the polemic: “The
polemic, as an excessive form whose volatility and tendency to be taken up in
unexpected ways make the risk of undecideability of rhetorical agency especially
apparent, is therefore productively queer” (p. 314). Since “the effectivity of any
given polemic is never fully determined by its substance or intention[,] this is a
move that de-essentializes both the polemical form and queerness itself” (p. 314).
Suddenly, Rand’s definition of a polemic has become a multiplicity. It has become
possible that a polemic can fulfill volatility and have a tendency to be taken up in
unexpected ways that do not fulfill the four conditions.
Rand’s article is one such example of a polemic that does not fulfill her own
requirements. Near the conclusion of her article, she admitted that she was
indulging in her “own bit of queer polemicization” (p. 314). This is an important
admission, since her article does not feature any of the conventional polemical
characteristics. This is okay in her own framework, since to qualify as a polemic it
must be available to be taken up by others, used for unexpected purposes, and
revised to serve those purposes.
Through Rand’s move from polemical form to polemical purpose, however
unexpected that adjustment and purpose might be, she has confirmed Burke’s
observation that actors adjust agency to suit their own purposes (1945/1969, p.
287). In addition, since essences of process are still essences nonetheless (DeLanda,
2002), defining the polemic in terms of its appropriated purposes is still an essence,
and following DeLanda, that essence needs to be explained. The next section makes
that explanation by analyzing the polemic as a multiplicity, which attends to the
polemic’s causal mechanisms to explain structural similarities.
A Rhetorical Polemic
Rand perpetuates a Hegelian dialectical framework in her analysis of the
polemic’s formal structure, and I wonder how many of my readers are responsible
for allowing people like her to continue using a Hegelian framework to publish
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formal analysis. What does that mean to you? Specifically, her casting of the polemic
as four structural characteristics, which is a conventional rhetorical form that
causes it to be used for unpredictable purposes, fails to account for the causal
mechanisms that produce the similarities that polemics have. Rand also focused on
responses to Kramer’s polemical rhetoric that adopt the position of the polemic’s
proximate enemy and paid little attention to Kramer’s friends. This move ignores
the cases in which Kramer’s audience maintains polemical friendship but acts with
the awareness that a proximate enemy was invoked. These cases would reveal
queer strategies that can be deployed with polemics. However, by focusing on
oppositional responses, Rand actually reified an essentialist foundation while
masking that activity by claiming that she was de-essentializing polemics. In other
words, Rand actually reinforced what she set out to disrupt. Furthermore, if the
reader does not hold individuals like Rand accountable for perpetuating this kind of
structuralist masking of structuralism, then the problem of essentialism will never
be solved, no matter how much Hegelian thinkers claim to be ambivalent about
identity (see Muńoz, 2009).
In this study, I use this response in two ways. First, in case the polemical
nature of my argument is not yet salient, I map the ways that the reader, as a
participant in academia, might respond to my insinuation that they are responsible
for allowing this situation to continue. Second, in the context of Walden, I return
attention to Annie Dillard’s Pilgrim at Tinker Creek as a kind of polemical response
that does not fit into Rand’s believer/skeptic binary.
The Multiplicity of Polemicization
Rand’s four characteristics of the polemic are necessary effects in one
contingency of polemicization, but they are not necessary effects in all contingencies
of polemicization. The most important tool that helps to construct the multiplicity of
a polemic is the idea of contingency, which has to do with how agents/actors
respond to appearances (Farrell, 1993). This means that the audience of a polemic is
not responding to emotional expressions that the polemic essentially has, but is
instead responding to emotional expressions that audiences perceive. This shift
from polemical essence to polemical contingency is one way to escape from the
piety of essentialism, since contingencies, if they obtain, produce the structures that
were previously seen to be essential. Specifically, to show that Rand’s analysis
amounts to an incomplete multiplicity of the polemic, I map the ways in which
someone might respond to the polemical nature of this dissertation. Without
waiting for an actual response, I use Dillard’s Tinker Creek to explore the way that a
polemic’s audience can be the polemic’s friend and address the polemic’s “public
space” (Rand, 2008, p. 309) through its own straightforwardness (Thoreau, 1840).
Tinker Creek’s queer rhetoric thus serves as a helpful example of responsibility for
others who find themselves at the margins of normalcy.
The most important tool that helps to construct the multiplicity of a polemic
is the idea of the contingency, which has to do with how agents/actors respond to
appearances (Farrell, 1993). Thomas Farrell has argued that as rhetorical beings, we
do not respond to noumenal realities, but rather, we respond to appearances. In
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addition, Farrell argued, citing Aristotle, “Contingency is presupposed on the very
notion of voluntary agency, since it makes no sense to deliberate over things which
are going to be the case anyway or things which could never be the case” (p. 77).
Appearances may or may not be identical with reality.
As such, the polemical involvement of emotional alienation is not a matter of
characteristics that polemics essentially have, but is instead a matter of how
polemics appear. Benjamin D. Powell (2007) has shown, in a review of the cognitive
neuroscientific research of Vittorio Gallese, that there are important causal
mechanisms, embedded in the processes of mirror neurons, that have to be satisfied
for actions, such as emotional expressions, to be successfully communicated.
Specifically, the successful perception of an action made by another individual
requires that the perceiver not only achieve an embodiment of the same action, but
also an “embodiment of the intended goal” (p. 113). In other words, the perceptions
of the polemic’s audience are contingent on what the audience actually embodies.
The target of an emotion is often an important part of that emotion (Goldie, 2002).
The polemic’s friends do not identify with the proximate enemy, and so they do not
experience alienation, since the target of their emotions is not themselves. In
contrast, audiences who identify as the polemic’s proximate enemy experience
alienation, since their embodied anger is directed inward. In the case of Walden, the
contingency of emotional alienation hinges on whether the audience identifies as an
adherent of æs alienum. The polemic’s contingency of emotional alienation is not
“just as likely to alienate—rather than satisfy or motivate—the audience,” as Rand
argued (2008, p. 303), but is instead a contingency determined by the audience.
This shift from polemical essence to polemical contingency is one way to
escape from the piety of essentialism, since contingencies may posit the structures
that were previously seen to be essential. Rand’s first characteristic holds for the
polemic’s proximate enemy, not the polemic’s friends, since the polemic causes
lasting emotional alienation only in the proximate enemy. For the polemic’s friends,
the polemic’s emotional expressions are not durably alienating; the polemic’s
friends identify with the polemicist. Rand’s discussion of the four characteristics of
polemics operates without much regard for rhetorical contingency, and as such,
assumes that the polemic’s audience is always going to have an arbitrary likelihood
of experiencing alienation. When seen as a structure of possibilities rather than a
statistic, the four characteristics only obtain for the proximate enemy, which may
not be present to a polemic at all, might cause widespread alienation, or some result
in between. When Rand’s four characteristics are seen only as essential
characteristics of how a polemic would appear to its proximate enemy, we realize
that it is in our interests to accept that the four characteristics are contingent.
To show that Rand’s analysis amounts to an incomplete multiplicity of the
polemic, I map the multiplicity of my polemic: the context of an intervention of the
enabling behavior of an academic reader who is a member of a discipline that is
perpetuating Hegelian thinking. This is helpful because it simplifies the manifold
nature of the multiplicity of Thoreau’s polemic, which has a long history and a
changing rhetorical situation, into a scenario that has been actualized in the current
project. This strategy of thinking with polemics instead of about them reveals the
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contingencies for which Rand both succeeded and failed to provide accounts, and it
allows the reader to expand the contingencies as far as the outcome may warrant. I
chose this particular example because, following Rand’s account, it involves a
polemicist invoking partisanship by naming a proximate enemy as responsible for
enabling a distant enemy. In my polemic, I have implicated the reader in a way that
highlights the mechanics of co-dependency, which revolves around enablers who
allow something undesirable to continue. The outcome of this confrontation is not a
binary conclusion; there are several contingencies, which constitute the multiplicity
of the polemic. These contingencies are a reflection of the fact that when agency
involves actors/agents, agency is subject to adjustment based on the purposes
envisioned by those actors/agents. I use the term ‘polemic’ here because the
example conforms to Rand’s conventional characteristics and is at risk of provoking
feelings of alienation, implicating my reader for enabling academia for perpetuating
Hegelian thinking, just as Rand described Kramer did in his gadfly rhetoric to his
audiences for allowing the system to abuse gays. I divide audience response into
various possibilities: A reader as ‘friend’ or as ‘enemy’. ‘Friend’ is the polemic’s
friend: ‘friend’ accepts responsibility for my claim, and recognizes co-dependency as
the true enemy, the inherent barrier that prevents the extinction of Hegelian
thinking. ‘Friend’ ceases the enabling behavior (or does not exhibit enabling
behavior in the first place) and can respond in a few ways: either (1) join my camp
by engaging the proximate enemy (i.e., attack other enablers), or (2) move on with
the reading process having taken individual responsibility (i.e., completely cease codependent behavior). ‘Enemy’ is the polemic’s proximate enemy: the ‘enemy’ denies
responsibility for what I have said and does not recognize co-dependency as the
enemy. The ‘enemy’ can respond in a few ways: either (3) fail to change (i.e.,
continue enabling) or (4) deploy the powers of rhetorical invention to formulate a
response to me as to why my polemic is wrong or misguided. Rand’s analysis
primarily focused on the oppositional responses of Crimp and Edelman, and
positioned them into the fourth contingency. The remainder of her analysis involved
a cursory acknowledgment of the rest of the respondents to Kramer’s rhetoric,
lumping them into the first and perhaps the third contingency. This leaves the
second and third contingencies relatively unexplored. Unfortunately, the enemy
who fulfills the third contingency is usually silent, and so it is difficult to explore it
rhetorically. This leaves the second contingency in need of an accounting.
To investigate the actual results of this second contingency, I am not going to
guess how the reader is going to respond, but I will I use Dillard’s Tinker Creek to
exemplify a way that a polemic’s audience can be the polemic’s friend and correct
the polemic through its own straightforwardness. Dillard’s rhetoric in Tinker Creek
deliberately cultivates strangeness (Slovic, 1992). Given this pattern of cultivation,
which has reached into most of her writings, and in particular, Dillard’s use or
disavowal of gender nonconforming writing in Tinker Creek to induce her own
melancholia and blindfold herself to metaphorical meaning (Abraham & Torok,
1994a), her strategy is queer. Moreover, Dillard positioned Tinker Creek as Walden’s
friend and responded in an oblique way by exploiting the other contingencies of
Walden’s polemics. Specifically, Dillard did not participate in Walden’s attack on its
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proximate enemy, the enabling behaviors of capitalism, æs alienum. In fact, Dillard
engaged in no conventional social criticism whatsoever. Within the confines of the
text itself (i.e., ignoring supplemental material that Dillard produced), the gender of
the narrator is not identifiable if the reader does not assume that the narrator and
the author are the same person. Suzanne Clark argued that Dillard’s displacement of
her gender reifies the absence of women in nature writing, a criticism that has been
directed at Thoreau in particular (1991). Thoreau made virtually no analysis on the
subjection of women, and some of his comments in Walden can be interpreted as
sexist (Golemba, 1990). Of course, Thoreau was deliberately presenting the
stereotyped individualist man as a front, and so there is cause to be suspicious of his
genuineness regarding these comments. Nevertheless, Dillard’s strategy of
befriending Walden and implicitly exposing an oversight in it through her own
example is a perfect example of Thoreau’s prescription for satirical attack: “Truth
does not turn to rebuke falsehood; her own straightforwardness is the severest
correction” (1840, p. 118).
Tinker Creek’s queer rhetoric thus serves as a helpful example of
responsibility for others who find themselves at the margins of normalcy. As many
queer people have found the hard way, complaining about intolerable
circumstances, such as a dearth of women writers, has the unfortunate effect of
drawing attention from the very sources of misery that produce those intolerable
circumstances. Michael Warner has written about a similar problem: “those who
write opaque left theory might very well feel that they are . . . writing to a public that
does not yet exist, and finding that their language can circulate only in channels
hostile to it” (2002, p. 130). This is one reason why queerness is driven into silence,
where it is then agitated by polemicists like Thoreau and Kramer. Dillard’s rhetoric
suggests that it may be possible to exploit the imaginative aspects of the public
sphere to occlude the enemy from detecting activists,35 thereby protecting them
from retaliation long enough for a counterpublic to take shape. Dillard’s Tinker
Creek exemplifies a form of rhetoric that does this by not producing a ‘complaint,’
but rather by producing a defilade ‘plaint,’ which refrains from addressing the object
of attack. “Though the folly be not corrected,” wrote Thoreau, the poet is satisfied
that truth has inspired the voice of genius, and made possible the next level of
genius (1840, p. 118). This next level, according to Thoreau, is love, which is a
quality that has been sorely missed from polemics, given their warlike quality.
However, if the polemic’s audience can respond to it beyond complaint, there is an
opportunity not only to display queerness in an unlikely safe space of a battlefront,
but also to invite additional queer results.
José Esteban Muñoz (1999) made a strikingly similar observation in his analysis
of an exhibit by the late queer cubano artist Felix Gonzalez-Torres. The exhibit is of a
strangely ordinary photograph taken by Peter Muscato of a ripped blank billboard
and a surrounding empty lot fenced off with barbed wire (p. 171). According to
Muñoz, viewers of the exhibit are split between awareness and ignorance due to the
photograph’s representation of “an absence, a lacuna, a void gesturing to something
valuable, loved, and missing” (p. 170).
35
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Coda
Thoreau’s Kouroo myth serves many purposes. It exposes the necessary
mixture of form and content. It also embodies the unfolding flower of Walden,
showing that purpose can be both perfect and mutable.
The Kouroo myth exposes the necessary mixture of form and content.
Burke’s analysis of the motion of agency produced a paradox due to the mechanics
of representation. Our focus on purpose has allowed us to intervene on agency and
adjust it with action, but our intervention within a representational medium has
made it impossible to separate action from motion, form from content (Burke,
1945/1969). Deleuze (1994) helps us to get beyond representation by using a
multiplicity to think non-representationally (Holland, 2013). Furthermore, by
responding to polemics, the reader can think with polemics, multiply the
contingencies of polemical response and respond to the emotional challenge to
wage war.
The Kouroo myth is the unfolding flower of Walden, showing that purpose
can be both perfect and mutable. There is a polemical ingredient in Walden, and it
gives emotional depth to Thoreau’s anti-capitalistic rage. That scintillating
animosity is still burning Walden’s readers, as evinced by the continued fight
between Thoreauvian detractors and apologists. However, this warlike behavior
does not exhaust the possibilities of Walden. There are some who have read it, who
appreciate the seriousness of Thoreau’s critique of “Economy,” and who know that
there are ways to engage that discussion without instigating the habit of combat.
Annie Dillard is one of those transcendent warriors. She demonstrated how to make
her point without piercing Walden. Annie Dillard’s rhetoric is queer; she not only
wore that queerness by eliding her gender within her narrative, but she also walked
far beyond it into the natural and uncomfortable world of strangeness (Slovic,
1992). This accepts and cherishes Thoreau’s mission to create a work of perfection,
and also responds in a way that, as Rand (2008) has pointed out, creates space for
deliberative agency.
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Conclusion
There is a dawn lurking behind the hills of every horizon at noon tide; there
are ears that hear the drowsy cricket, and eyes that see the glittering dews
even then.
—Walden, “Conclusion,” from one of Thoreau’s handwritten manuscript
pages; Beinecke Library, Yale University (Thoreau, 1970, p. 448)
When I began this project, my advisor gave me his copy of The Annotated
Walden (1970), an intimidating tome featuring a photographic copy of the first
edition of Walden. In the margin on each page are footnotes explaining various
literary references that modern readers are thought to need in order to understand
various code words and obscure allusions. The first time I leafed through it, I could
not fathom how it could be possible to add any more footnotes, since there are
precisely 1,008 of them there. When I found the book in my mailbox, I immediately
opened it, and discovered a note from my advisor, telling me that he had owned the
book for years and never opened it.
The challenge presented by this artifact is the same challenge that Thoreau
had in his quest to recover from melancholia, and it is the same challenge that
Walden’s reader has in realizing why they are living a life of “quiet desperation”
(1985, p. 329). Beginning the recovery of my losses and continuing the heroic
adventure of life has been an enormous challenge for me over the years, and I have
discovered that my relationship with Walden is a symbol of the beginning of that
process with myself. After I began to undergo my gender transition, I started to
explore ways to unlock another way of understanding Walden, just as I was
exploring ways to unlock another way of understanding myself. Something was
buried in this text that was given to me, just as my lost desires had been buried in
my psyche, waiting for introjection. One day, an insight occurred when I was
examining the last page of “Conclusion.” Beyond “THE END.” was a photocopy of a
page from one of Thoreau’s handwritten manuscript pages (Thoreau, 1970, p. 448).
At first I could not read Thoreau’s scrawl, and for years I ignored it. After all,
Thoreau’s effects have all been deciphered and published, right? Then, one day,
while I was alone, I looked at the cryptic writing, and the words slowly came to me. I
read the words aloud without paying attention to the meaning, and when I repeated
the words with the motivation of understanding them, I realized that there was a
sentence there that I did not remember encountering before, but it felt familiar,
almost like I had it once and then lost it. I went back to check the manuscript: the
sentence is not in any Clapper version of Walden (Schacht, n.d.). I tried to look up
the phrase on the Internet. Nothing. I do not presume to claim that I am the first
person to decipher the passage—rather, it was a personal achievement that was key
to the futures of my own life as well as the life of this dissertation. That sentence is
the epigraph to this chapter.
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The epigraph to this chapter is a useful way to introduce the two implications
that need to be discussed in this conclusion. These implications, which affect
communication studies, have to do with melancholia and queer studies.
First, when I decrypted the epigraph, I realized that the epigraph is an
appropriate way to discuss my discipline’s engagement with the concept of
melancholia. My own deciphering of the epigraph describes how a reader of Walden
induces the beginning of recovery from melancholia: by producing an environment
that encourages the reader to believe that one’s desires are legitimate, thus leading
to the subject’s discovery of melancholia and the long process of the subject’s
recovery. At the time that I discovered the epigraph, there was still much work to be
done to complete this project, and I had already made the important step of
recognizing my own melancholia. I only needed to absorb the import from the
statement, to make its desires my own, which required work. However, for me, the
remaining work was not an achievement per se. For others, such as queers of color,
that additional work may be far more challenging. Unfortunately, José Esteban
Muñoz (1999) assumed that the melancholic subject will become aware of their
melancholic condition and that introjection of the contents of the melancholic crypt
is only going to be stalled by extrinsic conditions, such as economic class. This
assumption homogenizes our epistemic conditions, describing just one possibility of
the condition of melancholia.
Second, the epigraph challenges the discipline’s habit of dialectical
engagement by challenging our preconceptions about the appearances of darkness,
sounds, and light. Special subtleties occur when it is noon where we are: many
horizons toward the west are producing a different dawn, and not everyone notices;
at noon, crickets are chirping softly enough that only the most sensitive ears detect
them, and each one is unique; there is just enough moisture on the grass to be seen
by the most discerning microscopic perspective, and each drop of dew is different.
In other words, the subtleties in Walden require a meticulous imagination and
attentiveness from the reader for the text to be understood at all, and each
interpreter who achieves friendship with Walden reaches a wild and legitimate
interpretation. Unfortunately, the current scholarship on polysemy has concluded
that when the spectrum of possible interpretations reaches a wide enough envelope,
a text is no longer exemplifying polysemy, but is instead demonstrating the
Derridean concept of dissemination (Ceccarelli, 1998). One of the implications of
this project is to place dissemination under the umbrella of polysemy, not outside of
it. To some this is an unacceptably queer result, and that when interpretations are
far enough afield then they are opposed to the text’s meaning. This dissertation
challenges Muñoz’s (2009) dialectical assumption.
This conclusion chapter explores these implications in two steps. The first
step initiates the business of wrapping up the dissertation by addressing the
research questions that were proposed in the Introduction chapter. The second step
of this conclusion addresses the two implications themselves. Specifically, the
implications of both melancholia and queer studies intersect with the research of
José Esteban Muñoz. Muñoz produced research on both of these topics, but his
understanding of melancholia (1999) did not address Butler’s (1997) discussion
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about the disavowal of desire, and his metaphysical orientation (2009) was
Hegelian. This second step lays out the remedies that need to be made to Muñoz’s
research so that his efforts to give voice to the disparaged minorities of the queer
community can be appreciated through a Deleuzian lens with a robust
understanding of melancholia that finds utopian comfort in the present.
Answering the Research Questions
The first research question, which inquires into the relationship between
Thoreau’s melancholic writing discussed in the Introduction chapter and his
“language of desire” (Golemba, 1990, p. 233, p. 234), was answered by the analysis
in Chapter Four. The second research question, which inquires into how this
relationship implicates queer studies and queer movements, was partially answered
in Chapter Five, and will require additional discussion in this chapter.
Research Question 1
The first research question inquires into the relationship between Thoreau’s
melancholic writing and Thoreau’s language of desire. Thoreau’s melancholic
writing was, of course, produced out of his melancholia, which was hatched early in
his life, and can be traced back at least to Margaret Fuller’s rejection of Thoreau’s
“The Service” from publication in The Dial (Fink, 1992). Melancholia is made
possible because mourning has been stalled; for whatever reason, the arresting of
mourning, made possible by the disavowal of desire, maintains the illusion that the
memory of the lost object is the lost object (Butler, 1997; Torok, 1994; Abraham &
Torok, 1994a). The encrypted fantasy that occurs at the beginning of mourning is a
subconscious skill of demetaphorization, which induces the subject to take literally
what is metaphorical (Abraham & Torok, 1994a). Thoreau’s “language of desire”
(Golemba, 1990, p. 233, p. 234), which I argue was put into increased practice when
he recognized his own long relationship with demetaphorization during his
experience with ether, was his way of writing with a deliberate blindness and
receptivity to metaphorical fertility. A phrase that is written in a language of desire
is one that can function metaphorically, but does not by itself. When readers
encounter these phrases, they commonly assume that there is a metaphor and are
induced to recover it from “a letter posted but never quite delivered (p. 228). The
trick with Thoreau’s language of desire is that the reader thinks that the recovery is
sourced by one’s memory of the text, which may be true, but sometimes, the
recovery is sourced from elsewhere, a selection made by one’s own desires.
Research Question 2
The second research question inquires into how the answer to the first
research question implicates the future of queer studies and queer movements. The
connection between melancholia and Thoreau’s language of desire involves a
recognition of the capability of language to be used with open-ended metaphorical
functionality that does not erase literal meaning, and that a reader can be called
upon to participate as a coauthor in the unique role of adding metaphorical
interpretation (p. 7). This addition of a metaphorical layer on top of Thoreau’s literal
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meaning leads to polysemy. To do this requires an occasional displacement of the
text as the arbiter of meaning and supplementing those moments with invitations to
the reader to participate as co-author (p. 7; Buell, 1995). This self-adjusting give and
take of invitation is the foundation for the friendship that was described in Chapters
Three and Four. Chapter Five discussed how the incongruous perspectives of
friendship intersect with the form of the polemic where friendship between text and
reader is jeopardized (Flannery, 2001 as quoted by Rand, 2008). The
unpredictability of polemics derives from the ability of the audience to swerve in
directions that are not directed by the polemic (Rand, 2008), creating a contingency
that possibly maintains or possibly departs from the particular friendship with the
polemic. This contingency of the polemic’s audience to react in a way that cannot be
determined by an essential content of the polemic or intent of the polemicist is why
Rand found polemics to be queer (p. 310). This move expands the traditional scope
of queerness, putting non-sexual topics within the scope of queer studies (pp. 311312).36 However, this general implication does not address communication studies
scholarship. Therefore, I want to focus on a few important texts by Muñoz that put
these implications into sharp relief for the discipline.
Muñoz
Muñoz’s attention to minorities of a minority is an important site for the
interaction between melancholia, queer studies, and queer culture, since these were
main areas of his research. However, my arguments here point to more work that
should be done with Muñoz, since I have found a gap in his discussion of
melancholia theory, and I find his discussion of process philosophy to be dismissive.
Muñoz’s focus on minorities who have the need to live and flourish within the
minority status of the queer community is too important to be cast aside because of
these oversights. Therefore, I want to address the foundations for his two texts,
Disidentifications (1999), and Cruising Utopia (2009). The first text developed a
theory of disidentification that relies on an understanding of melancholia that
neglects Butler’s (1997) updated arguments about melancholia. The second text
deployed queerness from within a Hegelian metaphysic. I do not propose to fix these
problems here, since that may require a reexamination of the artifacts that Muñoz
This move does not delegitimize a concern of queer studies for the impact that
capitalism has had in the derogation of populations that do not facilitate the
reproduction of capitalistic labor. Queer studies rightfully maintains the timely and
sustained attention to the suppressive practices of capitalism. However, my move
merely calls attention to Michael Warner’s observation that “people didn’t sweat
much over being normal until the spread of statistics in the nineteenth century”
(1999, p. 53) and Leslie Feinberg’s (1996) observation that there was a time when
gender conformity did not have its current normative power. Furthermore, there
may be a future in which those norms might fade. In those contexts, normativity still
had rhetorical force, but it did not exist in sex and gender. If that were not the case,
then queer forms could not antedate capitalism and pre-capitalistic polemics would
not have unpredictable functionality.
36
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examined or analysis of additional material. Instead, I want to provide suggestions
for future research so that that Muñoz’s critical insights can be appreciated in new
ways.
Disidentification
Muñoz’s (1999) invocation of disidentification is a departure from the binary
of identification and counter-identification (p. 97). This “third term” is invented by
virtue of the capabilities that recovered melancholic subjects have through the
previous incorporation of their losses (p. 97). However, Muñoz’s explication of
melancholia theory without attention to Butler (1997) proves to be limited. Here, I
address disidentification as a condition involving melancholia, and then discuss
what work needs to be done to update Muñoz’s analysis.
For Muñoz, disidentification “is a strategy that tries to transform a cultural
logic from within” (1999, p. 11). It is a “survival strategy” (p. 18) that involves a
constant foregrounding of “that lost object of identification” (p. 30). It is a line that
“is not easy to follow inasmuch as it is neither linear nor in any way straight. It is, in
fact, a very queer trajectory” (p. 39). Specifically, “Disidentification for the minority
subject is a mode of recycling or re-forming an object that has already been invested
with powerful energy. It is important to emphasize the transformative
restructuration of that disidentification” (p. 39). From my understanding of Muñoz’s
argument, because minorities within minorities have their heroes delegitimated by
authority figures in the public sphere and by some in queer counterpublic enclaves,
queers of color and gender nonconforming individuals have found themselves
afflicted with melancholia, and some of them have been able to recover by
introjecting from their melancholic crypts.
Unfortunately, Muñoz failed to appreciate the nuances of melancholia theory
that Butler published two years prior to the publication of Muñoz’s text. Muñoz
presented disidentification as a strategy that matches the “oppositional reception”
that Stuart Hall proposed can be done to media messages (p. 26) and one that
accomplishes its restructuring through de/reterritorialization (p. 58, p. 185). In this
analogue, “Disidentification is therefore about the management of an identity that
has been ‘spoiled’ in the majoritarian public sphere” (p. 185). In Butler’s (1997)
analysis of melancholia, the melancholic subject has disavowed their desire, and
when this observation is filtered through Deleuze and Guattari’s metaproductive
understanding of desire (2009), that disavowal, when combined with loss, shrinks
the dynamic ownership of one’s desires to static identity. In other words, the
melancholic subject affirms the spoiled nature of those desires and resigns oneself
to mere existence and desire-as-lack. Muñoz does not explain how any ‘unspoiling’
might take place. This is evident in his presentation of the mechanics of
disidentification. The clearest evidence of this is in one of his endnotes. As Muñoz
wrote, “Melancholia is a process that also depends on introjection. In my analysis,
this introjection is described as the ‘holding on to’ or incorporation of or by a lost
object” (p. 203). It is obvious that Muñoz was conflating introjection and
incorporation, claiming that the two activities are “coterminous” (p. 13, p. 15). In my
reading of Butler’s analysis, introjection and incorporation are not identical, but
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instead share a terminus (i.e., where one ends the other begins). Indeed, all of the
research that I have discussed in this dissertation by Butler, Abraham, Torok,
Leader, and Arsić indicates that when introjection is restored, introjection grows as
it proceeds and swells to occupy the space of incorporation in the “vampiric” (p. 13)
manner that Muñoz described. However, that vampirism takes time and approaches
a coterminous state but never rests. It is important to point out Torok’s (1994)
observation that introjection and incorporation differ most significantly in the timed
nature of how they occur; introjection is a gradual process in which one’s menu of
desires slowly expands through experimentation and observation, whereas
incorporation is a rapid task that is quickly accomplished, and it is sustained during
melancholia by the demetaphorized fantasy of swallowing and the burying of that
fantasy to make it seem literal (p. 113). In the case of grieving through introjection,
incorporation is done first before grieving can commence. This means that the
transition from melancholia to disidentification involves a process in which
introjection and incorporation are not coterminous, but have, at best, a coterminous
limit that will never obtain.
Muñoz’s Disidentifications does not account for the transition from
melancholia to disidentification, but that does not mean that melancholics are
doomed. I suggest that future research should search for individuals like Thoreau
who have had the experience of melancholia and who managed to ‘unspoil’ their
own identities in a move from melancholia to disidentification. Of course, Chapter
Two of this dissertation shows that melancholia is stabilized because of disavowal,
and there are many reasons why someone may disavow their desires. Therefore,
more examples of recovery should be explored so that queer people can envision
utopia in the apparent dystopia of the present.
Finding Utopia in Queerness
The feeling that queerness is displaced by the present and points instead to a
utopian future is a result of Hegelian thinking, a sentiment that I do not share.
Muñoz (2009) argued that queerness is not yet here, and relied on arguments from
Ernst Bloch and Hegelian idealism to make that argument. Unfortunately, Muñoz
was dismissive of process philosophy. Deleuze’s process philosophy (1994) locates
utopia in the unfolding present, not in a future that attacks the present. Thoreau
matched Deleuze’s conclusion with a narrative of utopia that is more than merely
possible or potential, but one that he actually achieved in his day. Furthermore, both
Thoreau and Deleuze responded to falsity positively rather than negatively. While I
sympathize with Muñoz’s project in Cruising Utopia, I would submit that his hasty
dismissal of process philosophy came from his Hegelian thinking. This section
serves to “brag,” borrowing a term from Thoreau (1985, p. 361, p. 389), to reassure
queers that utopia actually exists now.
Muñoz argued that queerness is not yet here, and relied on arguments from
Ernst Bloch and Hegelian idealism to make that argument. Muñoz’s (2009) project
was a response to what he referred to as Edelman’s polemic against the agenda of
the present moment in political culture, a culture that stipulates that the future is
the child (sexual reproduction; p. 11). Although Muñoz was critical of Edelman for
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sending queer thought into a nihilistic negation of political participation, Muñoz
confessed that he found a lot to like about Edelman’s diagnosis. Nevertheless, Muñoz
rejected Edelman’s prescription, saying ‘No’ to Edelman’s ‘No,’ complaining that
Edelman’s argument “quickly replaced the romance of community with the romance
of singularity and negativity” (p. 10). Muñoz’s “anti-antirelationality” (p. 14)
involved a Blochian understanding of time in which queers retain and cherish
memories of the “no-longer-conscious,” which is located in the present moment (p.
12). This trace enables “a critical hermeneutics attuned to comprehending the notyet-here” (p. 12). The not-yet-here is a perfection of the no-longer-conscious, a
utopia. In this framework, queerness itself is “a temporal arrangement in which the
past is a field of possibility in which subjects can act in the present in the service of a
new futurity” (p. 16).
Unfortunately, Muñoz was dismissive of process philosophy. Although Muñoz
never cited Deleuze or process philosophy by name, he did make a passing reference
to the “antiutopian critic” who “has a well-worn war chest of post-structuralism
pieties at her or his disposal to shut down lines of thought that delineate the concept
of critical utopianism” (p. 10). I can certainly see how process philosophy could be
included under the umbrella of post-structuralism, although such an ism suggests
that process philosophy eschews all attention to structure, which is simply not true.
Muñoz’s main project was to respond to the habitual thinking that takes the
superficially “pragmatic gay agenda” as the only game in town for queers; this flavor
of pragmatism is a myopic desire for belonging that asks for “mere inclusion in a
corrupt and bankrupt social order” (p. 20). In this sense, Muñoz found a need for a
rejection of the status quo that had enough forward thinking to inspire hope for
queer people who did not want to sell their souls to heteronormativity. As much as I
consider myself a Deleuzian and a Thoreauvian, I am attracted to Muñoz’s project,
but, strictly speaking, I do not identify with Muñoz’s complaint against “straight
time” (p. 22) and I feel the alienating pushback of Muñoz’s polemic, which refused to
consider process philosophy.
Deleuze’s process philosophy locates utopia in the unfolding present, not in a
future that attacks the present. Deleuze folded the past and the future within the
present, and deployed Hume’s concept of ‘contraction’ to show how processes in the
present explain the phenomena of past and future (1994, pp. 70-71). It is tempting
to understand contraction as the drafting, signing, and enforcement of contracts.
After all, contracts exist in the present moment, and their power derives from the
presence of signatures that represent the oaths that the contract’s parties made in
the past to do something in the future. However, such an analogy is flawed; Derrida
(1988) has famously critiqued the idea that a person who signs a document remains
the same person who could be subject to that document’s future enforcement.
Instead, I offer an understanding of contraction from another context: Thoreau
contracted melancholia. This contraction, along with the effects of Thoreau’s return
from melancholia with the boon of demetaphorization, has survived Thoreau’s
death and continues in the present moment in the form of records, memories,
sympathies, and a language of desire that produces recovery. The contraction
continues to have a passive (Deleuze, 1994, p. 71) inertia that is an inheritance
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passed from instant to instant, which continues to affect the trajectory of
Thoreauvian research, the use of his biography in this dissertation to inform the
reader, and so on. Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus is utopian because it located
the contraction of capitalism’s failure. Following Marx, Deleuze and Guattari argued
that capitalism produces schizophrenic thinking, which is the agency of capitalism’s
disruption, which will culminate as permanent revolution (2009; Holland, 1999). In
other words, as bad as the present looks to those of us who see a present that “is so
poisonous and insolvent” (Muñoz, 2009, p. 30), Deleuze folded harm, plan, and
solvency together into an imminent process like Thoreau, producing the image of a
toothless Buddhist master relaxing in the certainty that things are actually unfolding
as they should.
Thoreau matched Deleuze’s conclusion with a narrative of utopia that is
more than merely possible or potential, but one that he actually achieved in his day.
Thoreau derived immense comfort in his insistence that moral reform begins first
with the individual, and that such a technique is bound to have long-lasting effects.
As a consequence of this insistence on taking responsibility for one’s own moral
contributions, Thoreau took it upon himself to refuse to pay for a poll tax, which
precipitated his arrest by Sam Staples, the tax collector (Harding, 1982). Thoreau
was completely willing to go to jail for tax evasion (p. 199), which serves as one of
the most poignant examples of his ability to find utopia in a ‘broken’ situation. This
is why Thoreau found utopia in the present moment:
I did not read books the first summer; I hoed beans. Nay, I often did better
than this. There were times when I could not afford to sacrifice the bloom of
the present moment to any work, whether of the head or hands. I love a
broad margin to my life. Sometimes, in a summer morning, having taken my
accustomed bath, I sat in my sunny doorway from sunrise till noon, rapt in a
revery, amidst the pines and hickories and sumachs, in undisturbed solitude
and stillness, while the birds sing around or flitted noiseless through the
house, until by the sun falling in at my west window, or the noise of some
traveller's wagon on the distant highway, I was reminded of the lapse of time.
I grew in those seasons like corn in the night, and they were far better than
any work of the hands would have been. They were not time subtracted from
my life, but so much over and above my usual allowance. I realized what the
Orientals mean by contemplation and the forsaking of works. For the most
part, I minded not how the hours went. The day advanced as if to light some
work of mine; it was morning, and lo, now it is evening, and nothing
memorable is accomplished. Instead of singing like the birds, I silently smiled
at my incessant good fortune. As the sparrow had its trill, sitting on the
hickory before my door, so had I my chuckle or suppressed warble which he
might hear out of my nest. My days were not days of the week, bearing the
stamp of any heathen deity, nor were they minced into hours and fretted by
the ticking of a clock; for I lived like the Puri Indians, of whom it is said that
"for yesterday, today, and tomorrow they have only one word, and they
express the variety of meaning by pointing backward for yesterday forward
for tomorrow, and overhead for the passing day." This was sheer idleness to
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my fellow-townsmen, no doubt; but if the birds and flowers had tried me by
their standard, I should not have been found wanting. A man must find his
occasions in himself, it is true. The natural day is very calm, and will hardly
reprove his indolence. (1985, pp. 411-412)
There are multiple indicators of affirmative utopia in this presentist presentation.
First, Thoreau identifies with the Puri Indians who used demonstrative temporal
gestures. What is interesting about this finger pointing is that they are all spatial
references, which point to places in the present. Second, Thoreau’s moment of
utopia itself does not defy the value system of enterprise that gave his “fellowtownsmen” cause to dissect the hours of the day and criticize his day as “sheer
idleness.” Instead, his description of what he did was in terms of “something that a
thing is not” (Burke, 1945/1969, p. 23), which involved not using a clock or a
calendar. This omission of criticism is important and I discuss it in more detail in the
next paragraph. Finally, when Thoreau wrote that “if the birds and flowers had tried
me by their standard, I should not have been found wanting,” he was distancing
himself from the dictum of Daniel 5:27: “Thou art weighed in the balances, and art
found wanting” (Thoreau, 1995, p. 109). Instead of rejecting the scales of the
enterprising culture that saturated his civilization, he identified with the birds and
flowers, who taught Thoreau by example to relax during the passing of the day and
to appreciate “the gospel according to this moment” (1862, p. 673).
Both Thoreau and Deleuze responded to falsity positively rather than
negatively. Thoreau’s positive response is showcased in the long quote in the
previous paragraph. There, he follows his two-step progression toward genius that
he laid out in his “Persius” essay (1840). There, the first advancement toward genius
consisted of the graduation from complaint to plaint, which made it possible to
move from plaint to love. Thoreau’s omission of a critique of capitalism in his
moment of utopia shows that truth’s “straightforwardness is the severest
correction” (p. 118). The reason why this is not simply a mode of escapism can be
seen with more clarity by turning to Deleuze. In Deleuze’s project of answering
Hegel’s dialectic, Deleuze was very much aware that any move against Hegel would
feed into the form of the dialectic as a negation, and as Judith Butler has observed,
would merely prove Hegelian thinking (Hardt, 1993). According to Michael Hardt,
“From this perspective, opposition itself is essentially dialectical, and hence
‘opposition to the dialectic itself’ can only mean a reinforcement or repetition of the
dialectic” (p. 52). Instead of posturing his response as an attack or a negation of
Hegel that produces continuity with the target, Deleuze made two powerful
responses (p. 53). First, he insisted “that the history of philosophy contains real
discontinuities,” as exemplified by the Hegel-Nietzsche relationship, since “the
Nietzschean attack on the master-slave relation” is “carried out on planes
completely removed from Hegel’s discourse” (p. 53). Second, and more in line with a
Thoreauvian plaint, Deleuze proposed that we should “move away from the
dialectic, to forget the dialectic” (p. 53). Deleuze put that dictum into practice in his
later writings, in which Hegelian thinking is so refreshingly absent that there is not
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even an echo of Deleuze’s disposal of Hegel.37 In this sense, Thoreau and Deleuze
share an affinity; Thoreau’s utopia forgets capitalism, and Deleuze’s utopia forgets
Hegel.
While I sympathize with Muñoz’s project in Cruising Utopia, I would submit
that his hasty dismissal of process philosophy came from his embrace of Hegelian
thinking. I see two kinds of indicators of Muñoz’s hastiness. The first indicator is
Muñoz’s preference to categorize effective counterpublics as oppositional. The
second indicator is Muñoz’s admission that his rhetoric is polemical.
The first indicator of Muñoz’s hasty dismissal of process philosophy is an
assumption that effective counterpublics are automatically oppositional. This can be
demonstrated by examining an example from Cruising Utopia in which he indulged
in what I would characterize as ‘queer time,’ or what Muñoz, citing Bloch, referred to
as the “no-longer-conscious” (2009, p. 12). This kind of time differs from Muñoz’s
“straight time” (p. 22). This example involved Muñoz’s friend, Kevin Aviance, a
professional performer who was dancing in a gay dance club:
There is not much room for steps, and Aviance does not need them. This
particular dance is about his hands. His hands move in jerky mechanical
spasms. They frame his face and his outfit. He dances to the house music that
the DJ is playing especially for him. He is elevated from the dance floor but
also surrounded by dancers who are now dancing with him. He is both
onstage and one of the throng, one with the music. It makes sense that he is
elevated. He is there not because he is simply a better dancer than the other
clubgoers around him (he is) but because he is the bridge between quotidian
nightlife dancing and theatrical performance. (2009, p. 77)
In this quotation, which I have carefully extracted from its context, there is no
critique, no rebuke of heteronormative “straight time.” Instead, Muñoz and his
queer readers enjoy a utopian moment that actually existed in the present and
continues to contract, in which Aviance reveled in an ecstasy that shares similarities
with the bliss that Thoreau must have also felt leisurely sitting in his doorway. In the
next sentence, however, Muñoz returns to Hegelian negation, stipulating that
Aviance himself “defies the codes of masculinity that saturate the dance floor” (p.
77). I see no evidence to suggest that Aviance’s purpose was defiance, although he
did connote “gender ostracism” (p. 74). The agency of his dance was simple: “He
performs the powerful interface between femininity and masculinity that is active in
any gender, especially queer ones” (p. 79). Personally, I think that Aviance would
have found just as much “self-making” (p. 75) in his dance if he were performing
above a crowd that did not espouse such codes. Nevertheless, I must admit that it is
possible that Aviance was dancing out of defiance. My point is not to debate about
Aviance’s motives, and not to suggest that counterpublics never operate effectively
with opposition as their framework. Some counterpublics and dances oppose.
Nevertheless, I insist that, following Thoreau, a non-oppositional counterpublic,
As Brian Massumi wrote in his translator’s forward to A Thousand Plateaus,
“Hegel is absent, being too despicable to merit even a mutant offspring” (Deleuze &
Guattari, 1987, p. x).
37
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especially one that shifts the labor burden of opposition onto the State, can be
devastatingly effective.
The second kind of indicator of Muñoz’s hasty dismissal of process
philosophy is the presence of polemical form in his text. Muñoz makes it clear that
not only did he view Edelman’s No Future as a polemic, but he also viewed his own
response to Edelman as a polemic (p. 22). In light of Erin Rand’s (2008) claim about
the polemic as a queer rhetorical form, I would submit that Muñoz’s polemic is
ample evidence of a certain irony in his pronouncements that queerness is not yet
here, since the practice of polemical rhetoric is an embodiment of queerness
wherever it happens. Unfortunately, Muñoz’s canonization of Hegelian thinking
blinded him from these alternatives to negation.
Before I conclude this dissertation, I want to “brag,” following Thoreau
(1985, p. 361, p. 389), on behalf of queers, that utopia actually exists now, even
though queers like Muñoz and myself have experienced and will continue to endure
enormous suffering. Thoreau wrote that his bragging was the kind of cocksure
confidence that a rooster exudes when filled with the certainty that it is daytime.
Thoreau was so sure that taking responsibility for one’s desires would be fulfilling
that he did not find it necessary to interfere with the machinations of the expedient
State (Thoreau, 1849). As he wrote in “Resistance to Civil Government”,
It is not a man's duty, as a matter of course, to devote himself to the
eradication of any, even the most enormous, wrong; he may still properly
have other concerns to engage him; but it is his duty, at least, to wash his
hands of it, and, if he gives it no thought longer, not to give it practically his
support. (p. 195)
Those “other concerns to engage him” are the exercise of desire and conscience,
which are far more important than always trying to fix other people’s unwillingness
to do the same. To do otherwise would be to buy into the rubric of heteronomy that
causes melancholia, which produces its own solution. In this sense, I am served with
the question of how to address Muñoz’s complaint against capitalism’s suppression
of queers of color. In Thoreauvian fashion, I respond as Thoreau responded to the
illusive surveyor and self-sounder, that I am thankful that Muñoz complained, for he
protested in his own way, as I protest in mine. In addition, as Thoreau explained in
Walden, railroad ties have another name: sleepers. The sleepers are the planks that
secure the smooth functioning of the railways. Without the sleepers, there would be
no commerce, no capitalism. We who want this are the sleepers, and “I am glad to
know that it takes a gang of men for every five miles to keep the sleepers down and
level in their beds as it is, for this is a sign that they may sometime get up again”
(1985, p. 396). I am thankful that Muñoz complained, for he gives me my own plaint,
that this awfulness that is “straight time” will unravel itself as it jostles more
sleepers out of their beds and into the waking world.
Coda?
Because this dissertation seeks to expand discussion rather than to close it,
this final coda is deliberately incomplete, departing from its conventional meaning.
Therefore, the way that I wish to bring this dissertation to a close and continue to
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maintain a space for discussion about the topics of Thoreau’s melancholia, Walden’s
friendship, and queer agency is through a return to the situation that started this
discussion. Mark Jiminez and Beau Chandler’s sit-in at the Dallas county clerk’s
office in 2012 contains the necessary ingredients that validate the arguments that
have been made in this dissertation, but it does so in a way that also raises another
question that must be answered by the reader. How does one decide which desires
to exercise? In other words, since Jiminez and Chandler’s desires involved changes
in priority caused by events in the real world, it is important to recognize that
Thoreau’s compassion for the natural environment is an important lesson that must
be appreciated whenever the legitimacy of desire is made salient and questioned.
Escaping from the matrix of opposition is difficult because it then turns the search
for the limits of one’s knowledge into a critique of oneself rather than a critique of
others. This can be a difficult task for people who are in relatively comfortable
circumstances. However, Thoreau promised an unexpected degree of satisfaction of
a life taken to its limits, and all it requires is the constant fronting of oneself.
A coda brings closure via additional structure (coda, n.d.), and the
expectation of closure at this juncture created by the codas in each of the preceding
chapters must be acknowledged and allowed to fail. It is my hope that this project is
able to sustain discussion about melancholia and desire in ways that are
serendipitous and not merely representative of my arguments. So, if responses to
this project reveal failures, and if the corrections bring improvement, then my
argument will have been a success.
Jiminez and Chandler’s sit-in is more relevant to my project than a simple
effort to contrast Walden and “Resistance to Civil Government.” In my opening
chapter, I used Jiminez and Chandler’s encounter with Texas law to show an
expression of desire, even though the motivations for that clash that emerged must
be placed within the context of LGBTQ activism. The impression that I created in my
presentation suggested that the only inherent bar to their quest to get marriage
recognition was the law. One would think that as soon as the Obergefell v. Hodges
decision in 2015 vacated the Texas ban on gay marriage, the two men would be
expeditiously on their way to a traditional marriage ceremony. That was not the
case. In reality, Jiminez and Chandler chose to postpone their ceremony due to the
illness and death of Chandler’s mother (Taffet, 2017). David Taffet reported, “As
they worked their way through the grieving process, they decided to set a new date
and picked April 20, 2017, their five-year anniversary. Then the November election
happened and they decided to push the date up” due to fears that new judges and
laws would interfere with their plans (para. 13). We all know how common
situational exigencies can be and how deftly they can interfere with our desires;
Jiminez and Chandler’s situation, which led from a choice to delay and mourn to a
choice to sacrifice an anniversary wedding, was no different. Our lives are set with
multiple desires and obstacles, and it is the challenge of life to choose which ones to
prioritize—the task of planning their achievement that never ends.
Walden is replete with this complex network of competing desires. Set in an
environment that Thoreau chose to give the appearance of isolation and rugged
individualism (Golemba, 1990), it is easy to fall into the illusion that Thoreau was a
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paragon of simplicity and easy choices. That was not the case. Thoreau was busy at
Walden Pond and often made himself unavailable to visitors. It is thus
understandable that he produced a textual world in which he was beset with
attractive sources of introjection. He did this in many different and subtle ways,
such as with birds that approved of his simple lifestyle, or during his time boating
on the pond and playing a game of chase with a laughing loon, or his being kept
awake by moaning melancholic owls, or his address to a friend with whom he
enjoyed his longest friendship, Walden Pond. By describing each of these encounters
as occasions for identification, he was giving us opportunities to legitimate nonhuman and non-organic subjects for the mutual appropriation of virtue. These
sources of friendship were so abundant a mile from the nearest human neighbor
that one has to consider just how much more complex that network of friends was
when Thoreau lived with his family or with the Emerson family, hence Thoreau’s
advice to seek simplicity.
This dissertation therefore appears to be creating a curious paradox. This
paradox results from the cultivation of a friendship with the reader, which is also
jeopardized. That friendship is at risk because I brought up the possibility that you
are responsible for sustaining the oppositional logic of Hegel. I also agreed with
Thoreau’s claim that each person should exercise their desires, even if that means
choosing a path that attacks a federal armory. This is a reality for all activists who
desire to clash with others and Right Great Wrongs. If this kind of person
experiences gratification from the agon, then it is a curious admonishment to
Thoreau’s logic to graduate beyond complaint. Does this person have less love as a
result? An answer to this paradox has been a guide to my writing of this
dissertation, which has had to front other sources with which I disagree. Certainly
there are sources cited in this dissertation that contain arguments about Thoreau,
melancholia, and gender that I would consider to be incorrect, and I have been
tempted to hold these sources accountable for their wrong conclusions. In nearly all
of these situations, I found that the result is a distraction, and when I amended my
manuscript to set those corrections aside, I found satisfaction in the enhanced
directness of my desire to articulate the mythic quest for the restoration of desire.
Nevertheless, there have been a number of occasions where correction was
unavoidable. In those situations where I felt forced to write a rebuke, I found myself
realizing that my correction did not involve a truth that “turns to rebuke falsehood,”
since the correction did not involve a turn (Thoreau, 1840, p. 118).
There is a kind of confrontation that never requires an assessment of
whether the rebuke requires a turn, and Thoreau’s friendship provided him with a
way. In the first version of Walden, Thoreau argued,
If you stand right fronting and face to face to a fact, you will see the sun
glimmer on both its surfaces, as if it were a cimeter, and feel its sweet edge
dividing you through the heart and marrow, and so you will happily conclude
your mortal career. (Schacht, n.d., Ch. 2, para. 22b)
This confrontation with the failings of one’s facts occurs when we “settle ourselves,
and work and wedge our feet downward through the mud and slush of . . . that
alluvion which covers the globe” (Schacht, n.d., Ch. 2, para. 22a). That alluvion (the
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agency of creating river islands, see alluvion, n.d.) that Thoreau cared most to cleave
was you, your heart and marrow. However, this confrontation was sedentary, and
required a wedging downward that was still ignorant of how the site of that sweet
edge can be found. Later, when Thoreau experienced ego death from ether and
sauntering, he found that blade, which only reveals itself on the occasion of that
“grand surprise on a sudden revelation of the insufficiency of all that we called
Knowledge before” (Thoreau, 1862, p. 671). This happy death cannot be found with
a compass and it cannot be produced with intention. Rather, it must be encountered
with friendship with nature, and it must occur as an effect of the process of the front.
This is a case in which the complainer “must be both plaintiff and defendant too”
(Thoreau, 1840, p. 118). Our friendships, like Pascal’s vases, involve the fusion of
containers, and when a friendship exists, the need to confront falsity in one’s self
thus applies to friendship and brings us to see both sides of the cutting fact. What
does that mean to you?
The queerness of polemics proves that the way to these confrontations
requires that the way to it needs to be challenged. Thoreau understood that the rock
foundation was a limit to be requested from nature’s friendship but never to be
achieved. When Thoreau claimed that “man’s capacities have never been measured;
nor are we to judge of what he can do by any precedents” (1985, p. 330), he was
appropriating Spinoza’s virtue (see Spinoza, 1994, pp. 155-156 as discussed by May,
2009, p. 206). When he created the Walden polemic, he induced some of his friends
to confront him. A polemic is the site of that confrontation with falsity, and it is thus
up to the audience to determine whether friendship will be retained. It is this
dependency on friendship that makes polemics ethical. It is this dependency on
confrontation that makes polemics pragmatic. It is this dependency on the audience
that makes polemics rhetorical.
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